Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem
Size approval voting
| dc.creator | Alcalde Unzu, Jorge | es_ES |
| dc.creator | Vorsatz, Marc | es_ES |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-10T07:40:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-05-10T07:40:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/20645 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 24 p. | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Documentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak | es |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | 0703 | en |
| dc.rights | CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) | en |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Approval voting | en |
| dc.subject | Characterization | en |
| dc.title | Size approval voting | en |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo / Lan gaiak | es |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | en |
| dc.contributor.department | Economía | es_ES |
| dc.contributor.department | Ekonomia | eu |
| dc.rights.accessRights | Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia | es |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
Ficheros en el ítem
Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)
La licencia del ítem se describe como CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
