Martínez García, Beatriz

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Martínez García

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Beatriz

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Gestión de Empresas

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Does family ownership always reduce default risk?
    (Wiley, 2021) Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel; Corredor Casado, María Pilar; Martínez García, Beatriz; Enpresen Kudeaketa; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Gestión de Empresas
    This paper analyses the effect of family ownership on the outcome of the firm’s risk‐taking activities, measured by the company’s default risk. We show that family ownership reduces the probability of default, which is proxied by the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) model. Our study goes further than the initial approach by taking into account certain factors conditioning the aforementioned relationship. We find that the expected negative relationship between family ownership and default risk is modified when there is a significant participation of institutional investors, whose positive moderating influence intensifies if they are stable and long‐term oriented and/or during adverse financial circumstances.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Women in power with power: the influence of meaningful board representation on default risk
    (Elsevier, 2023) Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel; Martínez García, Beatriz; Poletti Hughes, Jannine; Gestión de Empresas; Enpresen Kudeaketa; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, Research Grant for Young Researchers 2023
    This paper examines the relationship between the presence of female board members and firms' corporate default risk. We find an inverted “U-shaped” relationship for a sample of 917 firms in 19 emerging markets for the period 2005–2019. We also show that, consistent with critical mass theory, boards need to have three or more female directors to significantly reduce default risk. Furthermore, having female directors with an independent role on the board in countries with less familial dominance, or having female directors with a leadership position, significantly reduces default risk. Finally, we find a positive effect of the interaction between a country's gender inequality and board gender diversity on default risk.