Open Access
Loan production and monetary policy
(Cambridge University Press, 2019) Casares Polo, Miguel; Deidda, Luca; Galdón Sánchez, José Enrique; Economía; Ekonomia
The authors examine optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with unemployment and financial frictions where banks produce loans using equity as collateral. Firms and households demand loans to finance externally a fraction of their flows of expenditures. Our findings show amplifying business-cycle effects of a more rigid loan production technology. In the monetary policy analysis, the optimal rule clearly outperforms a Taylor-type rule. The optimized interest-rate response to the external finance premium turns significantly negative when either banking rigidities are high or when financial shocks are the only source of business cycle fluctuations.
Open Access
Rethinking fiscal rules
(Elsevier, 2023) Carranza-Ugarte, Luis; Díaz-Saavedra, Julián; Galdón Sánchez, José Enrique; Economía; Ekonomia; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa
The Covid 19 pandemic has caused both a decrease in tax revenues and an increase in public spending, forcing governments to increase fiscal deficits to unprecedented levels. Given these circumstances, it is foreseeable that fiscal rules will play a predominant role in the design of many countries¿ recovery policies. We develop a general equilibrium, overlapping generations model for a small, open economy in order to study the impact of several fiscal rules upon welfare, public expenditures and growth. We calibrate the model to the Peruvian economy. In this economy, fiscal rules have been widely used and, unlike in other Latin American countries, they have been relatively successful. We find that fiscal rules will generate better results in terms of output if, in addition to maintaining control over the fiscal result, they also preserve public investment. We also find that the performance of economies that implement structural rules tends to be better than the performance of economies that implement rules based on realized budget balance.
Embargo
The value of information in competitive markets: evidence from small and medium-sized enterprises
(The University of Chicago Press, 2024-11-12) Galdón Sánchez, José Enrique; Gil, Ricard; Uriz-Uharte, Guillermo; Economía; Ekonomia
We empirically investigate how the performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) changes when gaining access to market information. To do so, we evaluate the impact of an information program diffused by a bank among its SME customers. Adopting firms gained access to reports with rich information about their own clientele and that of nearby establishments. While we find that adoption is associated with a 4.5% revenue increase, our instrumental variable results indicate that adoption increases revenue by 9%. The main mechanism driving our result is that the new information prompted adopting establishments to target gender-age customer groups underserved before adoption.
Open Access
On financial frictions and firm market power
(Banco de España, 2019) Casares Polo, Miguel; Deidda, Luca; Galdón Sánchez, José Enrique; Economía; Ekonomia
Construimos un modelo de equilibrio general estático con empresas monopolísticamente competitivas que toman prestados fondos de bancos competitivos en una economía sujeta a restricciones financieras. Estas fricciones son debidas a la imposibilidad de verificar tanto los beneficios de las empresas como el esfuerzo de sus gestores. El poder de mercado tiene dos efectos contrapuestos. Por un lado, las empresas marcan sus precios por encima del coste marginal y la producción resultante es inferior a la que se obtendría en competencia perfecta. Por otro, debido al incremento en la rentabilidad de las empresas, el poder de mercado reduce el impacto de las fricciones financieras. El resultado de la interacción de estos dos efectos es ambiguo. Este trabajo muestra que, ceteris paribus, existe un nivel óptimo positivo de poder de mercado que maximiza el bienestar. Este nivel aumenta con el riesgo moral y disminuye con la eficiencia del proceso de liquidación de las empresas en caso de quiebra.
Unknown
On financial frictions and firm's market power
(Wiley, 2023) Casares Polo, Miguel; Deidda, Luca; Galdón Sánchez, José Enrique; Economía; Ekonomia
There are two opposing welfare effects of market power in a model with monopolistic competition, loan defaults and moral hazard. The loss of output produced if firms set a higher mark-up over marginal costs confronts with some gain due to higher expected profits and the reduction of defaults. Such tradeoff results in an optimal level of market power that decreases with the efficiency of liquidation following default on a loan. If moral hazard is pervasive, credit rationing cuts down the default rates and mitigates the welfare cost of financial frictions.