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dc.creatorBerdud, Mikeles_ES
dc.creatorCabasés Hita, Juan Manueles_ES
dc.creatorNieto Vázquez, Jorgees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-10T07:40:30Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T07:40:30Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/20624
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organisation) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organisation can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organisational objectives and views herself as a part of the organisation. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that identity can be achieved when principal include mission-sense developing investments in contracts. By mission we mean a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organisations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThanks to the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support of this project (Project ECO2009-12836).en
dc.format.extent41 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiakes
dc.relation.ispartofseries1214en
dc.rightsCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectIdentityen
dc.subjectSocializationen
dc.subjectMissionen
dc.subjectMotivational capitalen
dc.titleIncentives beyond the money: identity and motivational capital in public organizationsen
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo / Lan gaiakes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentNafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Sailaeu
dc.rights.accessRightsAcceso abierto / Sarbide irekiaes
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/6PN/ECO2009-12836


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CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)