Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/53021

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Martínez Mora

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Francisco de Asís

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0002-0839-2569

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751137

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811934

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2012 - 20132
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Author: Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís × Subject: Single-peakedness ×

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    PublicationOpen Access
    The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences
    (Elsevier, 2013-12-05) Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís; Puy Segura, M. Socorro; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    This paper studies two widely used models of political competition - citizen-candidate and probabilistic voting - to investigate the impact that asymmetries in single-peaked preferences have on two-party electoral competition. In a two-candidate equilibrium of the citizen-candidate model, asymmetries determine which candidate proposes a more moderate platform. In the probabilistic voting model, they induce both parties to move their platforms in the direction of the asymmetry, and affect the probabilities of victory of the contenders, sometimes in unexpected ways: under a restriction on party preferences, more overprovision avoidance increases the probability of victory of the party proposing a larger public sector and vice versa. The final part of the analysis shows that consumers' risk aversion, prudence and a decreasingly effective government induce overprovision avoidance asymmetries, whereas consumers' risk neutrality, a constant-effective government and a property we call decreasing satiation induce shortfall avoidance asymmetries.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Asymmetric single-peaked preferences
    (Walter de Gruyter, 2012) Puy Segura, M. Socorro; Martínez Mora, Francisco de Asís; Economía; Ekonomia
    The asymmetry of single-peaked preferences has scarcely been incorporated as an assumption in economic models. We analyze how to deal with asymmetric single-peaked preferences in a tractable way. We define natural types of asymmetries, provide the tools to compare degrees of asymmetry, and propose concrete utility functions that represent different directions and degrees of asymmetry. As an application, we provide a representative voter theorem which establishes the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents that is compatible with the median being the representative voter.