


**ONLINE APPENDIX FOR “*Gender Differences in Alternating-Offer Bargaining: An Experimental Study*” BY
HERNANDEZ-ARENANZ, I. AND IRIBERRI, N.**

A APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE A1– GENDER NATURE OF THE REAL EFFORT TASK




Notes: Histogram for perceived gender nature of the task by gender.

FIGURE A2– GENDER NATURE OF THE BARGAINING




Notes: Histogram for perceived gender nature of bargaining by gender.

FIGURE A3– HISTOGRAM OF RESPONDER’S PIE SHARE BY TREATMENTS



Notes: Histogram for Responder's Pie Share by treatment.

FIGURE A4– DEADLINE EFFECT



Notes: Distribution of the last proposals (offer or demand) over time in seconds. *Total* refers to the total number of pairings that made their last proposal in a given time window. An *Agreement* refers to the number of pairings that made their last proposal in a given time window and are accepted.

TABLE A1– DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Women (N=284) (1)	Men (N=278) (2)	<i>p</i> -value (3)
Self-Assessed Rank (Task)	2.26 (0.93)	2.09 (0.92)	0.0234
Real Rank (Task)	2.44 (1.11)	2.40 (1.11)	0.6904
Real–Self-Assessed Rank (Task)	0.17 (1.02)	0.31 (0.86)	0.0782
Self-Assessed Rank (Bargaining)	2.64 (0.88)	2.43 (0.93)	0.0063
Real Rank (Bargaining)	2.53 (1.11)	2.49 (1.13)	0.6537
Real–Self-Assessed Rank (Bargaining)	-0.11 (0.96)	0.06 (0.99)	0.0432
Risk Preferences	3.34 (1.74)	4.17 (2.07)	0.0000
SVO angle	20.06 (12.77)	20.88 (14.88)	0.4857

Notes: Mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for individual control variables by gender. *Self-Assessment (Task)* refers to the self-reported rank in the real effort task and takes values 1 (top quartile) to 4 (bottom quartile). *Real Rank (Task)* refers to the real rank in the real effort task and takes values 1 (top quartile) to 4 (bottom quartile). *Real–Self-Assessed Rank (Task)* refers to the difference between the real and the self-assessed rank in the real effort task. *Self-Assessment (Bargaining)* refers to the self-reported rank in bargaining and takes values 1 (top quartile) to 4 (bottom quartile). *Real Rank (Bargaining)* refers to the real rank in bargaining and takes values 1 (top quartile) to 4 (bottom quartile). *Real–Self-Assessed Rank (Bargaining)* refers to the difference between the real and the self-assessed rank in bargaining. *Risk Preferences* takes values 1-8, with lowest numbers indicating greater risk aversion. *SVO angle* is the SVO angle from ?. Column (3) displays the *p*-value from a two-tailed *t*-test on the equality of means by gender.

TABLE A2– MEAN VALUES OF AMBIGUITY BY TREATMENT AND PIE

	Dist_Mean				Dist_Mode			
	Pie=5	Pie=10	Pie=15	Overall	Pie=5	Pie=10	Pie=15	Overall
Symmetric	0.040	0.049	0.060	0.050	0.030	0.045	0.052	0.042
Empowerment	0.086	0.089	0.110	0.096	0.091	0.117	0.119	0.108
Empowerment with past agreements	0.079	0.068	0.089	0.080	0.072	0.067	0.090	0.078
Entitlement	0.090	0.073	0.065	0.077	0.091	0.078	0.065	0.079
Entitlement with past agreements	0.073	0.057	0.058	0.062	0.070	0.050	0.057	0.058
Information	0.070	0.114	0.100	0.097	0.054	0.150	0.187	0.137
Overall	0.073	0.076	0.082	0.077	0.068	0.086	0.095	0.084

Notes: Mean values for the two ambiguity measures, by treatment and pie: *Dist_Mean* and *Dist_Mode* for successful agreements. *Dist_Mean* is the absolute difference between the responder’s share and the mean value of the responder’s share by treatment and pie. *Dist_Mode* is the absolute difference between the responder’s share and the mode of the responder’s share by treatment and pie.

TABLE A3– EXPECTATIONS AND SEMI-ELASTICITIES

$E(y X)$	$\Phi(X\gamma) [X\beta + \sigma\lambda(X\beta/\sigma)]$	
$P(y > 0 X)$	$\Phi(X\gamma)$	
$E(y X, y > 0)$	$X\beta + \sigma\lambda(X\beta/\sigma)$	
$S_j(y) = \frac{\partial E(y X)/\partial x_j}{E(y X)}$	$\gamma_j\lambda(X\gamma) + \frac{\beta_j\theta(X\beta/\sigma)}{X\beta + \sigma\lambda(X\beta/\sigma)}$	Total Effect
$S_j(P = 1) = \frac{\partial P(y>0 X)/\partial x_j}{P(y>0 X)}$	$\gamma_j\lambda(X\gamma)$	Extensive Margin
$S_j(y > 0) = \frac{\partial E(y X, y>0)/\partial x_j}{E(y X, y>0)}$	$\frac{\beta_j\theta(X\beta/\sigma)}{X\beta + \sigma\lambda(X\beta/\sigma)}$	Intensive Margin

Notes: $\Phi(\cdot)$ denotes the cumulative normal distribution function, $\phi(\cdot)$ its density function, $\lambda(\cdot) = \frac{\phi(\cdot)}{\Phi(\cdot)}$ the inverse Mills ratio, and $\theta(z) = 1 - \lambda(z)[z + \lambda(z)]$. Coefficients from the probit are denoted by γ , and coefficients from the truncated normal regression by β . σ is the standard deviation of the random component ϵ .

TABLE A4– GENDER DIFFERENCES: AGGREGATE RESULTS WITH INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS

	$S_z(P = 1)$ (1)	Proposer's Outcomes		Responder's Outcomes	
		$S_z(y y > 0)$ (2)	$S_z(y)$ (3)	$S_z(y y > 0)$ (4)	$S_z(y)$ (5)
PANEL A: SYMMETRIC					
β_1 : Male Prop	0.0214 (0.0596) [0.982]	0.0175 (0.0285) [0.930]	0.0389 (0.0638) [0.930]	-0.0174 (0.0281) [0.930]	0.00401 (0.0680) [0.998]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0388 (0.0409) [0.862]	-0.00986 (0.0311) [0.984]	-0.0486 (0.0564) [0.901]	0.00977 (0.0308) [0.984]	-0.0290 (0.0456) [0.930]
Observations	400	400	400	400	400
Clusters	80	80	80	80	80
PANEL B: ASYMMETRIC					
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0425 (0.0274) [0.355]	0.0396 (0.0255) [0.355]	-0.00288 (0.0337) [0.998]	-0.0749 (0.0477) [0.355]	-0.117** (0.0594) [0.107]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.103***, ^a (0.0317) [0.003]	-0.0337 (0.0237) [0.417]	-0.137***, ^a (0.0437) [0.003]	0.0628 (0.0441) [0.417]	-0.0402 (0.0478) [0.901]
Observations	1,072	1,072	1,072	1,072	1,072
# Clusters	242	242	242	242	242
PANEL C: ASYMMETRIC + PAST AGREEMENTS					
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0234 (0.0338) [0.917]	0.0220 (0.0170) [0.549]	-0.00137 (0.0344) [0.998]	-0.0529 (0.0393) [0.549]	-0.0763 (0.0570) [0.503]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0520 (0.0348) [0.373]	-0.0379**, ^b (0.0148) [0.017]	-0.0899**, ^c (0.0418) [0.065]	0.0873**,^b (0.0344) [0.017]	0.0353 (0.0406) [0.901]
Observations	1,015	1,015	1,015	1,015	1,015
# Clusters	240	240	240	240	240

Notes: Cragg's hurdle model for the pie share captured by the proposer and by the responder. Semi-elasticities are reported. $S_z(P = 1)$ in column (1) refers to the effect of gender in the probability of reaching a deal. $S_z(y|y > 0)$ in columns (2) and (4) refers, for the proposer and the responder outcomes respectively, to the effect of gender in the share captured conditional on reaching a deal. $S_z(y)$ in columns (3) and (5) refers, for the proposer and the responder outcomes respectively, to the effect of gender in the overall share captured (including fail negotiations) such that $S_z(y) = S_z(P = 1) + S_z(y|y > 0)$. All regressions control for each bargaining environment, *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects as well as individual controls. Individual level controls include subjects' risk and social preferences and their self-assessed ability levels in the real effort task and in bargaining ability, separately for *Proposers* and *Responders*. All fixed effects and individual controls are interacted with each bargaining environment. Direct effects displayed in **bold**. Standard errors are clustered at subject level using two-way clustering. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values.

TABLE A5– GENDER DIFFERENCES: DISAGGREGATED RESULTS, PROBABILITY OF AGREEMENT AND CONDITIONAL EARNINGS $S_z(P = 1)$ AND $S_z(y|y > 0)$, WITH INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROBABILITY OF REACHING A DEAL ($S_z(P = 1)$)						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.0214 (0.0596) [0.997]	-0.0612 (0.0502) [0.710]	-0.0605 (0.0484) [0.710]	-0.0141 (0.0404) [0.997]	0.00985 (0.0440) [0.997]	-0.0841* (0.0510) [0.458]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0388 (0.0409) [0.867]	-0.128** (0.0591) [0.196]	-0.0791 (0.0578) [0.655]	-0.0951** (0.0446) [0.206]	-0.0882* (0.0464) [0.297]	0.0178 (0.0504) [0.997]
Observations	400	400	262	410	600	415
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL EARNINGS ($S_z(y y > 0)$)						
<i>PANEL B1: PROPOSER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.0175 (0.0285) [0.981]	0.0588* (0.0349) [0.423]	0.0551 (0.0456) [0.710]	0.00719 (0.0440) [0.997]	0.0265 (0.0208) [0.696]	0.00884 (0.0260) [0.997]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.00986 (0.0311) [0.997]	0.0115 (0.0254) [0.996]	-0.0658 (0.0517) [0.696]	-0.0731* (0.0390) [0.312]	-0.0322** (0.0164) [0.255]	-0.0447 (0.0292) [0.545]
Observations	400	400	262	410	600	415
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
<i>PANEL B2: RESPONDER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0174 (0.0281) [0.981]	-0.179* (0.103) [0.423]	-0.0686 (0.0563) [0.710]	-0.00993 (0.0660) [0.997]	-0.0967 (0.0727) [0.696]	-0.0103 (0.0304) [0.997]
β_2 : Male Resp	0.00977 (0.0308) [0.997]	-0.0347 (0.0750) [0.996]	0.0819 (0.0642) [0.696]	0.109* (0.0584) [0.312]	0.111** (0.0564) [0.255]	0.0522 (0.0347) [0.545]
Observations	400	400	262	410	600	415
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120

Notes: Decomposition of the overall effect displayed in Table A6 into the probability of reaching a deal ($S_z(P = 1)$, Panel A) and earnings conditional to reaching a deal ($S_z(y|y > 0)$) for the proposer (Panel B1) and the Responder (Panel B2). Semi-elasticities are reported such that $S_z(y) = S_z(P = 1) + S_z(y|y > 0)$. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects. Individual level controls include subjects' risk and social preferences and their self-assessed ability levels in the real effort task and in bargaining ability, separately for *Proposers* and *Responders*. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values

TABLE A6– GENDER DIFFERENCES: DISAGGREGATED RESULTS, OVERALL EARNINGS $S_z(y)$, WITH INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROPOSER’S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.0389 (0.0638) [0.999]	-0.00243 (0.0486) [1.000]	-0.00545 (0.0658) [1.000]	-0.00688 (0.0598) [1.000]	0.0363 (0.0439) [0.980]	-0.0752 (0.0530) [0.7333]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0486 (0.0564) [0.973]	-0.116* (0.0688) [0.475]	-0.145* (0.0840) [0.463]	-0.168*** ^c (0.0672) [0.092]	-0.120** (0.0536) [0.174]	-0.0268 (0.0638) [1.000]
Observations	400	400	262	410	600	415
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
PANEL B: RESPONDER’S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.00401 (0.0680) [1.000]	-0.240* (0.131) [0.393]	-0.129* (0.0749) [0.463]	-0.0240 (0.0774) [1.000]	-0.0869 (0.0937) [0.962]	-0.0944 (0.0637) [0.685]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0290 (0.0456) [0.999]	-0.162* (0.0857) [0.348]	0.00279 (0.0783) [1.000]	0.0144 (0.0611) [1.000]	0.0228 (0.0615) [1.000]	0.0700 (0.0541) [0.755]
Observations	400	400	262	410	600	415
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120

Notes: Cragg’s truncated hurdle model for the earnings captured by the proposer (Panel A) and by the responder (Panel B) in each bargaining environment. Semi-elasticities are reported. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects as well as individual controls. Individual level controls include subjects’ risk and social preferences and their self-assessed ability levels in the real effort task and in bargaining ability, separately for *Proposers* and *Responders*. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values.

TABLE A7– GENDER DIFFERENCES: DISAGGREGATED RESULTS, PROBABILITY OF AGREEMENT AND CONDITIONAL EARNINGS $S_z(P = 1)$ AND $S_z(y|y > 0)$, ROBUST TO EXPERIMENTER DEMAND EFFECTS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROBABILITY OF REACHING A DEAL ($S_z(P = 1)$)						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.106** (0.0480) [0.101]	-0.0649 (0.0548) [0.743]	-0.0731 (0.0612) [0.743]	-0.00368 (0.0377) [0.999]	0.0126 (0.0409) [0.999]	-0.00483 (0.0434) [0.999]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0825* (0.0464) [0.298]	-0.135** (0.0665) [0.154]	-0.0309 (0.0652) [0.999]	-0.0912***,b (0.0342) [0.037]	-0.0472 (0.0467) [0.820]	-0.0196 (0.0451) [0.999]
Observations	324	342	201	345	562	363
Clusters	72	74	69	75	116	113
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL EARNINGS ($S_z(y y > 0)$)						
<i>PANEL B1: PROPOSER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.0138 (0.0342) [0.999]	0.0615* (0.0321) [0.211]	0.0696 (0.0474) [0.515]	0.0165 (0.0446) [0.999]	0.0301 (0.0215) [0.566]	-0.00694 (0.0270) [0.999]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0540 (0.0371) [0.520]	0.00353 (0.0232) [0.999]	-0.0790 (0.0496) [0.411]	-0.0886***,b (0.0317) [0.033]	-0.0312** (0.0155) [0.158]	-0.0450* (0.0267) [0.330]
Observations	324	342	201	345	562	363
Clusters	72	74	69	75	116	113
<i>PANEL B2: RESPONDER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0138 (0.0341) [0.999]	-0.199* (0.106) [0.211]	-0.0846 (0.0579) [0.515]	-0.0246 (0.0655) [0.999]	-0.105 (0.0764) [0.566]	0.00808 (0.0314) [0.999]
β_2 : Male Resp	0.0540 (0.0355) [0.520]	-0.0110 (0.0760) [0.999]	0.0959 (0.0583) [0.411]	0.131***,b (0.0447) [0.033]	0.108** (0.0531) [0.158]	0.0524 (0.0319) [0.330]
Observations	324	342	201	345	562	363
Clusters	72	74	69	75	116	113

Notes: Decomposition of the overall effect displayed in Table A8 into the probability of reaching a deal ($S_z(P = 1)$, Panel A) and earnings conditional to reaching a deal ($S_z(y|y > 0)$ for the proposer (Panel B1) and the Responder (Panel B2). The sample includes only the 2,137 negotiations in which no subject mentions gender as an objective of the experiment. Semi-elasticities are reported such that $S_z(y) = S_z(P = 1) + S_z(y|y > 0)$. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values

TABLE A8– GENDER DIFFERENCES: DISAGGREGATED RESULTS, OVERALL EARNINGS $S_z(y)$, ROBUST TO EXPERIMENTER DEMAND EFFECTS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROPOSER'S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0922* (0.0520) [0.344]	-0.00335 (0.0588) [1.000]	-0.00348 (0.0782) [1.000]	0.0128 (0.0598) [0.999]	0.0427 (0.0427) [0.909]	-0.0118 (0.0436) [0.999]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.137** (0.0659) [0.149]	-0.132* (0.0752) [0.354]	-0.110 (0.0805) [0.658]	-0.180***, ^a (0.0410) [0.001]	-0.0785 (0.0548) [0.638]	-0.0646 (0.0532) [0.788]
Observations	324	342	201	345	562	363
Clusters	72	74	69	75	116	113

PANEL B: RESPONDER'S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.120* (0.0650) [0.292]	-0.264** (0.127) [0.146]	-0.158* (0.0834) [0.259]	-0.0283 (0.0740) [0.999]	-0.0924 (0.0927) [0.909]	0.00325 (0.0609) [1.000]
β_2 : Male Res	-0.0285 (0.0515) [0.996]	-0.146* (0.0890) [0.439]	0.0650 (0.0894) [0.985]	0.0396 (0.0613) [0.995]	0.0605 (0.0549) [0.863]	0.0328 (0.0544) [0.995]
Observations	324	342	201	345	562	363
Clusters	72	74	69	75	116	113

Notes: Cragg's truncated hurdle model for the earnings captured by the proposer (Panel A) and by the responder (Panel B) in each bargaining environment. Semi-elasticities are reported. The sample includes only the 2,137 negotiations in which no subject mentions gender as an objective of the experiment. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values

TABLE A9– EFFECTS OF ULTIMATUMS IN PROPOSER'S AND RESPONDER'S PIE SHARE

	Proposer's Outcomes			Responder's Outcomes		
	$S_j(y)$ (1)	$S_j(P = 1)$ (2)	$S_j(y > 0)$ (3)	$S_j(y)$ (4)	$S_j(P = 1)$ (5)	$S_j(y > 0)$ (6)
Ultimatum	-0.531*** (0.0485)	-0.495*** (0.0434)	-0.0360** (0.0175)	-0.431*** (0.0509)	-0.495*** (0.0434)	0.0642** (0.0315)
Offer	0.0324 (0.0513)	0.0218 (0.0479)	0.0106 (0.0138)	0.00254 (0.0516)	0.0218 (0.0479)	-0.0193 (0.0253)
Ultimatum*Offer	0.150*** (0.0538)	0.0343 (0.0491)	0.116*** (0.0197)	-0.180*** (0.0592)	0.0343 (0.0491)	-0.215*** (0.0358)
Observations	2,487	2,487	2,487	2,487	2,487	2,487
# Clusters	562	562	562	562	562	562

Notes: *Offer* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the proposal is coming from the *Proposer* and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for each of the bargaining environments, *Pie Size*, *Period* and *Session* fixed effects. All fixed effects are interacted with each of the bargaining environments. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level using two-way clustering. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE A10– PROBABILITY OF REACHING AN ULTIMATUM

Panel A: Gender Differences in the Likelihood of Reaching an *Ultimatum*

	Overall (1)	Symmetric (2)	Empowerment (3)	Entitlement (4)	Information (5)	Empowerment Past Agree. (6)	Entitlement Past Agree. (7)
β_1 : Male Prop	0.215** (0.0912)	0.170 (0.170)	0.812*** (0.214)	0.161 (0.185)	0.194 (0.177)	0.400** (0.181)	0.0854 (0.140)
β_2 : Male Resp	0.344*** (0.103)	0.209 (0.195)	0.545** (0.251)	0.375 (0.249)	0.515*** (0.186)	0.554** (0.218)	0.246* (0.140)
Observations	2,487	400	400	262	410	600	415
# Clusters	562	80	80	80	82	120	120

Panel B: Gender Differences in the Likelihood of Closing an *Ultimatum* Agreement

	Overall (1)	Symmetric (2)	Empowerment (3)	Entitlement (4)	Information (5)	Empowerment Past Agree. (6)	Entitlement Past Agree. (7)
β_1 : Male Prop	0.314** (0.126)	0.135 (0.212)	1.124*** (0.287)	0.116 (0.289)	0.380* (0.218)	0.765*** (0.256)	0.0617 (0.199)
β_2 : Male Resp	0.371*** (0.137)	0.176 (0.296)	0.553** (0.270)	0.376 (0.303)	0.531** (0.242)	0.631** (0.285)	0.306* (0.168)
Observations	2,116	343	339	229	352	505	348
# Clusters	562	80	80	80	82	120	120

Notes: Probit for the probability of reaching the last the last 10 seconds without a deal (Panel A) and for closing a deal in the last 10 seconds (Panel B). Semi-elasticities are displayed. All regressions control for *Pie Size* and include *Period* and *Session* fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level using two-way clustering. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A11– GENDER DIFFERENCES: DISAGGREGATED RESULTS, PROBABILITY OF AGREEMENT AND CONDITIONAL EARNINGS $S_z(P = 1)$ AND $S_z(y|y > 0)$, IN NON-ULTIMATUM AGREEMENTS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROBABILITY OF REACHING A DEAL ($S_z(P = 1)$)						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0444 (0.0571) [0.878]	-0.140** (0.0709) [0.193]	-0.0577 (0.0597) [0.878]	-0.00649 (0.0586) [0.991]	-0.0340 (0.0553) [0.890]	-0.0615 (0.0727) [0.878]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0612 (0.0590) [0.873]	-0.191*** ^c (0.0808) [0.064]	-0.0908 (0.0825) [0.865]	-0.205*** ^b (0.0795) [0.040]	-0.117* (0.0625) [0.237]	-0.0654 (0.0661) [0.875]
Observations	325	323	196	297	492	289
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL EARNINGS ($S_z(y y > 0)$)						
<i>PANEL B1: PROPOSER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	0.00502 (0.0317) [0.991]	0.0719* (0.0392) [0.268]	0.0899* (0.0469) [0.208]	0.0344 (0.0562) [0.890]	0.0264 (0.0219) [0.785]	-0.0229 (0.0329) [0.879]
β_2 : Male Resp	-0.0434 (0.0367) [0.808]	-0.00264 (0.0306) [0.991]	-0.0555 (0.0395) [0.625]	-0.0899*** ^c (0.0376) [0.060]	-0.0414*** ^b (0.0166) [0.049]	-0.0433 (0.0319) [0.648]
Observations	325	323	196	297	492	289
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
<i>PANEL B2: RESPONDER</i>						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.00497 (0.0314) [0.991]	-0.198* (0.110) [0.268]	-0.110* (0.0584) [0.208]	-0.0524 (0.0856) [0.890]	-0.0886 (0.0741) [0.785]	0.0262 (0.0374) [0.879]
β_2 : Male Resp	0.0429 (0.0361) [0.808]	0.00814 (0.0839) [0.991]	0.0681 (0.0481) [0.625]	0.138*** ^c (0.0551) [0.060]	0.137*** ^b (0.0540) [0.049]	0.0495 (0.0372) [0.648]
Observations	325	323	196	297	492	289
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120

Notes: Decomposition of the overall effect displayed in Table A12 into the probability of reaching a deal ($S_z(P = 1)$, Panel A) and earnings conditional to reaching a deal ($S_z(y|y > 0)$ for the proposer (Panel B1) and the Responder (Panel B2). The sample excludes from the analysis those negotiations closed within the last 10 seconds. Semi-elasticities are reported such that $S_z(y) = S_z(P = 1) + S_z(y|y > 0)$. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected *p*-values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard *p*-values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected *p*-values.

TABLE A12– $S_z(y)$: OVERALL EARNINGS IN NON-ULTIMATUM AGREEMENTS

	Symm. (1)	Asymmetric			Asymmetric + Past Agreements	
		Emp. (2)	Ent. (3)	Info. (4)	Emp. (5)	Ent. (6)
PANEL A: PROPOSER'S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0394 (0.0672) [0.996]	-0.0682 (0.0725) [0.969]	0.0323 (0.0696) [0.999]	0.0279 (0.0788) [1.000]	-0.00766 (0.0545) [1.000]	-0.0844 (0.0766) [0.913]
β_2 : Male Res	-0.105 (0.0760) [0.717]	-0.194** (0.0943) [0.183]	-0.146 (0.101) [0.662]	-0.295***, ^a (0.0914) [0.004]	-0.159**, ^c (0.0699) [0.086]	-0.109 (0.0743) [0.658]
Observations	325	323	196	297	492	289
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120
PANEL B: RESPONDER'S OVERALL EARNINGS						
β_1 : Male Prop	-0.0494 (0.0633) [0.992]	-0.338**, ^c (0.145) [0.075]	-0.168* (0.0902) [0.285]	-0.0589 (0.107) [0.997]	-0.123 (0.103) [0.865]	-0.0353 (0.0851) [0.999]
β_2 : Male Res	-0.0183 (0.0620) [1.000]	-0.183* (0.0978) [0.280]	-0.0227 (0.0831) [1.000]	-0.0675 (0.0889) [0.994]	0.0195 (0.0673) [1.000]	-0.0159 (0.0744) [1.000]
Observations	325	323	196	297	492	289
Clusters	80	80	80	82	120	120

Notes: Cragg's truncated hurdle model for the earnings captured by the proposer (Panel A) and by the responder (Panel B) in each bargaining environment. Semi-elasticities are reported. The sample excludes from the analysis those negotiations closed within the last 10 seconds. All regressions control for *Pie Size*, *Period*, and *Session* fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at subject level using two-way clustering in parentheses. Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values in brackets with 1,000 bootstrap replication. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$ for standard p -values. ^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$ for Romano-Wolf multiple hypothesis corrected p -values

B APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS

B.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE EXPERIMENT!

We are going to start the experiment. From now on it is not allowed to talk, to look at what other participants are doing or to walk around. Please, switch off your mobile phone. If you have any question or you need help, raise your hand and one of the researchers will assist you. If you do not follow these instructions YOU WILL BE ASKED TO LEAVE THE EXPERIMENT AND YOU WILL NOT GET ANY PAYMENT. Thank you.

The University of the Basque Country has provided the funds for this experiment. The quantity you can earn depends on your decisions, the decisions of other participants as well as on luck.

Experimental stages and tasks: The experiment consists of 3 stages:

In the first stage, you will see matrices with “0”s and “1”s during 5 minutes. Your task consist in counting the number of “1”s in each matrix. The number of correct answers that you provide will determine your productivity which will be relevant for the next part of the experiment.

In the second stage of the experiment, the computer will randomly match you with another partner and your task will consist of dividing an amount of money through a bargaining. This quantity depends on your productivity and the productivity of the participant you are matched with. You will have 3 minutes for each negotiation. There will be 10 bargaining rounds in which you will be matched with a different participant each time.

In the third stage you will be presented with three short tasks in which you can earn more money.

Earnings:

You have 3 euro for sure. In addition, in the second stage of the experiment, once the experiment had concluded, the computer will choose two bargaining rounds randomly and you will be paid the amount you had earned in each of those. Finally, in the third stage you can earn extra money for each of the three short tasks. Therefore, at the end of the experiment your final earnings will be the sum of the 3 euro you get for participating, plus your earnings in the two bargaining rounds randomly selected, plus your earnings in each of the short tasks from stage 3. Your earnings will be paid in cash privately at the end of the experiment.

We will now start with the experiment. At the beginning of each stage, we will include detailed information about the task, the decisions as well as about earning.

B.2 REAL EFFORT TASK

In the stage, you will see matrices with “0”s and “1”s, similar to the ones displayed below, during 5 minutes.

Your task consists of counting the number of “1”s in each matrix. The size of the matrices will vary. Once you introduce an answer for one matrix and press the bottom “OK”, the next matrix will appear. All participants will see the same matrices in the same order. There is a maximum of 60 matrices.

Example 1: 8x8 Matrix, Solution = 30

1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1

Example 2: 6x6 Matrix, Solution = 16

1	0	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	0	0
1	0	0	1	0	0
1	1	0	0	1	1
1	1	1	1	0	0

The number of correct answers that you provide will determine your productivity. The higher your productivity the higher will be, on average, the amount of money you will have to divide in the next stage.

B.3 BARGAINING STAGE: SYMMETRIC

In this stage you will be matched randomly with another participant and your task consists of dividing an amount of money through a bargaining. This amount can be €5, €10 or €15.

HOW IS COMPUTED THE AMOUNT OF MONEY TO BE DIVIDED?

It will proceed in the following way:

1. The number of correct answers in the first stage will determine the productivity of each participant in the following way:
 - Bottom third: Those participants with the lowest number of correct answers will have a productivity of €5
 - Intermediate third: Those participants with an intermediate number of correct answers will have a productivity of €10
 - Top third: Those participants with the highest number of correct answers will have a productivity of €15
2. In each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant and the amount to be divided will be:
 - YOUR PRODUCTIVITY with a 50% chance
 - THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE PARTICIPANT YOU ARE MATCHED WITH with a 50% chance

For example, if your productivity is €5 and the productivity of the other participant is €15, the amount to be divided will be €5 with a 50% chance and €15 with a 50% chance. Finally, if you and the participant with whom you are matched have the same productivity of 5, 10, or 15 euro, then the amount to be divided will be 5, 10 and 15 euro respectively.

WHAT DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN DURING A BARGAINING?

Before starting, for each couple, you will be told whether you are participant A or participant B. During the negotiation you will have to decide HOW MUCH MONEY WILL GET PARTICIPANT B, such that if you are participant A you will make offers to participant B and if you are the participant B you will make demands from participant A.

The negotiation works in the following way:

- Participant A will start the negotiation with a first offer, deciding how much money participant A wants to offer to participant B.
- Participant B can accept or reject that offer. If the offer is accepted, participant B will get the amount offered and participant A will get the pie to be divided minus the amount offered to participant B.
- If the offer is rejected, the bargaining continues and it will be the turn of participant B to make a demand from participant A, deciding how much money participant B wants to get.
- Participant A can accept or reject that demand. If the demand is accepted, participant B will get the amount demanded and participant A will get the pie to be divided minus the amount demanded by participant B.
- If the demand is rejected, the bargaining continues and it will be the turn of participant A to make a new offer to participant B. And so on and so forth.

Offers and demands have to be multiples of €0.1 (10 cents). You will have a total of 3 minutes to reach a deal. If during this time you do not reach a deal, both participants will get €0.

There will be 10 different bargaining rounds where you will be matched with a different participant each time. During each negotiation you will be informed about the amount of money you have to divide, if you are participant A or participant B, of the remaining time left for the 3 minutes, as well as on the complete bargaining record: offers made by A, demands made by B and whether they have been accepted or rejected.

For payment, at the end of the experiment, the computer will choose two bargaining rounds randomly, one between rounds 1 and 5 and another between rounds 6 and 10, and you will be paid according to the

deal you have reached in those negotiation rounds or €0 in case that you did not reach a deal.

B.4 BARGAINING STAGE: EMPOWERMENT

[...] If during this time you do not reach a deal,

participant A will get an amount of money for sure, while participant B will get €0. The amount of money that participant A gets, is a randomly chosen amount between 50% and 85% of the amount to be divided.

That is, in case in which you do not reach a deal within the 3 minutes, participant A will get:

- Between €2.5 and €4.25 if the amount to be divided is €5
- Between €5 and €8.5 if the amount to be divided is €10
- Between €7.5 and €12.75 if the amount to be divided is €15

The exact amount will be randomly chosen by the computer once the negotiation had finished.

[...] At the end of the experiment, the computer will choose two bargaining round randomly, one between rounds 1 and 5 and another between rounds 6 and 10, and you will be paid according to the deal you have reached in those negotiation rounds or

a positive amount if you are participant A and €0 if you are participant B in case that you did not reach a deal.

B.5 BARGAINING STAGE: EMPOWERMENT WITH PAST AGREEMENTS

Finally, you will be provided with the information on the most frequent agreed amount for the participant B in the previous sessions.

B.6 BARGAINING STAGE: ENTITLEMENT

[...] as well as on the complete bargaining record: offers made by A, demands made by B and whether they have been accepted or rejected.

In addition, you will know your productivity and the productivity of the participant with whom you are matched, so you could learn whether the amount to divide corresponds to your productivity or to the productivity of the participant with whom you are matched.

B.7 BARGAINING STAGE: ENTITLEMENT WITH PAST AGREEMENTS

Finally, you will be provided with the information on the most frequent agreed amount for the participant B in the previous sessions.

B.8 BARGAINING STAGE: INFORMATION

[...] There will be 10 different bargaining rounds where you will be matched with a different participant each.

During each negotiation only the participant A will observe the amount to be divided while the participant B will only know that this amount can be 5, 10 or 15 euro, but not the exact amount. The participant A cannot accept demands that are higher than the amount of money to be divided.

B.9 ELICITATION TASKS

This stage of the experiment consists of three short tasks with which you can earn extra money. The first one consists of answering four different questions regarding this session. In the second and in the third you will have to choose among different options.

As you will progress in this third stage of the experiment, we will provide you with more detailed instructions about each task.

TASK I:

Next you will be asked 4 questions relative to this session. At the end of the experiment the computer will choose one of them randomly and you will be paid €1 if the answer you have provided is correct according to the data we have gathered during the session and €0 otherwise.

QUESTION 1: If we sort all participants in this session from lowest to highest number of correct answers in stage 1 (counting “1”s), and we divide all subjects in 4 segments of equal size such that the participants with highest scores are in the first segment, the next in the second, the next in the third and the ones with lowest in the fourth segment, in which segment do you think you will be?

Options: 1st segment/2nd segment/3rd segment/4th segment

QUESTION 2: On average, who do you think has performed better in the task from stage 1 (counting “1”s)?

Options: Men/No differences/Women

QUESTION 3: In each negotiation, a participant could get between 0% and 100% of the amount of money to be divided. If we sort all participants in this session from lowest to highest share of money that on average has obtained during the 10 negotiations, and we divide all the subjects in 4 segments of equal size such that the participants who obtained on average the highest share of money are in the first segment, the next in the second, the next in the third and the ones with lowest in the fourth segment, in which segment do you think you will be?

Options: 1st segment/2nd segment/3rd segment/4th segment

QUESTION 4: On average, who do you think has obtained a higher share of the money during the negotiations?

Options: Men/No differences/Women

TASK II:

On the next screen you will be presented with 8 different options, each of which offers two different quantities that you can win by choosing that option. In all the options, each outcome has a probability of 50%, i.e., the result of choosing an option depends exclusively on luck. At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly pick one result from the option you have chosen and you will be paid accordingly.

Below this text you will find the 8 available options. To see in more detail how to read this table, consider option 5. In this option the possible results are €0.7 and €2.7. Both are equally likely, which means that the computer will choose €0.7 as the payment on one of every 2 occasions and €2.7 the other.

You must choose one of the 8 possible options. To that end, an empty box will appear where you must

enter the number of the option (from 1 to 8) that you want to choose.

	Probability 50%	Probability 50%
1	€1.5	€1.5
2	€1.3	€1.8
3	€1.1	€2.1
4	€0.9	€2.4
5	€0.7	€2.7
6	€0.6	€2.8
7	€0.4	€2.9
8	€0	€3

TASK III:

Next, you will be matched randomly with another participant in this room. You will be presented with 6 situations in which you will have to choose one from among 9 options. Each option represents the quantity of money that you can earn from this task as well as the quantity of money that can earn the participant with whom you are matched.

At the end of the task, one participant in the matching will be randomly selected as Decider and the other as Receiver. The computer will randomly select one of the 6 situations and the payment you will get is the following:

- If you are the Decider, you will obtain what you have chosen for yourself in the situation selected by the computer
- If you are the Receiver, you will obtain what the other participant have chosen for you in the situation selected by the computer

The quantities displayed represent cents of euro.