Nieto Vázquez, Jorge

Profile Picture

Email Address

person.page.identifierURI

https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/49658

Birth Date

Job Title

Last Name

Nieto Vázquez

First Name

Jorge

person.page.departamento

Economía

person.page.instituteName

ORCID

person.page.observainves

751111

person.page.upna

258

Name

Filters

2012 - 20144
Reset filters

Settings

Subject: Motivational capital ×

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Thumbnail Image
    PublicationOpen Access
    Identity, incentives and motivational capital in public organizations
    (2014) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organization) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organization can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organizational objectives and views herself as a part of the organization. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that the principal can include investments to foster identity in contracts. Think for instance in developing a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organizations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run.
  • Thumbnail Image
    PublicationOpen Access
    Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations
    (2014) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are riskaverse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.
  • Thumbnail Image
    PublicationOpen Access
    Incentives beyond the money: identity and motivational capital in public organizations
    (2012) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organisation) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organisation can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organisational objectives and views herself as a part of the organisation. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that identity can be achieved when principal include mission-sense developing investments in contracts. By mission we mean a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organisations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run.
  • Thumbnail Image
    PublicationOpen Access
    Motivational capital and incentives in health care organisations
    (2012) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards. Intrinsic motivation could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.