Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence
Fecha
2015Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Artículo / Artikulua
Versión
Versión aceptada / Onetsi den bertsioa
Identificador del proyecto
Impacto
|
10.1016/j.socec.2015.05.007
Resumen
In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This ...
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In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and confirm the striking result of segregation. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies notably decreases with the cost of moving and that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects. [--]
Materias
Subgame perfect equilibrium,
Segregation,
Experimental games
Editor
Elsevier
Publicado en
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2015, 57, 134-147
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila
Versión del editor
Entidades Financiadoras
Financial support from the Spanish Economy and Competitiveness Ministry (ECO2014-55745-R, ECO2013-46550-R, ECO2013-44879-R, SEJ-2012-1436, ECO2012-34202), Fundación BBVA, Junta de Andalucía Excelencia (P07-SEJ-02547) and Generalitat Valenciana (PROMETEOII/2014/054) is gratefully acknowledged.