Martínez García, Beatriz

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/49528

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Martínez García

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Beatriz

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Gestión de Empresas

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0003-2812-1536

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88871

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811375

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Author: Poletti Hughes, Jannine ×

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Leverage in family firms: the moderating role of female directors and board quality
    (Wiley, 2020) Poletti Hughes, Jannine; Martínez García, Beatriz; Gestión de Empresas; Enpresen Kudeaketa
    Grounded in the agency, socioemotional wealth and resource dependence theories, we study how debt decisions are influenced by family control and how such relationship is moderated by an internal corporate governance mechanism, the quality of the board of directors. Our results show that family-controlled firms use more leverage at lower levels of family ownership to retain family control over the business, but once their socioemotional wealth is fulfilled at higher levels of ownership, they decrease leverage in pursuit of conservative financing policies. These actions are found to be moderated by board quality (i.e., experience and expertise) and female directors (predominantly independent).
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Women in power with power: the influence of meaningful board representation on default risk
    (Elsevier, 2023) Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel; Martínez García, Beatriz; Poletti Hughes, Jannine; Gestión de Empresas; Enpresen Kudeaketa; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, Research Grant for Young Researchers 2023
    This paper examines the relationship between the presence of female board members and firms' corporate default risk. We find an inverted “U-shaped” relationship for a sample of 917 firms in 19 emerging markets for the period 2005–2019. We also show that, consistent with critical mass theory, boards need to have three or more female directors to significantly reduce default risk. Furthermore, having female directors with an independent role on the board in countries with less familial dominance, or having female directors with a leadership position, significantly reduces default risk. Finally, we find a positive effect of the interaction between a country's gender inequality and board gender diversity on default risk.