Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís
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Martínez Mora
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Francisco de Asís
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Economía
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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics
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Publication Open Access The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences(Elsevier, 2013-12-05) Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís; Puy Segura, M. Socorro; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEThis paper studies two widely used models of political competition - citizen-candidate and probabilistic voting - to investigate the impact that asymmetries in single-peaked preferences have on two-party electoral competition. In a two-candidate equilibrium of the citizen-candidate model, asymmetries determine which candidate proposes a more moderate platform. In the probabilistic voting model, they induce both parties to move their platforms in the direction of the asymmetry, and affect the probabilities of victory of the contenders, sometimes in unexpected ways: under a restriction on party preferences, more overprovision avoidance increases the probability of victory of the party proposing a larger public sector and vice versa. The final part of the analysis shows that consumers' risk aversion, prudence and a decreasingly effective government induce overprovision avoidance asymmetries, whereas consumers' risk neutrality, a constant-effective government and a property we call decreasing satiation induce shortfall avoidance asymmetries.Publication Open Access The desegregating effect of school tracking(Elsevier, 2014-01-23) De Fraja, Gianni; Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEThis paper makes the following point: 'detracking' schools, that is preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their ability, may lead to an increase in income residential segregation. It does so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group of their children. If ability and income are positively correlated, tracking implies that some high income households face the choice of either living in the areas where most of the other high income households live and having their child assigned to the low track, or instead living in lower income neighbourhoods where their child would be in the high track. Under mild conditions, tracking leads to an equilibrium with partial income desegregation where perfect income segregation would be the only stable outcome without tracking.Publication Open Access Asymmetric single-peaked preferences(Walter de Gruyter, 2012) Puy Segura, M. Socorro; Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís; Economía; EkonomiaThe asymmetry of single-peaked preferences has scarcely been incorporated as an assumption in economic models. We analyze how to deal with asymmetric single-peaked preferences in a tractable way. We define natural types of asymmetries, provide the tools to compare degrees of asymmetry, and propose concrete utility functions that represent different directions and degrees of asymmetry. As an application, we provide a representative voter theorem which establishes the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents that is compatible with the median being the representative voter.