

Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the field*

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May 23, 2018

Abstract

Data from a TV show provide the opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining with sizable stakes. A *proposer* and a *responder*, who is selected by the proposer, bargain over a fixed pie. Proposers are in a stronger bargaining position because they have a positive outside option and information on the size of the pie, while responders have neither. The matching between male proposers and female responders stands as the most favorable for proposers. Women as responders demand less *only* from male proposers, which explains the difference in earnings.

Keywords: Bargaining, gender differences, gender interaction effects, field data.

JEL classification numbers: C72, J16, J31.

*We thank Pedro Rey-Biel, Javier Gardeazabal, Antonio Cabrales, and seminar participants at various universities for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Amaia Echarri and Fernando Videgain for their help. Iñigo Hernandez-Arenaz acknowledges financial support from Vicerrectorado de Investigación de la UPV/EHU (PIF//13/015) and Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco (IT869-13). Nagore Iriberry acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (ECO2015-66027-P MINECO/FEDER), Departamento de Educación and Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco (IT869-13) and Norwegian Research Council (TOPPFORSK 250506).

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1 Introduction

The gender wage gap has long been an important object of study in economics. Although it has shown a decreasing trend over time, classical explanations based on differences in human capital and preferences are not able to fully explain it (Blau and Kahn, 2000 and 2017).

Gender differences in negotiation have been proposed as a complementary explanation for the gender gap. Starting wages and pay increases are often the result of bilateral negotiation. The influential book by Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever, “Women don’t Ask” (2003), reveals important gender differences in the likelihood of negotiating. For example, Babcock et al. (2003) find that among graduates of Carnegie Mellon University, 57% of men negotiated their starting salary, while only 8% of women did so. Moreover, wages are affected by negotiations that come later in one’s career, e.g., for pay increases.¹ In addition to gender differences in negotiating, gender differences might also be important *when* negotiating: if women obtain worse deals when negotiating starting salaries or pay increases, this will clearly go some way toward explaining the gender wage gap (Azmat and Petrongolo, 2014; Card et al. 2015; Blau and Kahn, 2017).

The Spanish TV show “*Negocia como puedes*” (“*Bargain as you can*”) provides a unique opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects when bargaining in a real-life situation with sizable stakes (average pie is 402 Euro). On this show, a contestant who plays the role of the *proposer* is endowed with a sum of money, i.e., the pie, and is asked a question. However, the proposer cannot provide an answer; instead, the proposer has three minutes to find someone in the street, who plays the role of the *responder*, from whom the answer can be purchased via bargaining. If a deal is reached within the three-minute limit and the answer is correct, the responder receives the negotiated price and the proposer keeps the remaining amount. The proposer is in a stronger bargaining position than the responder because only the proposer knows the size of the pie, is the one who chooses potential responders, and can drop a particular responder at any time as long as the proposer can look for another potential

¹More recently, Leibbrandt and List (2014) using a field experiment, and Exley et al. (2017) using a laboratory experiment, find similar gender differences in entering into negotiation. Eriksson and Sandberg (2012) find that women are less likely than men to initiate a negotiation only when the counterpart is a woman.

responder within the three-minute limit. The strong/weak bargaining positions of the proposer/responder are confirmed by the disparity in earnings, as the proposer on average receives 367 Euro and the responder 49 Euro.²

We find that negotiations between male proposers and female responders stand out from negotiations between all other gender combinations: such negotiations are the most favorable for proposers and the least favorable for responders in terms of earnings. In particular, negotiations between male proposers and female responders result in approximately 11 Euro more for the proposer than in any other matching. It is precisely when the strong bargaining position is held by men and the weaker bargaining position is held by women that we find important differences in earnings. To understand this important gender interaction in earnings, we look at gender interaction effects in bargaining behavior. We analyze offers, demands and probabilities of accepting by responders and proposers. We find no evidence for gender differences or gender interaction effects in opening offers. Interestingly, we find that it is women who discriminate between male and female proposers by demanding less from men than from women. That is what explains the main difference in earnings.

One important caveat in our bargaining setting is that proposers choose the responders, in contrast to random matching between proposers and responders, which would allow for an ideal testbed for studying gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining. We therefore perform a series of robustness checks to rule out the possibility that the results are driven by the pure selection of responders based on a set of important observable characteristics.

Many papers have studied gender differences in bargaining (Ayres, 1991, Ayres and Siegelman, 1995, Säve-Söderbergh, 2007, Rigdon, 2012, Castillo et al., 2013, Van Dolder et al., 2015, Andersen et al., 2017, Exley et al., 2016). However, less is known about gender interaction effects in bargaining.³ Given that bargaining requires interaction between two agents, gender differences in one role may crucially depend on the gender of the interlocutor. Existing studies based on field data do not study gender interaction

²On average, the pie is worth 402 Euro. If we restrict the dataset to negotiations that ended up in agreement, the average pie is worth 416 Euro.

³Gender interaction effects in related settings have been studied, such as when performing under competition (Gneezy et al., 2003, Antonovics et al., 2009, Lindquist and Säve-Söderbergh, 2011, Iriberry and Rey-Biel, 2017), as well as in other-regarding preferences (Ben-Ner et al., 2004, and Aguiar et al., 2009).

effects, either because the gender of the person in one role is not known or because there is not enough variation.

Economists are thus limited to the use of laboratory experiments. Eckel and Grossman (2001), using face-to-face ultimatum games, find that women are more likely to accept offers from women and that men are more likely to accept offers from women, while Solnick (2001) finds that women are more likely to accept offers from male proposers than from female proposers. Sutter et al. (2009) find more competition and retaliation between same gender matchings than between mixed gender matchings using the power-to-take game. More closely related to our setting, Dittrich et al. (2014), using a laboratory face-to-face alternating-offer wage-bargaining game, find that the starting salaries offered by men to women are lower than those offered by women to men, resulting in significant gender interaction effects on wage-bargaining outcomes. This line of research shows that observed gender differences may depend crucially on the gender of the interacting individual, so such interactions deserve equal attention. More recently, Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberry (2018) study gender differences and gender interaction effects in symmetric and asymmetric bargaining settings in the laboratory by considering different sources of asymmetries. While they find no evidence for gender differences in symmetric bargaining environments, where there exists a clear sharing rule, they find that men tend to obtain better deals than women in asymmetric bargaining environments when no such clear sharing rules exist.

Our setting offers multiple advantages over laboratory experiments. First, the pie to be divided is worth an average of 402 Euro, so the stakes are sizable and significantly larger than those in a typical laboratory experiment. Second, except for the three-minute limitation, the bargaining is not structured, so the observed negotiations on the TV show are closer to the type of bargaining that occurs in real life than are structured negotiations in the laboratory. The setting also offers some advantages over standard field data. First, the bargaining process is recorded, such that we are able to observe not only the bargaining outcome but also the entire bargaining process. Second, there is gender variation in the roles of both proposers and responders, so it is possible to study not only gender differences but also gender interaction effects. Finally, on the downside, our setting also presents some limitations that are common to all studies that use behavior on a TV show (List, 2006; Post et al., 2008; Van Dolder

et al., 2015), which can ultimately affect the study’s external validity.⁴

Overall, our findings are consistent with the literature that finds that women obtain worse deals when negotiating. In addition, the paper makes three important contributions. First, in line with the few papers that examine gender interactions (Eckel and Grossman, 2001, Solnick, 2001, and Dittrich et al., 2014), it confirms that gender interactions are crucial to understanding gender differences. When looking at both gender differences and gender interaction effects, we show that examining gender differences only can lead to a misleading interpretation of the results. Second, the paper offers evidence based on unstructured bargaining behavior observed in the field with sizable stakes as a supplement to the bargaining behavior observed in the laboratory. Finally, in sharp contrast to Dittrich et al. (2014), we find that in our setting, the determinant behavior that results in gender interaction effects does not reside in proposers’ initial offers but in responders’ demands, as it is indeed women who demand less from men.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the TV show, the data and the identification strategy. Section 3 presents the results on gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining outcomes and behavior. Section 4 includes robustness tests that address both the selection and unbalancedness problems in our data. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Data

2.1 The Setting: Bargaining on a TV Show

We use bargaining that occurs on the Spanish TV show “*Negocia como puedas*” (“*Bargain as you can*”) to study gender differences and gender interaction effects. The show was televised on the Spanish national TV channel *Cuatro*. It was a quiz show that was recorded in the streets of major cities in Spain in the summer of 2013.

In a typical episode, the TV host approaches someone in the street and asks if he or

⁴One limitation that should be kept in mind is the extent to which the individuals studied are representative, as they are willing to participate and indeed end up participating on a TV show. In that respect, although not eliminated, the participation bias might be lower than on other shows because this show is recorded in the main streets of major cities in Spain, and the contestants are picked on the spot without any pre-enrollment or previous interview. In addition, audience effect must be taken into account, which might influence the observed behavior.

she wants to participate on the show. If the person accepts, a brief introduction follows, providing the person's name, age and occupation. Hereafter, we will refer to these contestants as the *proposers*. The proposer is endowed with a pie and is asked a rather easy question, as the correct answer is provided 87% of the time. However, the proposer cannot answer. The proposer's task is, within a three-minute limit, to find someone on the street (hereafter, the *responder*) who can provide an answer to the posted question and to negotiate a price for that answer via bargaining. The proposer can approach as many potential responders as needed, and only when a potential responder provides an answer that is considered satisfactory to the proposer does the bargaining begin. If an agreement is reached and the answer is correct, then the proposer pays the responder the agreed amount. If the proposer does not reach an agreement within the three minutes, the game ends, and both get nothing. The proposer can, at any point in the bargaining process, unilaterally cease the negotiation and look for a new responder as long as it is within the three-minute limit. This set up is repeated for the same proposer up to 4 different times (*stages*) with different bargaining partners and different pie sizes as long as the questions are answered correctly. In the first stage, the proposer's pie is 100 Euro. In the subsequent stages, the proposer's pie is the amount retained from the previous stage plus a fixed amount. The extra endowments are 200 Euro, 300 Euro, and 1,000 Euro in stages 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Note that in the last stage, proposer's pie can be as high as 1,600 Euro, which is a sizable amount. The size of the pie is only known to the proposer and is never known to the responder.

In a typical round of bargaining, the proposer starts with an offer, which the responder either accepts or rejects. If the responder rejects the offer, then the responder can make a demand, which can be accepted or rejected by the proposer. We refer to the combination of the proposer's offer, the responder's response, the responder's demand and the proposer's response to the demand as a *round*. Although the actual bargaining is unstructured, the negotiation typically proceeds via alternating offers. However, note that a round does not need to proceed to completion, as one of the bargaining partners can remain silent in a specific round. However, in each round, at least one of the bargainers must make an active move by posting an offer or a demand and responding to an offer or a demand.

As argued in the introduction, the proposer's bargaining position is stronger than the responder's bargaining position. First, the proposers know with certainty the

actual size of the pie to be divided, while the responders do not. Second, while the proposer can break off the negotiation and look for another responder at any time, the responder has no such outside option. These two features make the positions of the proposer and responder asymmetric, with the former given a strong role and the latter a weak one. This asymmetry is backed up by the bargaining behavior and outcomes. It is usually the proposer who starts the negotiation with an opening offer (95% of the time). Research on bargaining has shown that the starting offer is an important determinant of the outcome (see, for example, Van Poucke and Buelens, 2002). Additionally, the bargaining outcomes are very asymmetric, as on average, the proposer receives 367 Euro, while the responder only receives 49 Euro. The existence of this asymmetry between the roles is interesting because it provides the opportunity to test whether gender differences and gender interaction effects are dependent of the relative strength of the bargaining positions, as found in related works (Dittrich et al. 2014; Andersen et al. 2017; Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberry, 2018).

2.2 The Database

We have created a panel database that records the bargaining behavior on the TV show. There are a total of 436 matchings. Data from 8 bargaining matchings were dropped because the TV show host made comments about the proposer’s behavior, for example, accusing the proposer of being stingy, which might have influenced both the bargaining outcome and behavior. Therefore, for the analysis, we use the bargaining behavior from 428 matchings between 134 proposers and 428 different responders.⁵ There are 73 female proposers (54%) and 61 male proposers (46%), and 157 female responders (37%) and 271 male responders (63%). The sample of proposers is balanced in terms of gender composition, but the sample of responders contains more men than women.

For the proposers, we gather data directly from the footage regarding their names, ages and occupations (students, retired, unemployed, low-level occupation or high-level occupation).⁶ The responders only reveal their names, so we have no information on

⁵The analysis when including all 436 matchings instead of the 428 matchings yields the same conclusions.

⁶We follow the 2-digit classification used by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and consider as low-level those occupations whose digits are strictly above 49, along

their ages and occupations. However, given that we have footage from the TV show, we have elicited in the laboratory subjective perceptions of the ages of both proposers and responders (a scale from 1 (below 30) to 6 (above 70)), socio-economic status (0 for medium-low and 1 for medium-high) and attractiveness (using a scale between 0 (very unattractive) and 8 (very attractive)). We showed snapshots of all participants –both proposers and responders– to 10 different raters and averaged the results.⁷

We also recorded the proposer’s endowment, *Pie*, the stage the contestant is in, *Stage*, and the deviation from the mean endowment in each stage, (*Pie-Mean*) by stage.⁸ *Bargaining Time* refers to the time in seconds left for bargaining, where the maximum is three minutes. Finally, we classify each bargaining matching according to whether the question asked is perceived to be male, neutral or female (*Male Question*, *Neutral Question*, and *Female Question*). Remember that the contestant is asked a question whose answer he/she needs to purchase via bargaining. Therefore, the choice of the bargaining partner, and in particular the gender of the chosen bargaining partner, is influenced by whether the question is male or female. We gave the questions and answers separately to two different people, one a man and the other a woman, and asked them to classify the questions as male, neutral or female in terms of how likely men and women are to provide the correct answer.⁹ Approximately 70% of questions

with occupations in the armed forces. The low-level occupation variable includes occupations such as waiters and hairdressers. Accordingly, we consider as high level those occupations whose digits are below 49. The high-level occupation variable includes occupations such as engineers and clerical jobs.

⁷Each rater evaluated 125 participants in about one hour and was rewarded with a fixed amount of 15 Euro. Participants’ snapshots were shown on individual computers, one at a time. For the proposers, five men and five women were recruited. For the responders, if the responder was chosen by a male proposer, then all 10 raters were male, while if the responder was chosen by a female proposer, then all 10 raters were female. Since we have the proposers’ real ages, we computed the correlation between the real age and the perceived age. The result is 0.94, which confirms the validity of these ratings. In addition, given that we are using the average of the ratings, we calculated the interim reliability scale (Cronbach’s alpha), which yields a score of 0.99 for perceived age, 0.94 for socio-economic status and 0.85 for attractiveness, thus confirming the alignment of the raters on each of the variables.

⁸As is clear from the description of the TV show, the size of the endowment increases proportionally from stage to stage, so these two variables are highly correlated (over 0.9). Because we cannot include both *Pie* and *Stage*, we decided to control for the stage, which ranges from 1 to 4, and for the deviation from the mean endowment in each stage.

⁹The raters initially agreed on their classification in 70% of the questions. Among the questions

are classified as neutral, 16% as male, and 16% as female.

[Table 1 here]

Panel A in Table 1 presents the mean values and standard deviations for all the demographic and control variables for the proposers and the demographic variables for the responders, overall (column 1), and for female (column 2) and male (column 3) participants separately. Column 4 in Panel A reports the p -values for the F -test of equality of means across genders. As the data show, the only significant difference between male and female proposers is that men are perceived to be less attractive and are more likely to hold a low-level occupation, while women are more likely to hold a high-level occupation. We control for all these characteristics when analyzing the behavior of proposers. For responders, the only significant difference is that female responders are perceived to be more attractive than male responders.

The rest of the columns in Panel A compare the characteristics separated by the gender combinations of the bargaining matches. With 73 female and 61 male proposers, and 157 female and 271 male responders, we end up with 139 *Female Proposer-Male Responder*, 92 *Female Proposer-Female Responder*, 65 *Male Proposer-Female Responder*, and 132 *Male Proposer-Male Responder* bargaining matchings. For the proposers, this enables us to see whether male/female proposers who choose a male responder differ in their characteristics from male/female proposers who choose a female responder. Similarly, for the responders, this enables us to see whether male/female responders who are chosen by male proposers differ in their characteristics from male/female responders who are chosen by female proposers. As expected, the male or female nature of the question significantly affects the gender choice of the bargaining partner. When asked a male question, contestants look for a male responder, but when faced with a female question, they look for a female responder; see columns 7 and 10. We find no evidence of important differences in the rest of the variables, with two minor exceptions: female proposers who are students are more likely to choose male responders, and male responders who are chosen by male proposers are more attractive than those who are chosen by female proposers.

upon which they disagreed, all but 5 were questions that one rater classified as neutral but the other classified as male or female. After the initial perceptions of each rater were collected, they discussed face-to-face the questions upon which they disagreed and reached agreement on all of them.

Panel B in Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the outcome variables we analyze, overall (column 1) and for the gender combinations of the bargaining matches. The last column in Panel B reports the p -values for the F -test of equality of means across all four gender matchings. We distinguish between variables that describe bargaining outcomes and bargaining behavior.

The main bargaining outcome variables of interest are *Prob. of No Agreement*, *Proposer's Outcome* and *No. of Rounds*.¹⁰ *Prob. of No Agreement* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the proposer and the responder do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise. Overall, only 12% of the negotiations failed (51 out of 428). There are 3 possible cases in which bargaining partners do not reach an agreement: The proposer drops the negotiation to look for another possible responder, the responder abandons the negotiation, or the three-minute limit is reached while negotiating. The former is the most common case (94% of breakdowns, 48 cases). The responder never abandons a negotiation. In addition, the latter is very rare (6% of breakdowns, 3 cases). For the rest of the outcome variables, we restrict the sample to successful bargaining matchings (377 matchings, 88%). Proposers on average earn 367 Euro. Given that the size of the pie to be shared in successful negotiations averages 416 Euro, proposers take 88% of it. The shortest negotiation lasted for one round, while the longest lasted for 15. On average, successful negotiations take longer (approximately 4 rounds) than unsuccessful ones (approximately 3 rounds). The final column shows the p -value for the comparison between the four cases of different gender pairings. The matchings that prove most beneficial for the proposer are those between a male proposer and a female responder (404 Euro), while the lowest outcome for the proposer is in bargaining between two women (325 Euro). These differences, however, are not significant. Interestingly, only the number of rounds when the negotiation did not fail shows significant differences, with negotiations between male contestants being the fastest. Notice, however, that a priori important variables can differ significantly from one matching to another, e.g., the size of the pie. Regression analysis shows that the controls are important to identify gender differences and gender interaction effects.

When analyzing bargaining behavior in successful negotiations, taking into account the panel structure of the database, we look at the offers made by the proposers (*Of-*

¹⁰We also considered an alternative measure for the number of rounds, such as the time elapsed since bargaining began. The conclusions remain unchanged.

fers), the demands made by the responders (*Demands*), and their respective probabilities of accepting (*Prob. Responder Accepts*, *Prob. Proposer Accepts*). Note that these are round-by-round data, so there are several observations per bargaining matching as long as the negotiation took more than one round. Moreover, there are matchings that have no demands or offers, so one bargaining role remained silent. Therefore, the column for the number of observations includes both the round-by-round observations and, in parentheses, the number of bargaining matchings. The average offer by proposers is 34 Euro, and the average demand is 105 Euro, with the probabilities of accepting being 14% by responders and 23% by proposers. The demands among different matchings show significant differences, with demands from female responders to male proposers being the lowest, at approximately 60 Euro.

2.3 Research Question and Identification Strategy

The database from the TV show enables us to test for gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining by examining the effects of the gender of the proposer and the responder as well as the effects of the four different gender combinations ($\{\text{Proposer, Responder}\} \times \{\text{Male, Female}\}$).

We distinguish between bargaining outcomes and bargaining behavior: bargaining outcomes include whether the bargaining fails to reach an agreement (*Prob. of No Agreement*), the bargaining outcome for the proposer (*Proposer's Outcome*), and the duration of the bargaining process (*No. of Rounds*). Bargaining behavior includes offers made by proposers (*Offers*), demands made by responders (*Demands*), and their respective probabilities of accepting (*Prob. Proposer/Responder Accepts*).

To test whether gender and gender interactions matter in explaining bargaining outcomes and behavior, we estimate the following regressions:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{MaleProposer}_i + \beta_2 \text{MaleResponder}_j + \gamma X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Male}_i \text{Female}_j + \beta_2 \text{Female}_i \text{Male}_j + \beta_3 \text{Male}_i \text{Male}_j + \gamma X_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

In studying the bargaining outcomes, we use collapsed data at the responder level, given that these variables and indeed the independent variables remain constant round by round. For *Prob. of No Agreement*, we use all 428 matchings, while for *Proposer's Outcome* and *No. of Rounds*, we constrain the sample to the 377 matchings

that reached an agreement. Given that the same proposer is matched with different responders, we always cluster the standard errors at the proposer level.

When analyzing bargaining behavior in successful negotiations, we exploit the panel structure of the database, i.e., we use the round-by-round bargaining data but specify the identification of the responder as the panel variable and estimate a random effects model clustering the standard errors at the proposer level.¹¹

Two types of control variables are used in all the regressions. First, we include control variables that refer to the proposers' and responders' socio-demographic characteristics. Second, we use controls specific to the bargaining matching, such as the stage, the variation in the pie within the stage and the bargaining time. Finally, we also include controls specific to each dependent variable, such as controlling for previous offers when explaining the probability of the responder accepting.

3 Results

3.1 Outcome Variables: *Probability of No Agreement, Proposer's Outcome and Number of Rounds*

We start by measuring gender differences and gender interaction effects on bargaining outcomes: probability of reaching an agreement, amount of money agreed upon for the proposer and the duration of the bargaining process. Table 2 summarizes the regression results for gender differences (columns 1-3) and gender interaction effects (columns 4-6).¹² We find neither gender difference nor gender interaction effects on

¹¹When analyzing bargaining behavior with 0-1 outcome variables and exploiting the panel structure of the data, such as *Prob. Proposer Accepts* or *Prob. Responder Accepts*, we estimate a random effects probit model. In these cases, we use bootstrapped standard errors.

¹²For the variable *Prob. of No Agreement*, we show the estimation results using the probit model, while for *No. of Rounds*, we use a Poisson regression. We also consider alternative specifications, as shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. For *Prob. of No Agreement*, we consider linear probability and logit estimation models (shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively). For *No. of Rounds*, we also consider OLS, which is shown in column 5. For the three outcome variables, we also consider the data as a panel, as we observe the same proposer matched with different responders, and we estimate a random effects model, shown in columns 3, 4 and 6, for *Prob. of No Agreement*, *Proposer's Outcome*, and *No. of Rounds*, respectively. All these alternative specifications lead to the same conclusions. When estimating gender interaction effects, we also include the p -values for the hypothesis test that conducts

the probability of no agreement and on the duration of bargaining (columns 1, 3, 4 and 6). In contrast, there are important differences in terms of earnings. Although there is no evidence of any gender difference in proposers and responders' earnings (column 2), we find that negotiations between male proposers and female responders result in approximately 11 Euro more for the proposer than any other possible gender matching (column 5).¹³ This result shows that gender interactions are crucial: it is not just that men and women obtain different outcomes when bargaining, but, more importantly, the differences depend on the gender of the bargaining partner and on the roles played during the bargaining. A later analysis of gender differences and gender interaction effects in the bargaining process clarifies whether this is due to male proposers discriminating against female responders, to female responders behaving differently when interacting with male proposers, or to a combination of both.

[Table 2 here]

As shown by the estimation results in Table A1 in the Appendix, many control variables are significant in explaining the bargaining outcomes.¹⁴ Three control variables are of special interest. First, the first offer made by the proposer, consistent

a pairwise comparison of the effects of different gender combinations, as shown at the bottom of Table 2. For the estimation results for all the control variables, please see Table A1 in the Appendix.

¹³The main results on gender and gender interaction effects are also found if we only control for *Stage* and *(Pie-Mean) by stage*. We have also restricted the sample of negotiations to the very first responder, leaving us with 375 negotiations. Of these 375 negotiations, 39 failed, and 336 ended up in agreement. Using this restricted sample of negotiations, we reach similar conclusions.

¹⁴In terms of the probability of there being no agreement, the longer the bargaining goes on, the lower the probability of failure is. Additionally, negotiations that have more time left are more likely to fail, given that the proposers still have time to find alternative responders. Interestingly, older proposers, those who hold low-level occupations, and students are less likely to break up the bargaining. As expected, we find that the larger the pie is –the higher the stage and the greater the deviations from the mean pie in each stage– the greater the outcome is for the proposer, as the responders are unaware of the size of the pie. In addition, the coefficient of the deviation from the mean pie in each stage is close to 1, which suggests that increases in the size of the pie are absorbed by the proposer, who plays a strong role in the bargaining given the information asymmetry regarding the size of the pie. Additionally, as expected, the more rounds there are, the lower the outcome is for the proposer. When looking at the duration of the negotiation (*No. of Rounds*), the results show, as expected, that the longer bargaining goes on, the more rounds there are; furthermore, the larger the pie is, as measured in terms of the different stages, the longer the bargaining goes on. Finally, when proposers are unemployed or hold a low-level occupation, the process is shorter. The control *Retired*

with the previous literature on bargaining (see, for example, Van Poucke and Buelens, 2002) proves to be an important determinant for bargaining outcomes: the higher the first offer is, the more likely it is that a successful agreement will be reached, the lower the proposer’s outcome is, and the shorter the negotiation is. Second, *Proposer Starts* describes how the negotiation starts. This variable takes the value of 1 when the proposer starts the negotiation. Third, *Proposer Accepts* describes how the negotiation ends by taking the value of 0 when it is the responder who accepts the proposer’s offer and 1 when it is the proposer who ends up accepting a responder’s demand. The estimated coefficients show that initiating the negotiation pays off while being the party who accepts the other’s demand/offer does not. A further analysis in which we split the bargaining outcomes into those that end with the proposer accepting a responder’s demand (202 cases out of 377) and those that end with the responder accepting a proposer’s offer (175 cases out of 377) shows that the difference found in the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* interaction stems from deals that end with proposers accepting responders’ demands. This result suggests that behavior regarding demands plays a crucial role in explaining why the bargaining matching between a male proposer and female responder is different from that of all the other bargaining pairs.

To better understand the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* interaction effect, we examine two further issues. These additional results are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. First, we analyze whether the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* interaction effect is equally strong in all stages. We reject this hypothesis. We find that the interaction effect is lowest and not significant in the very first stage, while in subsequent stages, it becomes larger in magnitude. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that the estimated coefficients on *Male Proposer-Female Responder* are different between stages 2, 3 and 4. These results are shown in column 2, when restricting the analysis to stage 1, and in column 3, when restricting the analysis to stages higher than 1. Although a typical proposer usually negotiates four times, we note that this difference across stages should not necessarily be interpreted as learning. We believe that in the first stage, where the pie is 100 Euro, there is not enough wiggle room for these differences to be significant, while in later stages, when the pie is larger, there is. Second, although we believe that the most appropriate bargaining outcome variable is earnings in absolute

cannot be estimated in columns 1 and 4 because it turns out that *Retired* perfectly predicts whether the negotiations ended successfully or not.

values, as this is the only amount that can be evaluated by both bargaining parties, we also look at the share, the payment divided by size of the pie, and the proposer’s (responder’s) relative share, which is the share divided by the mean share for proposers (responders) in each stage. If we look at the first stage only, we do not observe any significant effect, independent of which outcome variable we analyze. However, when we examine subsequent stages, we find that the matching between male proposers and female responders stands out from the rest, independent of which outcome variable analyze. This result is consistent with our previous finding that proposes that the interaction effect becomes important in magnitude from stage 2 on. Alternative outcome variables help us interpret the magnitude of the effect. Regarding the shares, in the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* matching, proposers (responders) receive between 1.5 and 3.8 percentage points more (less) of the pie than they do in other matchings. Regarding the relative shares, male proposers when bargaining with female responders receive approximately 4.6% more than when bargaining with male responders, while female responders when bargaining with male proposers receive approximately 16% less than when bargaining with female proposers.

Three final remarks are noteworthy. First, the results shown in Table 2 are not driven by extremely high and low bargaining outcomes for the proposer. We replicated the regressions on the proposer’s outcome and deleted the 5% highest and lowest outcomes, and the estimation results remain unchanged. Second, we also considered other controls. In particular, we controlled for whether the question is male or female, as one might consider situations in which a particular perception affects participants’ bargaining power. We find that these control variables are never significant, and more importantly, the results on the gender interactions of Table 2 remain unchanged. Third, using the alternative specification of *Male Proposer*, *Male Responder* and the interaction instead of *Male Proposer-Female Responder*, *Female Proposer-Male Responder* and *Male Proposer-Male Responder*, we find that, as expected, the interaction is significant, which clearly shows that the significance of the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* coefficient found in Table 2 is not just the effect of “adding up” two different effects but rather a pure interaction effect. Given that gender interaction effects and the hypothesis testing shown at the end of the tables also inform about gender differences, from now on, we only show the gender interaction effect regressions.

3.2 Bargaining Behavior: *Offers, Demands, and Probabilities of Accepting*

We now analyze bargaining behavior regarding offers, demands and the likelihood of accepting offers and demands. We decided to conduct regressions for the opening offer and subsequent offers separately, as the first are exogenous and are not influenced by the interaction with the responder. Furthermore, opening offers are important determinants of subsequent behavior in bargaining. For the rest of the variables, we test whether the behavior in the first and subsequent rounds is indeed different. This analysis leads us to conduct regression analyses for the likelihood of responders accepting initial and subsequent offers separately, but not for demands and the likelihood of proposers accepting demands.

[Table 3 here]

Table 3 shows the results of the gender interaction effects for offers (columns 1 and 2), for the likelihood of responders accepting the offers (columns 3 and 4), for demands (column 5) and for the likelihood of proposers accepting the demands (column 6).¹⁵ Table A4 in the Appendix shows the estimation results for all the control variables. When looking at *Subsequent Offers (Demands)*, we use previous demands (offers) as control variables. To retain the largest number of observations, when a proposer (responder) is silent in one round, in the next round, we use the latest offer (demand) proposed as a control. The conclusions remain the same if instead we restrict the analysis to observations in which a previous offer/demand exists. However, the sample size, and especially the sample for *Subsequent Offers*, decreases drastically.

Opening offers (column 1) do not show any significant gender-related effects. This result is in sharp contrast with the findings of other authors, e.g., Dittrich et al. (2014), who report that initial offers from men to women are lower. The likelihood of responders accepting a given offer (columns 3 and 4) and the offers made in subsequent rounds (column 2) show no evidence of important gender differences or gender interaction effects once initial offers and past demands are controlled for. Regarding

¹⁵Table A5 shows the estimation results for alternative specifications. The results for *Demands* are robust and sound, while the marginal results for *Subsequent Offers* lose significance when using an OLS estimation with collapsed data.

demands (column 5) and consistent with our findings when examining the raw mean values for demands (Table 1, Panel B), we find one important gender interaction effect: when demanding from a male proposer, women demand approximately 63 Euro less. Reexamining the demands but making use of the variables *Male Proposer* and *Male Responder* and adding the interaction term between the two confirms a significant effect of interaction term, thus clearly showing that the significance of the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* is specifically due to the interaction of a male proposer and a female responder and not to the sum of the gender differences in the proposer and responder roles. Moreover, this interaction effect is present from the very first round. We find no differential behavior when examining the likelihood of accepting demands (column 6). All controls go in the expected directions.¹⁶

We also analyzed gender differences and gender interaction effects in the use of different bargaining strategies, and the results are shown in Table A6 in the Appendix. We classify four types of bargaining strategies. First, one can actively make offers or demands or remain passively silent and wait for the other person to do so. Second, active bargaining strategies can be classified into increasing, decreasing or maintaining offers/demands from round to round. We find no gender differences or gender interaction effects in remaining silent when bargaining in either role. Interestingly, we find that men are more likely to increase their offers from round to round, while women are more likely to stick to an offer. We find neither gender differences nor gender interaction effects in the use of bargaining strategies among responders. More importantly, these findings do not enlighten the main result regarding *Male Proposer-Female Responder* matching being the most beneficial for proposers and the least beneficial for

¹⁶The higher (lower) the offers (demands) are, the more likely it is that they will be accepted by the responder (proposer). Moreover, the higher the opening offer by the proposer, the more likely he/she is to accept responders' demand. Additionally, the opening offer is an important determinant of subsequent offers, and previous offers positively affect subsequent demands. In addition, past demands also prove to be important in explaining offers. Some non-linearities appear, as the squared term is also significant. Finally, and interestingly, the size of the pie to be divided up as measured through the stage variable is positively related to offers and demands. This finding is not completely intuitive. Note that responders do not know how large the pie is, so proposers could pretend to be at the first stage in all negotiations, and offers should not therefore depend on the size of the pie. However, proposers do adjust their offers to the size of the pie, and consequently responders do adjust their demands to the proposers' offers.

responders.

We finish this section with four comments. First, the main effect is observed when male contestants act as proposers, which is the strong role, and female participants act in the role of responders, which is the weak role. Second, this effect is sizable. As the average demand in *Female Proposer-Female Responder* matching is 113 Euro, female responders demand approximately 55% less from male proposers. Third, the differential behavior depending on gender is not initiated by the proposer’s opening offers but by the responder’s demands. We can therefore directly relate this result to the differences found in the earnings obtained from bargaining. The fact that male proposers bargaining with female responders is the most beneficial for proposers is explained by female responders demanding less from male proposers. Consistent with this interpretation, when we use average demands as an additional control in explaining the bargaining outcome in column 5 of Table 2, the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* combination is no longer different from the rest of the gender combinations, but it remains positive and significant when the average offers are included as an additional control. Finally, further analysis of subsequent offers suggests that when there is a previous demand, the weak effect we found in column 2 becomes slightly stronger, while when there is no previous demand, that is, when responders reject an offer but post no demand (remain silent), we find no evidence of a gender difference.¹⁷ This further confirms that the difference in bargaining outcomes is driven by differences in demands.

4 Robustness Tests: Unbalancedness and Selection

Contrary to what would occur in a perfectly randomized setting, in our setting, proposers and responders are not randomly matched, as proposers choose their bargaining parties. In this section, we analyze the determinants of the gender of the chosen responder and address the problems that this issue may generate in our analysis. The results from robustness tests are shown in Table 5.

¹⁷Notice that opening offers and opening demands play quite different roles in our database. First, very few interactions start with a demand rather than an offer (20 out of 377), so opening offers are the real starting point of bargaining, while demands come after the first offer has been rejected.

4.1 Unbalancedness

Table 1 clearly shows that while the sample of proposers is balanced in terms of gender, the sample of responders is not. In particular, there are significantly more male than female responders, which suggests that both male and female proposers show a preference for bargaining with men rather than women or that there are more men than women among the eligible set of responders. This issue generates an unbalanced sample of the different gender combinations, with the *Male Proposer-Male Responder* and *Female Proposer-Male Responder* matchings being overrepresented with respect to the *Male Proposer-Female Responder* and *Female Proposer-Female Responder* matchings.

Since this may affect the estimated coefficients from the previous section and, in particular, the standard errors and thus the power of the analyses, we conduct a regression analysis with probability weights. The idea behind this analysis is to weight each observation within each matching by the inverse of its probability in the sample with a view to balancing the sample in terms of the different matchings.¹⁸ The estimation results from columns 2, 5 and 8 in Table 5 show that the conclusions remain the same when the unbalancedness of the data is taken into account.

4.2 Selection

Another concern caused by the lack of randomness is the potential existence of selection bias: if male and female proposers choose their responders differently, the validity of our results may be questionable. In this regard, the natural first step is to examine whether male and female proposers choose their counterparts differently, particularly concerning the gender of the bargaining party. This analysis is performed in Table 4.¹⁹

[Table 4 here]

Once the controls are added, male participants are found to have a stronger preference for male bargaining partners.²⁰ The stronger preference of male proposers for

¹⁸This approach is successful as long as the coefficient of *Male Proposer* is 0 when we regress the gender of the responder on the gender of the proposer, and the constant is 0.5.

¹⁹Estimations with alternative specifications are shown in Table A7 in the Appendix. The conclusions remain the same when using alternative specifications.

²⁰As expected, the most important determinant of the gender of the responder is whether the

male responders may be explained by gender differences in preferences, such as taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1971), or by gender differences in beliefs, as men may assign a higher probability than women do to the notion of men knowing the correct answer, or men may believe more strongly than women do that male responders will be less aggressive in their bargaining behavior. In any case, men and women do not show different probabilities of knowing the correct answer (as shown by the results in Table A8 in the Appendix), and men do not obtain better deals when negotiating with men (as shown by the results in Tables 3 and 4).²¹ Alternatively, men and women might have different beliefs about the likelihood of men engaging in bargaining. Unfortunately, our bargaining setting does not allow us to distinguish between the alternative explanations for this finding. The most important insight from this analysis for our purposes is that it makes clear that male and female proposers choose the gender of their bargaining party differently, and therefore, our results from Section 3 could be affected by a selection problem.

To overcome this caveat, we first run a regression analysis on a matched sample using probability score matching (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, and Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, for a practical guide). Because there are fewer women in the sample of responders, we define our treatment variable as having a female responder, and we estimate the probability score using the regression shown in column 2 in Table 4.²² We then use the nearest neighbor matching method to match the sample of female responders to that of male responders, such that they have similar propensity scores. The distributions of the probability scores for proposers choosing a male and female responder, both for the unmatched and matched samples, are shown in Figure

question is perceived to be male or female. When presented with a male question (e.g., a sports-related question), proposers look for male responders, while when presented with a female question (e.g., questions related to fashion or celebrities), proposers look for female responders. Furthermore, we tested whether the male preference for male responders is independent of the perception (male/female/neutral) of the question, which is supported by the data (column 4 of Table A7 in the Appendix).

²¹In Table A8 in the Appendix, we further test whether men and women are equally likely to provide the correct answer to male and female questions in columns 3 and 4 in Table A8, respectively. We do not find any evidence supporting this notion.

²²We eliminate the independent variables on the male/female nature of the questions, as they cannot possibly influence the outcome variables of *Prob. of No Agreement*, *Proposer's Outcome* and *No. of Rounds*.

1. The results of this procedure return a sample that seems to be random based on the proposer’s observable characteristics, as shown by the analysis in column 3 of Table 4, in which the only determinant of the responder’s gender is given by the male/female perception of the question.²³ We carry out the regression analysis within the matched sample only. The results are shown in Table 5 (columns 3, 6 and 9).²⁴ As expected, some observations are lost when the analysis is restricted to the matched sample, as some observations cannot be matched. More importantly, the effect on the main bargaining outcome, *Proposer’s Outcome*, remains positive, significant, and very similar in size.

A second test that should alleviate the concerns about selection driving the main results consists of checking how male proposers who choose female responders differ from male proposers who choose male responders and how female responders who are chosen by male proposers differ from female responders who are chosen by female proposers. Finding no differences in this respect would mean that if selection occurs, at least it cannot be tied to the observable characteristics we can control for. Columns 8 to 10 in Panel A of Table 1 present a comparison of male proposers, and the results clearly show that those who happen to choose a male responder do not differ significantly from those who happen to select a female responder. Columns 5 to 7 in Panel A of Table 1 show that female responders who are chosen by male proposers do not significantly differ from those who are chosen by female proposers. This further confirms that the results are not driven by male proposers who choose female responders being of a particular type or by female responders chosen by male proposers being of a particular type, but rather by women in the role of responders demanding less from men in the role of proposers. Nevertheless, as we mentioned in the introduction, we cannot rule out selection based on characteristics that are unobservable.

²³Furthermore, when replicating Panel A of Table 1 on the matched sample, all significant differences within all matchings disappear, with the exception of the effect of the question’s perception. These results are available upon request.

²⁴The results shown in Table 5 use matchings without replacement. We also used matchings with replacement: compared to those without replacement for the *Proposer’s Outcome*, the outcome for *Male Proposer-Female Responder* matchings is not significantly different from the outcome of *Male Proposer-Male Responder* matchings, and for the *No. of Rounds*, the *Male Proposer-Male Responder* matching takes significantly less time than does the *Female Proposer-Female Responder* matching. It is known that standard errors increase with replacement, which lowers the significance of the results.

5 Conclusions

We use bargaining behavior on a TV show in which proposers choose individuals to bargain with to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining involving sizable stakes.

We find significant gender interaction effects in both bargaining behavior and bargaining outcomes. The *Male Proposer-Female Responder* matching is found to be different from all the other combinations. Contrary to the findings in previous works, we find no evidence of differences in opening offers between male and female proposers or male and female responders. More importantly, it is women who demand less from male proposers. An important caveat of our bargaining setting is that proposers choose their bargaining party. We find evidence that men show a stronger preference for male bargaining partners. This finding is consistent with taste-based discrimination but also with many other alternative explanations. Although we can rule out selection based on some important observable characteristics for which we can control, we cannot fully rule out selection based on other characteristics that are unobservable in our data.

We draw three main conclusions. First, gender interaction effects are proved to be crucial in understanding gender differences. In our setting, women demand less *only from men*. This difference results in negotiations that are more favorable to men and less favorable to women when men negotiate with women. Second, we find no differential behavior in opening offers. Third, the most relevant gender differential results are found in the behavior of responders, who hold what is a priori a weaker position in this setting. Accordingly, it is only when men take the role of the strong player (the proposer) and women the role of the weak player (the responder) that significant gender differences are found. This result highlights the importance of the role played in bargaining. Dittrich et al. (2014), using an employer-employee setting, Andersen et al. (2017), using seller-buyer framing, and Hernandez-Arenaz and Iriberry (2018), using a laboratory setting, also find gender differences and gender interaction effects that depend on the roles played. Future work should be directed at understanding the *interaction* between gender interaction effects and the roles played in bargaining.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Proposers and Responders

Proposers	Overall	Female	Male	p-value	Female-Male	Female-Female	p-value	Male-Male	Male-Female	p-value
Obs.	134	73 (54%)	61 (46%)		139	92		132	65	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	34.37 (13.45)	33.08 (13.12)	35.90 (13.8)	0.23	31.55 (11.97)	33.24 (12.49)	0.30	34.63 (12.07)	35.88 (13.73)	0.52
Student	0.19 (0.39)	0.23 (0.42)	0.13 (0.34)	0.13	0.31 (0.46)	0.16 (0.37)	0.01	0.11 (0.32)	0.14 (0.35)	0.62
Retired	0.05 (0.22)	0.07 (0.25)	0.03 (0.18)	0.36	0.06 (0.23)	0.05 (0.23)	0.92	0.02 (0.12)	0.06 (0.24)	0.08
Unemployed	0.09 (0.29)	0.07 (0.25)	0.11 (0.32)	0.35	0.08 (0.27)	0.07 (0.25)	0.69	0.14 (0.35)	0.08 (0.27)	0.18
Low-Level Occupation	0.35 (0.48)	0.23 (0.42)	0.49 (0.5)	0.00	0.19 (0.4)	0.27 (0.45)	0.17	0.45 (0.5)	0.45 (0.5)	0.99
High-Level Occupation	0.32 (0.47)	0.40 (0.49)	0.23 (0.42)	0.04	0.36 (0.48)	0.45 (0.5)	0.19	0.28 (0.45)	0.28 (0.45)	0.96
Perceived Age	2.41 (1.13)	2.32 (1.16)	2.51 (1.09)	0.34	2.15 (1.06)	2.35 (1.12)	0.17	2.35 (1.02)	2.63 (1.02)	0.08
Perceived Status	0.36 (0.24)	0.38 (0.23)	0.35 (0.26)	0.47	0.41 (0.23)	0.38 (0.22)	0.36	0.35 (0.27)	0.41 (0.24)	0.10
Perceived Attractiveness	3.44 (1.37)	3.92 (1.35)	2.87 (1.18)	0.00	4.14 (1.32)	3.91 (1.32)	0.19	3.01 (1.2)	2.77 (1.05)	0.18
Pie	345.84 (186.23)	337.39 (189.45)	355.95 (183.35)	0.57	421.05 (425.52)	366.68 (387.49)	0.33	385.46 (397.67)	445.75 (429.45)	0.33
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	-0.80 (18.58)	0.16 (19.90)	-1.96 (16.96)	0.51	-0.83 (36.45)	3.74 (17.58)	0.26	-1.20 (22.07)	-1.08 (25.93)	0.97
Stage	1.93 (0.53)	1.90 (0.53)	1.97 (0.52)	0.42	2.14 (1.02)	1.98 (0.99)	0.25	2.05 (1)	2.25 (1.02)	0.21
Bargaining Time	103.82 (27.54)	104.34 (31.52)	103.20 (22.08)	0.81	110.96 (47.09)	107.34 (47.52)	0.57	105.05 (48.18)	100.82 (44.2)	0.55
Male Question	0.16 (0.23)	0.17 (0.23)	0.14 (0.23)	0.55	0.26 (0.44)	0.03 (0.18)	0.00	0.21 (0.41)	0.05 (0.21)	0.00
Neutral Question	0.68 (0.32)	0.70 (0.31)	0.67 (0.33)	0.63	0.68 (0.47)	0.73 (0.45)	0.40	0.68 (0.47)	0.62 (0.49)	0.36
Female Question	0.16 (0.24)	0.13 (0.23)	0.19 (0.24)	0.22	0.06 (0.25)	0.24 (0.43)	0.00	0.11 (0.31)	0.34 (0.48)	0.00

Responders	Overall	Female	Male	p-value	Male-Female	Female-Female	p-value	Male-Male	Female-Male	p-value
Obs.	428	157 (37%)	271 (63%)		65	92		132	139	
Perceived Age	2.80 (1.17)	2.70 (1.15)	2.86 (1.18)	0.20	2.75 (1.14)	2.67 (1.16)	0.65	2.96 (1.19)	2.76 (1.18)	0.17
Perceived Status	0.45 (0.27)	0.45 (0.26)	0.44 (0.28)	0.81	0.47 (0.27)	0.44 (0.25)	0.47	0.45 (0.28)	0.43 (0.27)	0.55
Perceived Attractiveness	3.17 (1.19)	3.63 (1.26)	2.90 (1.07)	0.00	3.54 (1.5)	3.69 (1.07)	0.47	3.05 (1.07)	2.76 (1.05)	0.02

Notes: The table shows the mean values and the standard deviations of the main outcome and control variables. *Age* describes the age in years. *Student*, *Retired*, *Unemployed*, *Low-Level Occupation* and *High-Level Occupation* take the value of 1 when the proposer is a student, retired, unemployed and holding a low and high occupation, respectively. *Perceived Age*, *Perceived Status* and *Perceived Attractiveness* are elicited measures of age, status and attractiveness, in a scales between, 1 (below 30) to 6 (above 70), 0 (medium-low) and 1 (medium high), and 0 (very unattractive) to 8 (very attractive), respectively. *Pie* refers to the amount in euro to bargain over. *Stage* refers to the number of stage and can take values between 1 and 4. *(Pie-Mean) by stage* shows the deviation of the pie by stage. *Bargaining Time* summarizes the time left in seconds for the bargaining. Finally, *Male/Neutral/Female question* take the value of 1 when the question is classified as male, neutral and female. The *p*-value are for the F-Test of equality of variable means across gender.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Panel B. Outcome Variables

	Obs.	Overall	Female-Male 139 cases (32%)	Female-Female 92 cases (21%)	Male-Female 65 cases (15%)	Male-Male 132 cases (31%)	p-value
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bargaining Outcomes:							
Prob. of No Agreement	428	0.12 (0.32)	0.10 (0.30)	0.15 (0.36)	0.06 (0.24)	0.14 (0.35)	0.24
Proposer's Outcome	377	367.14 (394.09)	378.29 (404.99)	325.31 (354.89)	403.59 (418.33)	364.02 (396.69)	0.68
No. of Rounds (when agreement)	377	3.58 (2.12)	3.72 (2.31)	3.81 (2.06)	3.77 (2.2)	3.16 (1.86)	0.09
No. of Rounds (when no agreement)	51	2.71 (1.12)	2.57 (0.94)	2.71 (1.33)	2.75 (1.50)	2.79 (1.08)	0.96
Bargaining Behavior when agreement:							
Offers	1283 (376)	34.11 (36.96)	35.62 (38.53)	33.25 (34.05)	29.90 (23.05)	35.63 (43.88)	0.23
Prob. Responder Accepts	1283 (376)	0.14 (0.34)	0.14 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)	0.10 (0.30)	0.17 (0.37)	0.16
Demands	871 (321)	105.31 (182.85)	127.64 (200.86)	112.96 (247.37)	60.23 (40.09)	100.99 (142.11)	0.00
Prob. Proposer Accepts	871 (321)	0.23 (0.42)	0.22 (0.42)	0.21 (0.40)	0.25 (0.43)	0.25 (0.44)	0.62

Notes: The table shows the mean values and the standard deviations of the main outcome variables. *Prob. of No Agreement* takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise. *Proposer's Outcome* refers to the amount in euro agreed for the proposer and *No. of Rounds* summarizes the duration of the bargaining process. *Offer* and *Demand* refer to the offers and demands in euro by the proposer and responder, respectively, and *Prob. Responder(Proposer) Accepts* take the value of 1 when an offer(demand) is accepted and 0 otherwise. The *p*-value are for the F-Test of equality of variable means across gender combinations.

Table 2. Gender Differences and Gender Interaction Effects in Bargaining Outcomes

	Prob. No Agreement (1)	Proposer's Outcome (2)	No. of Rounds (3)		Prob. No Agreement (4)	Proposer's Outcome (5)	No. of Rounds (6)
Male Proposer	0.0218 (0.0285)	1.899 (3.641)	-0.313 (0.230)	Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.0447 (0.0397)	10.78*** (3.822)	-0.177 (0.337)
Male Responder	0.00286 (0.0315)	-3.873 (3.111)	-0.192 (0.248)	Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0397 (0.0384)	2.995 (3.689)	-0.0868 (0.332)
				Male Proposer-Male Responder	0.0160 (0.0389)	-0.523 (5.037)	-0.476 (0.305)
Constant		62.36*** (17.77)		Constant		54.92*** (19.21)	
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES	Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES
All other controls	YES	YES	YES	All other controls	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	377	377	Observations	428	377	377
R-squared		0.994		R-squared		0.994	
				H_0 : MF=FM	0.91	0.05	0.79
				H_0 : MF=MM	0.18	0.02	0.33
				H_0 : FM=MM	0.13	0.50	0.17

Notes: The dependent variables refer to: *the Prob. of No Agreement*, which takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise (column 1 and 3); *Proposer's Outcome*, which summarizes the outcome in euro obtained by the proposer from the bargaining (columns 2 and 4); and *No. of Rounds* describes the duration of the bargaining process (columns 3 and 6). Columns 1 and 4 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. Columns 2 and 5 show the coefficients for OLS and columns 3 and 6 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the Poisson regression model. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3. Gender Interaction Effects in Offers, Demands and Probabilities of Acceptance

	Opening Offers (round=1) (1)	Offers (round>1) (2)	Prob. Responder Accepts (round=1) (3)	Prob. Responder Accepts (round>1) (4)	Demands (5)	Prob. Proposer Accepts (6)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.649 (3.041)	-4.820* (2.880)	0.0968 (0.0656)	-0.0515 (0.0489)	-63.88*** (21.64)	0.00631 (0.102)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0347 (1.695)	-3.237 (2.501)	0.0794 (0.0573)	0.00532 (0.0483)	4.143 (16.93)	0.0189 (0.0768)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	1.300 (2.544)	0.0520 (3.781)	0.0742 (0.0517)	0.0617 (0.0497)	-16.59 (16.76)	0.0629 (0.103)
Constant	6.736 (6.579)	26.39* (14.98)			86.92 (54.65)	
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
All other controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	357	926	357	926	871	871
R-squared	0.429					
Number of Responders	357	316	357	316	321	321
H_0 : MF=FM	0.81	0.61	0.74	0.29	0.00	0.89
H_0 : MF=MM	0.32	0.21	0.61	0.02	0.01	0.53
H_0 : FM=MM	0.51	0.44	0.90	0.16	0.28	0.60

Notes: The dependent variable *Offers* refer to the offers in euro made by the proposer (columns 1 and 2); *Prob. Responder Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the responder accepts the offer made by the proposer and 0 otherwise (columns 3 and 4); *Demands* refer to the demands in euro made by the responder (column 5); and *Prob. Proposer Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the proposer accepts the demand made by the responder and 0 otherwise (column 6). Columns 3, 4, and 6 show the marginal effects of the coefficients using the probit model. Except for round 1 regressions (column 1 and 3), we use random effects model. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 3 and 5) and bootstrapped standard errors (columns 4 and 6), in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 4. Choice of the Gender of the Responder

	Prob. Male Responder Full Sample (1)	Prob. Male Responder Full Sample (2)	Prob. Male Responder Matched Sample (3)
Male Proposer	0.0683 (0.0543)	0.136*** (0.0527)	0.0334 (0.0714)
Age Proposer		0.00222 (0.00333)	0.00291 (0.00391)
Student Proposer		0.108 (0.0746)	0.00709 (0.100)
Retired Proposer		-0.124 (0.189)	-0.127 (0.184)
Unemployed Proposer		0.138* (0.0742)	0.00379 (0.109)
Low-Occupation Proposer		0.00293 (0.0681)	0.00922 (0.0796)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer		0.0534** (0.0261)	0.00307 (0.0304)
Perc. Status Proposer		-0.151 (0.124)	-0.0648 (0.141)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage		-0.000261 (0.000789)	0.000899 (0.00123)
Remaining Time		0.000529 (0.000471)	0.000103 (0.000531)
Male Question		0.302*** (0.0520)	0.378*** (0.0737)
Female Question		-0.285*** (0.0626)	-0.278*** (0.0693)
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	428	314

Notes: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the selected responder is male and 0 otherwise. The table shows the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5. Robustness Tests: Gender Interaction Effects in Bargaining Outcomes

	Prob. No Agreement	Weights Prob. No Agreement	Matched Sample Prob. No Agreement	Proposer's Outcome	Weights Proposer's Outcome	Matched Sample Proposer's Outcome	Number of Rounds	Weights Number of Rounds	Matched Sample Number of Rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.0447 (0.0397)	-0.0475 (0.0365)	-0.0485 (0.0382)	10.78*** (3.822)	10.41*** (3.591)	8.988** (3.600)	-0.177 (0.337)	-0.236 (0.338)	-0.237 (0.350)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0397 (0.0384)	-0.0328 (0.0367)	-0.0403 (0.0385)	2.995 (3.689)	3.217 (3.637)	0.524 (3.990)	-0.0868 (0.332)	-0.0565 (0.339)	0.00804 (0.367)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	0.0160 (0.0389)	0.0158 (0.0380)	0.0111 (0.0396)	-0.523 (5.037)	-0.208 (4.886)	-0.479 (5.260)	-0.476 (0.305)	-0.522* (0.304)	-0.694** (0.343)
Constant				54.92*** (19.21)	58.62*** (16.09)	73.75*** (14.56)			
Controls for Stage	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
All other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	428	428	314	377	377	278	377	377	278
R-squared				0.994	0.995	0.996			
H_0 : MF=FM	0.91	0.70	0.85	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.79	0.61	0.51
H_0 : MF=MM	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.33	0.36	0.17
H_0 : FM=MM	0.13	0.18	0.24	0.50	0.51	0.85	0.17	0.11	0.05

Notes: The dependent variables, *Prob. of No Agreement*, *Proposer's Outcome* and *No. of Rounds* are defined in the notes of Table 2. Columns 1, 4 and 7, replicate columns 4-6 in Table 2. Columns 2, 5 and 8, show estimation results using a regression that weights each observation within each gender combination by the inverse of its probability. Columns 3, 6 and 9 show estimation results restricted to the matched sample. That matching is done following a nearest neighbor without replacement, where the treatment variable is defined as the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the responder is female and 0 otherwise. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$




Figure 1: (a) Histogram for Probability Score of Proposers choosing a Female Responder. (b) Histogram for Probability Score of Proposers choosing a Female Responder in the Matched Sample

Table A1. Full Specification for Gender Differences and Gender Interaction Effect in Bargaining Outcomes

	Prob. No Agreement (1)	Proposer's Outcome (2)	No. of Rounds (3)		Prob. No Agreement (4)	Proposer's Outcome (5)	No. of Rounds (6)
Male Proposer	0.0218 (0.0285)	1.899 (3.641)	-0.313 (0.230)	Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.0447 (0.0397)	10.78*** (3.822)	-0.177 (0.337)
Male Responder	0.00286 (0.0315)	-3.873 (3.111)	-0.192 (0.248)	Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0397 (0.0384)	2.995 (3.689)	-0.0868 (0.332)
				Male Proposer-Male Responder	0.0160 (0.0389)	-0.523 (5.037)	-0.476 (0.305)
Age Proposer	-0.00764*** (0.00252)	0.170 (0.236)	0.00990 (0.0130)	Age Proposer	-0.00767*** (0.00253)	0.199 (0.239)	0.0102 (0.0130)
Student Proposer	-0.0641* (0.0367)	6.204 (4.888)	0.520 (0.351)	Student Proposer	-0.0553 (0.0377)	5.251 (4.636)	0.500 (0.356)
Retired Proposer		-3.331 (9.903)	-0.754 (0.543)	Retired Proposer		-5.042 (9.842)	-0.981*** (0.325)
Unemployed Proposer	0.0567 (0.0833)	-5.383 (11.28)	-0.984*** (0.325)	Unemployed Proposer	0.0618 (0.0838)	-5.153 (11.34)	-0.447* (0.262)
Low-Occup. Proposer	-0.0664** (0.0315)	-2.643 (4.474)	-0.451* (0.262)	Low-Occup. Proposer	-0.0621* (0.0320)	-2.545 (4.456)	-0.771 (0.543)
Perc. Status Proposer	0.145* (0.0831)	7.265 (6.479)	0.886* (0.530)	Perc. Status Proposer	0.160* (0.0820)	4.834 (6.654)	0.849 (0.538)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	-0.00758 (0.0131)	0.442 (1.275)	-0.153 (0.103)	Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	-0.00930 (0.0130)	0.708 (1.278)	-0.148 (0.104)
Perc. Age Responder	-0.00309 (0.0158)	4.311** (1.848)	-0.0310 (0.110)	Perc. Age Responder	-0.00596 (0.0156)	4.729** (1.888)	-0.0241 (0.112)
Perc. Status Responder	-0.0966 (0.0592)	-13.91** (6.752)	0.208 (0.413)	Perc. Status Responder	-0.0924 (0.0588)	-15.14** (6.607)	0.189 (0.414)
Perc. Attractiveness Responder	0.00468 (0.0173)	3.255 (2.011)	0.0933 (0.113)	Perc. Attractiveness Responder	0.00163 (0.0176)	3.981* (2.046)	0.105 (0.113)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	0.00122 (0.000788)	1.206*** (0.0998)	-0.00167 (0.00323)	(Pie-Mean) by Stage	0.00110 (0.000791)	1.212*** (0.0999)	-0.00157 (0.00327)
Remaining Time	0.000663** (0.000280)	0.0829* (0.0478)	0.00601** (0.00242)	Remaining Time	0.000653** (0.000274)	0.0835* (0.0470)	0.00602** (0.00242)
No. Of Rounds	-0.0307*** (0.00786)	-7.214*** (1.028)		No. Of Rounds	-0.0298*** (0.00765)	-7.263*** (1.039)	
First Round Offer	-0.00204* (0.00120)	-1.116*** (0.214)	-0.0485*** (0.00893)	First Round Offer	-0.00211* (0.00120)	-1.108*** (0.211)	-0.0483*** (0.00883)
Proposer Starts		19.32*** (6.723)	0.925** (0.404)	Proposer Starts		19.12*** (6.930)	0.920** (0.404)
Proposer Accepts		-11.11*** (3.330)		Proposer Accepts		-11.41*** (3.324)	
Constant		62.36*** (17.77)		Constant		54.92*** (19.21)	
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES	Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	377	377	Observations	428	377	377
R-squared		0.994		R-squared		0.994	
				H_0 : MF=FM	0.91	0.05	0.79
				H_0 : MF=MM	0.18	0.02	0.33
				H_0 : FM=MM	0.13	0.50	0.17

Notes: The dependent variables refer to: *the Prob. of No Agreement*, which takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise (column 1 and 3); *Proposer's Outcome*, which summarizes the outcome in euro obtained by the proposer from the bargaining (columns 2 and 4); and *No. of Rounds* describes the duration of the bargaining process (columns 3 and 6). The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. In addition, *First Round Offer* summarizes the offer in euro made in the very first round. *Proposer Starts* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bargaining starts with the proposer making an offer, and 0 otherwise. *Proposer Accepts* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bargaining ends with the proposer accepting responder's demand, and 0 otherwise. Columns 1 and 4 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. Columns 2 and 5 show the coefficients for OLS and columns 3 and 6 show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the Poisson regression model. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A2. Alternative Specifications for Gender Differences
and Gender Interaction Effects in Bargaining Outcomes

	LPM	Logit	RE Probit	RE	OLS	RE
	Prob. No	Prob. No	Prob. No	Proposer's	No. of	No. of
	Agreement	Agreement	Agreement	Outcome	Rounds	Rounds
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.0624 (0.0471)	-0.0521 (0.0407)	-0.0440 (0.129)	10.78*** (3.822)	-0.209 (0.375)	-0.183 (0.374)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0532 (0.0499)	-0.0372 (0.0403)	-0.0422 (0.0462)	2.995 (3.689)	-0.0952 (0.361)	-0.0851 (0.361)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	0.00145 (0.0466)	0.0117 (0.0392)	0.0183 (0.0497)	-0.523 (5.037)	-0.520 (0.320)	-0.510 (0.322)
Constant	0.413*** (0.137)			54.92*** (19.21)	2.231** (1.063)	2.198** (1.073)
All Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	428	428	428	377	377	377
R-squared	0.117				0.160	
Number of Proposers			131	131		131
H_0 : MF=FM	0.85	0.74	0.99	0.05	0.77	0.80
H_0 : MF=MM	0.19	0.18	0.64	0.02	0.35	0.31
H_0 : FM=MM	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.50	0.15	0.15

Notes: The dependent variables refer to: *the Prob. of No Agreement*, which takes the value of 1 when the bargaining partners do not reach an agreement and 0 otherwise (columns 1 to 3); *Proposer's Outcome*, which summarizes the outcome in euro obtained by the proposer from the bargaining (column 4); and *No. of Rounds* describes the duration of the bargaining process (columns 5 to 6). All controls, as shown in Table A1 in the paper, are included. At the bottom, p -values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6) and bootstrapped standard errors (column 3), in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A3. Alternative Measurements of Bargaining Outcome Across Stages

	Proposer's Outcome Overall (1)	Proposer's Outcome Stage=1 (2)	Proposer's Outcome Stage>1 (3)	Proposer's Share Overall (4)	Proposer's Share Stage=1 (5)	Proposer's Share Stage>1 (6)	Proposer's Rel. Share Overall (7)	Proposer's Rel. Share Stage=1 (8)	Proposer's Rel. Share Stage>1 (9)	Responder's Rel. Share Overall (10)	Responder's Rel. Share Stage=1 (11)	Responder's Rel. Share Stage>1 (12)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	10.78*** (3.822)	-2.260 (3.566)	17.54*** (5.851)	0.0147 (0.0139)	-0.0226 (0.0357)	0.0274** (0.0116)	0.0158 (0.0181)	-0.0304 (0.0479)	0.0308** (0.0135)	-0.157** (0.0762)	0.0885 (0.140)	-0.261*** (0.0901)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	2.995 (3.689)	-2.839 (2.541)	7.300 (5.844)	-0.00850 (0.0124)	-0.0284 (0.0254)	0.000750 (0.0115)	-0.0106 (0.0162)	-0.0381 (0.0341)	0.000541 (0.0134)	0.0383 (0.0680)	0.111 (0.0995)	-0.0301 (0.0909)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	-0.523 (5.037)	-5.476** (2.650)	3.600 (7.062)	-0.0232 (0.0146)	-0.0548** (0.0265)	-0.0125 (0.0159)	-0.0299 (0.0185)	-0.0736** (0.0356)	-0.0158 (0.0187)	0.0914 (0.0870)	0.214** (0.104)	0.0287 (0.116)
Age Proposer	0.199 (0.239)	-0.253** (0.110)	0.487 (0.369)	-0.000749 (0.000646)	-0.00253** (0.00110)	3.43e-05 (0.000644)	-0.00106 (0.000827)	-0.00339** (0.00148)	-7.63e-06 (0.000741)	0.000892 (0.00397)	0.00989** (0.00431)	-0.00289 (0.00542)
Student Proposer	5.251 (4.636)	-0.182 (2.884)	10.56 (6.779)	0.00656 (0.0150)	-0.00182 (0.0288)	0.0117 (0.0160)	0.00683 (0.0194)	-0.00244 (0.0387)	0.0133 (0.0188)	-0.0721 (0.0801)	0.00712 (0.113)	-0.110 (0.116)
Retired Proposer	-5.042 (9.842)	8.554** (3.496)	-17.63 (16.91)	0.0239 (0.0233)	0.0855** (0.0350)	0.00575 (0.0265)	0.0312 (0.0297)	0.115** (0.0470)	0.00880 (0.0303)	-0.0707 (0.151)	-0.335** (0.137)	0.0709 (0.234)
Unemployed Proposer	-5.153 (11.34)	2.775 (3.947)	-7.600 (14.86)	0.0115 (0.0208)	0.0277 (0.0395)	0.0101 (0.0207)	0.0163 (0.0260)	0.0373 (0.0530)	0.0127 (0.0241)	0.00176 (0.142)	-0.109 (0.155)	-0.0136 (0.175)
Low-Occup. Proposer	-2.545 (4.456)	2.272 (2.038)	-2.120 (6.349)	0.00597 (0.0139)	0.0227 (0.0204)	0.000555 (0.0151)	0.00991 (0.0170)	0.0305 (0.0274)	0.00155 (0.0176)	0.0344 (0.0963)	-0.0889 (0.0798)	0.0416 (0.117)
Perc. Status Proposer	4.834 (6.654)	6.068 (3.956)	6.141 (9.940)	0.0231 (0.0217)	0.0607 (0.0396)	0.0125 (0.0240)	0.0315 (0.0274)	0.0815 (0.0531)	0.0152 (0.0280)	-0.0702 (0.134)	-0.238 (0.155)	-0.0610 (0.182)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	0.708 (1.278)	-0.905 (0.785)	1.380 (1.942)	-0.00339 (0.00419)	-0.00905 (0.00785)	-0.000759 (0.00447)	-0.00456 (0.00539)	-0.0121 (0.0105)	-0.00102 (0.00522)	0.0105 (0.0238)	0.0354 (0.0307)	-0.00133 (0.0332)
Perc. Age Responder	4.729** (1.888)	-0.373 (0.906)	6.088** (2.452)	0.00225 (0.00493)	-0.00373 (0.00906)	0.00624 (0.00565)	0.00195 (0.00622)	-0.00502 (0.0122)	0.00711 (0.00666)	-0.0372 (0.0293)	0.0146 (0.0355)	-0.0573 (0.0395)
Perc. Status Responder	-15.14** (6.607)	-0.734 (5.569)	-18.63* (9.463)	-0.0178 (0.0232)	-0.00734 (0.0557)	-0.0226 (0.0247)	-0.0196 (0.0293)	-0.00985 (0.0748)	-0.0256 (0.0292)	0.174 (0.132)	0.0287 (0.218)	0.205 (0.166)
Perc. Attractiveness	3.981* (2.046)	0.363 (1.210)	5.331* (2.765)	-7.84e-05 (0.00565)	0.00363 (0.0121)	0.00217 (0.00675)	-0.000611 (0.00711)	0.00487 (0.0162)	0.00229 (0.00797)	-0.0164 (0.0334)	-0.0142 (0.0473)	-0.0305 (0.0465)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	1.212*** (0.0999)		1.232*** (0.0988)									
(Pie-Mean)/Pie				0.241** (0.100)		0.198* (0.111)	0.232* (0.119)		0.221* (0.129)	-2.968*** (0.813)		-1.987** (0.825)
Bargaining Time	0.0835* (0.0470)	0.0163 (0.0179)	0.121* (0.0728)	0.000181* (9.65e-05)	0.000163 (0.000179)	0.000143 (0.000110)	0.000220* (0.000121)	0.000219 (0.000241)	0.000160 (0.000127)	-0.00130** (0.000640)	-0.000639 (0.000702)	-0.00145 (0.000910)
No. Of Rounds	-7.263*** (1.039)	-3.736*** (0.595)	-9.011*** (1.475)	-0.0213*** (0.00258)	-0.0374*** (0.00595)	-0.0150*** (0.00215)	-0.0267*** (0.00336)	-0.0502*** (0.00799)	-0.0174*** (0.00252)	0.122*** (0.0133)	0.146*** (0.0233)	0.117*** (0.0165)
First Round Offer	-1.108*** (0.211)	-1.128*** (0.102)	-1.138*** (0.231)									
(First Round Offer)/Pie				-1.036*** (0.110)	-1.128*** (0.102)	-1.181*** (0.226)	-1.331*** (0.137)	-1.515*** (0.137)	-1.378*** (0.261)	5.209*** (0.716)	4.416*** (0.400)	8.494*** (1.709)
Proposer Starts	19.12*** (6.930)	7.602* (4.103)	25.47** (9.989)	0.0563*** (0.0200)	0.0760* (0.0410)	0.0464** (0.0205)	0.0713*** (0.0254)	0.102* (0.0551)	0.0534** (0.0236)	-0.314** (0.121)	-0.298* (0.161)	-0.368** (0.164)
Proposer Accepts	-11.41*** (3.324)	-7.309*** (1.802)	-15.42*** (5.030)	-0.0545*** (0.00940)	-0.0731*** (0.0180)	-0.0352*** (0.00991)	-0.0689*** (0.0120)	-0.0982*** (0.0242)	-0.0406*** (0.0116)	0.304*** (0.0541)	0.286*** (0.0706)	0.283*** (0.0737)
Constant	54.92*** (19.21)	103.4*** (9.088)	195.8*** (26.68)	0.899*** (0.0444)	1.034*** (0.0909)	0.896*** (0.0444)	1.204*** (0.0577)	1.389*** (0.122)	1.067*** (0.0515)	0.424 (0.257)	-0.134 (0.356)	0.817** (0.351)
Control For Stage	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	377	128	249	377	128	249	377	128	249	377	128	249
R-squared	0.994	0.573	0.992	0.585	0.573	0.462	0.428	0.573	0.402	0.413	0.573	0.420
H ₀ : MF=FM	0.05	0.82	0.10	0.07	0.82	0.05	0.10	0.83	0.05	0.02	0.82	0.04
H ₀ : MF=MM	0.02	0.24	0.07	0.01	0.24	0.00	0.01	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.01
H ₀ : FM=MM	0.50	0.21	0.60	0.24	0.21	0.31	0.21	0.21	0.28	0.53	0.21	0.59

Notes: OLS for the dependent variables *Proposer's Outcome*, *Proposer's Share*, *Proposer's Rel. Share*, and *Responder's Rel. Share* for the overall sample (columns 1, 4, 7, and 10), first stage (columns 2, 5, 8, and 11) and for stage 2 on (columns 3, 6, 9, and 12). *Proposer's Outcome* refers to the amount of money kept by the proposer. *Proposer's Share* refers to the share of the pie kept by the proposer. *Proposer's Rel. Share* (*Responder's Rel. Share*) refers to the share kept by the proposer (responder) in relation with the average share kept by the proposer (responder) in the same stage. Notice that the results regarding the analysis *Responder's Outcome* and *Responders's Share* would be identical to the ones of *Proposer's Outcome* and *Proposer's Share* but with the opposite sign. *(First Round Offer)/Pie* and *(Pie-Mean)/Pie* are equivalent to *(First Round Offer)* and *(Pie-Mean)* but expressed as shares of the pie. Otherwise, control variables are the same as in Table A1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4. Full Specification for Gender Interaction Effects in Offers, Demands and Probabilities of Acceptance

	Opening Offers (round=1) (1)	Offers (round>1) (2)	Prob. Responder Accepts (round=1) (3)	Prob. Responder Accepts (round>1) (4)	Demands (5)	Prob. Proposer Accepts (6)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	-0.649 (3.041)	-4.820* (2.880)	0.0968 (0.0656)	-0.0515 (0.0489)	-63.88*** (21.64)	0.00631 (0.102)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	-0.0347 (1.695)	-3.237 (2.501)	0.0794 (0.0573)	0.00532 (0.0483)	4.143 (16.93)	0.0189 (0.0768)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	1.300 (2.544)	0.0520 (3.781)	0.0742 (0.0517)	0.0617 (0.0497)	-16.59 (16.76)	0.0629 (0.103)
Age Proposer	-0.0125 (0.0997)	-0.210 (0.161)				0.000599 (0.00293)
Student Proposer	0.528 (2.599)	-2.573 (2.860)				-0.0520 (0.0661)
Retired Proposer	-1.497 (4.540)	10.26 (7.324)				0.0222 (0.167)
Unemployed Proposer	5.013* (2.789)	16.48 (12.23)				0.114 (0.166)
Low-Occup. Proposer	4.441 (2.684)	3.460 (2.454)				0.0749 (0.0988)
Perc. Age Proposer			-0.0136 (0.0123)	-0.0150 (0.0182)	-8.670 (5.391)	
Perc. Status Proposer	5.341 (4.219)	-7.856* (4.456)	-0.0517 (0.0532)	-0.00806 (0.0769)	35.55 (24.71)	-0.124 (0.128)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	0.725 (0.850)	0.434 (0.871)	-0.00583 (0.0106)	0.00636 (0.0162)	-15.80** (6.336)	0.00321 (0.0243)
Perc. Age Responder	-1.430* (0.770)	-1.540 (1.263)	0.0180 (0.0133)	0.0151 (0.0175)	-5.267 (7.948)	-0.0240 (0.0222)
Perc. Status Responder	2.940 (2.863)	4.490 (4.484)	-0.00650 (0.0415)	0.0283 (0.0742)	79.61*** (29.63)	-0.0216 (0.127)
Perc. Attractiveness	0.479 (0.875)	-1.351 (1.219)	0.00787 (0.0128)	0.0113 (0.0183)	-11.34 (7.999)	-0.0404 (0.0360)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	-0.231*** (0.0511)	-0.0248 (0.0522)	0.00164* (0.000841)	0.000450 (0.000723)	0.228 (0.298)	-0.000563 (0.000979)
Bargaining Time	-0.0160 (0.0164)	-0.101*** (0.0349)	-0.000907*** (0.000280)	-0.000390 (0.000364)	-0.131 (0.222)	-0.000446 (0.000461)
Round		8.202*** (1.384)		0.0235 (0.0177)	14.60 (13.75)	0.0851** (0.0378)
Demand at Current Round						-0.00333** (0.00136)
Previous Demand		0.0806*** (0.0281)				
(Previous Demand) ²		-4.43e-05** (1.94e-05)				
First Round Offer		1.312*** (0.219)				0.00928** (0.00414)
Offer at Current Round			0.00381*** (0.000959)	0.000215 (0.000638)	0.580*** (0.194)	
Proposer Starts		-19.32*** (5.524)		-0.121* (0.0678)	-7.452 (23.54)	-0.0573 (0.131)
No Previous Demand					56.77** (24.50)	-0.0414 (0.0476)
Constant	6.736 (6.579)	26.39* (14.98)			86.92 (54.65)	
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	357	926	357	926	871	871
R-squared	0.429					
Number of Responders	357	316	357	316	321	321
H_0 : MF=FM	0.81	0.61	0.74	0.29	0.00	0.89
H_0 : MF=MM	0.32	0.21	0.61	0.02	0.01	0.53
H_0 : FM=MM	0.51	0.44	0.90	0.16	0.28	0.60

Notes: The dependent variable *Offers* refer to the offers in euro made by the proposer (columns 1 and 2); *Prob. Responder Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the responder accepts the offer made by the proposer and 0 otherwise (columns 3 and 4); *Demands* refer to the demands in euro made by the responder (column 5); and *Prob. Proposer Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the proposer accepts the demand made by the responder and 0 otherwise (column 6). Columns 3, 4, and 6 show the marginal effects of the coefficients using the probit model. Except for round 1 regressions (column 1 and 3), we use random effects model. The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 3 and 5) and bootstrapped standard errors (columns 4 and 6), in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A5. Alternative Specifications with Collapsed Data for
Gender Interaction Effects in Offers, Demands and Probabilities of Acceptance

	OLS or RE	Probit	RE Probit	OLS or RE	Probit	RE Probit
	Offers (round>1)	Prob. Responder	Prob. Responder	Demands	Prob. Proposer	Prob. Proposer
	(1)	Accepts (round>1)	Accepts (round>1)	(4)	Accepts	Accepts
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	0.191 (3.033)	-0.126 (0.0903)	-0.126 (0.119)	-38.41*** (14.12)	0.0508 (0.0777)	0.0505 (0.0918)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	-2.450 (2.529)	0.0499 (0.0779)	0.0499 (0.0801)	-4.320 (13.22)	-0.0571 (0.0730)	-0.0548 (0.0780)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	-2.083 (3.374)	0.106 (0.0726)	0.106 (0.101)	-5.604 (13.40)	-0.124* (0.0676)	-0.124* (0.0724)
Constant	25.97** (10.84)			142.7** (57.10)		
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	316	316	316	321	321	321
R-squared	0.729			0.487		
Number of Proposers	121	121		122	122	
H_0 : MF=FM	0.42	0.06	0.12	0.04	0.20	0.28
H_0 : MF=MM	0.42	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03
H_0 : FM=MM	0.92	0.43	0.51	0.94	0.32	0.38

Notes: The dependent variable *Offers* refer to the offers in euro made by the proposer (column 1); *Prob. Responder Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the responder accepts the offer made by the proposer and 0 otherwise (columns 2 and 3); *Demands* refer to the demands in euro made by the responder (columns 4); and *Prob. Proposer Accepts* takes the value of 1 when the proposer accepts the demand made by the responder and 0 otherwise (columns 5 and 6). All controls, as shown in Table A4 in the paper, are included. At the bottom, *p*-values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1,2,4,and 5) and bootstrap standard errors (column 3 and 6), in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A6. Gender Interaction Effects in Proposers' and Responders' Bargaining Strategies

	Proposers				Responders			
	Silent (1)	Increasing Offers (2)	Decreasing Offers (3)	Maintaining (4)	Silent (5)	Increasing Demands (6)	Decreasing Demands (7)	Maintaining (8)
Male Proposer-Female Responder	0.0220 (0.0279)	0.0789** (0.0393)	-0.0172** (0.00845)	-0.0610 (0.0387)	0.0410 (0.0702)	0.0106 (0.0580)	-0.0720 (0.0902)	0.0959 (0.0826)
Female Proposer-Male Responder	0.00388 (0.0170)	0.0259 (0.0389)	-0.0336** (0.0142)	0.00381 (0.0372)	0.0752 (0.0635)	-0.0607 (0.0467)	0.0430 (0.0815)	0.0278 (0.0730)
Male Proposer-Male Responder	0.0119 (0.0214)	0.116*** (0.0372)	-0.0228** (0.0103)	-0.0847** (0.0393)	0.0352 (0.0612)	-0.0538 (0.0431)	0.0223 (0.0797)	0.0659 (0.0812)
Age Proposer	0.000779 (0.000735)	0.00109 (0.00189)	5.46e-05 (0.000533)	-0.00120 (0.00177)				
Student Proposer	-0.0140 (0.0149)	0.0656* (0.0388)	-0.0110 (0.00899)	-0.0527 (0.0408)				
Retired Proposer	-0.0266 (0.0299)	-0.0436 (0.105)	-0.0153*** (0.00437)	0.0782 (0.126)				
Unemployed Proposer	-0.0101 (0.0342)	0.00654 (0.0674)	-0.000952 (0.0169)	0.000285 (0.0874)				
Low-Occup. Proposer	-0.00647 (0.0146)	-0.0727* (0.0418)	0.00308 (0.0119)	0.0667* (0.0403)				
Perc. Age Proposer					0.00322 (0.0202)	-0.0232 (0.0214)	0.00414 (0.0250)	0.0166 (0.0252)
Perc. Status Proposer	-0.0483 (0.0317)	0.0130 (0.0662)	0.00650 (0.0259)	0.00499 (0.0649)	0.0266 (0.0883)	-0.0822 (0.0859)	0.128 (0.136)	-0.0600 (0.112)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	0.00592 (0.00577)	-0.00121 (0.0118)	-0.00329 (0.00463)	0.00350 (0.0120)	0.0141 (0.0183)	0.00453 (0.0171)	-0.0158 (0.0255)	0.0170 (0.0216)
Perc. Age Responder	-0.00177 (0.00533)	0.00610 (0.0177)	-0.00785 (0.00559)	8.83e-05 (0.0175)	0.00421 (0.0214)	0.0113 (0.0180)	-0.0102 (0.0320)	-0.00512 (0.0300)
Perc. Status Responder	0.0171 (0.0236)	-0.108* (0.0627)	-0.00692 (0.0196)	0.0917 (0.0605)	-0.135* (0.0805)	0.0812 (0.0753)	0.0493 (0.109)	-0.134 (0.102)
Perc. Attractiveness Responder	-0.00725 (0.00663)	0.0153 (0.0175)	-0.00941* (0.00531)	-0.00317 (0.0172)	0.0242 (0.0253)	-0.0347 (0.0222)	0.00394 (0.0328)	0.0297 (0.0328)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	0.000555 (0.000348)	0.000295 (0.000570)	-4.86e-05 (0.000153)	-0.000334 (0.000518)	0.000613 (0.000858)	-0.000844 (0.000514)	0.00166 (0.00106)	-0.000752 (0.000879)
Remaining Time	0.000332** (0.000169)	5.31e-05 (0.000344)	0.000132 (0.000110)	-0.000132 (0.000320)	-0.000441 (0.000486)	-0.000370 (0.000393)	0.000504 (0.000630)	-0.000237 (0.000511)
No. Of Rounds	0.00312 (0.00345)	0.0336*** (0.0127)	0.00322 (0.00241)	-0.0360*** (0.0117)	0.0558*** (0.0151)	0.0482*** (0.00960)	-0.0287** (0.0129)	-0.0450*** (0.0153)
Round	-0.00338 (0.00305)	-0.0864*** (0.0122)	0.00220 (0.00216)	0.0842*** (0.0128)	-0.0945*** (0.0133)	-0.0395*** (0.0135)	-0.0104 (0.0146)	0.0730*** (0.0148)
Control for Stages	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	1,349	911	911	911	1,174	551	551	551
Number of Responders	377	308	308	308	354	230	230	230
H_0 : MF=FM	0.43	0.19	0.15	0.09	0.64	0.24	0.20	0.42
H_0 : MF=MM	0.63	0.30	0.43	0.51	0.93	0.23	0.24	0.71
H_0 : FM=MM	0.64	0.02	0.35	0.03	0.49	0.88	0.78	0.60

Notes: Dependent variables refer to the different types of strategies used in the bargaining process. *Silent* takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder remains silent. *Increasing* takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder increases the offer or demand from one round to the next. *Decreasing* takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder decreases the offer or demand from one round to the next. Finally, *Maintain* takes the value of 1 when the proposer or responder maintains the same offer or demand from one round to the next. All columns show the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit random effects model. The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. At the bottom, p -values for the hypothesis testing are shown where pairwise comparisons are made for the different gender combinations, where FF refers to bargaining between women, MF refers to the bargaining between a male proposer and a female responder, FM refers to the bargaining between a female proposer and a male responder and MM refers to the bargaining between men. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table A7. Alternative Specifications and Additional Results
for the Choice of the Gender of the Responder

	LPM Prob. Male Responder (1)	Logit Prob. Male Responder (2)	RE Probit Prob. Male Responder (3)	Probit Prob. Male Responder (4)	Probit Prob. Male Responder (5)
Male Proposer	0.142** (0.0555)	0.138*** (0.0525)	0.145** (0.0605)	0.154** (0.0647)	0.0552 (0.153)
Age Proposer	0.00252 (0.00356)	0.00257 (0.00339)	0.00166 (0.00372)	0.00221 (0.00337)	0.00212 (0.00338)
Student Proposer	0.117 (0.0819)	0.110 (0.0739)	0.104 (0.0917)	0.106 (0.0750)	0.106 (0.0749)
Retired Proposer	-0.119 (0.192)	-0.135 (0.192)	-0.0934 (0.285)	-0.133 (0.186)	-0.128 (0.187)
Unemployed Proposer	0.146* (0.0843)	0.145** (0.0700)	0.138 (0.0905)	0.140* (0.0724)	0.134* (0.0741)
Low-Occupation Proposer	0.00276 (0.0726)	0.00403 (0.0677)	0.0103 (0.0794)	0.00423 (0.0689)	0.00322 (0.0684)
Perc. Attractiveness Proposer	0.0534* (0.0277)	0.0551** (0.0272)	0.0537* (0.0306)	0.0539** (0.0265)	0.0433 (0.0285)
Perc. Status Proposer	-0.148 (0.126)	-0.157 (0.125)	-0.163 (0.151)	-0.149 (0.124)	-0.152 (0.124)
(Pie-Mean) by Stage	-0.000435 (0.000779)	-0.000434 (0.000773)	0.0000334 (0.00105)	-0.000277 (0.000773)	-0.000274 (0.000786)
Remaining Time	0.000507 (0.000486)	0.000491 (0.000482)	0.000502 (0.000504)	0.000534 (0.000473)	0.000543 (0.000467)
Male Question	0.290*** (0.0539)	0.308*** (0.0535)	0.324*** (0.0550)	0.343*** (0.0586)	0.301*** (0.0521)
Female Question	-0.303*** (0.0638)	-0.282*** (0.0623)	-0.314*** (0.0720)	-0.275*** (0.0965)	-0.289*** (0.0639)
Male Proposer*Male Question				-0.154 (0.157)	
Male Proposer*Female Question				-0.0193 (0.120)	
Male Proposer*Perc. Attract. Proposer					0.0249 (0.0419)
Constant	0.274 (0.184)				
Controls for Stage	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	428	428	428	428	428
R-squared	0.154				

Notes: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the selected responder is male and 0 otherwise. The table shows the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5) and bootstrapped standard errors (column 3), in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8. Are Male Responders
More Likely to Know the Correct Answer?

	Prob. Correct Answer (1)	Prob. Correct Answer (2)	Prob. Correct Answer Male Questions (3)	Prob. Correct Answer Female Questions (4)
Male Responder	-0.0648* (0.0343)	-0.0482 (0.0362)	-0.0989 (0.1633)	0.0059 (0.0941)
Male Question		-0.123** (0.0612)		
Female Question		-0.0353 (0.0507)		
Observations	427	427	70	67

Notes: The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the responder provided the correct answer and 0 otherwise. The table shows the marginal effect values of the coefficients using the probit model. The control variables are described in the notes of Table 1. Clustered standard errors at the proposer level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1