Strategy-proof location of public facilities
Fecha
2018Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Artículo / Artikulua
Versión
Versión aceptada / Onetsi den bertsioa
Impacto
|
10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.010
Resumen
Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in t ...
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Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules. [--]
Materias
Social choice rule,
Strategy-proofness,
Pareto efficiency,
Single-peaked preferences,
Single-dipped preferences
Editor
Elsevier
Publicado en
Games and Economic Behavior, 112 (2018) 21-48
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila
Versión del editor
Entidades Financiadoras
Financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the projects ECO2015-64330-P and ECO2015-65701-P, is gratefully acknowledged.