Person:
Alcalde Unzu, Jorge

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Alcalde Unzu

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Jorge

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0003-1839-6245

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4338

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 19
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Freedom of choice: John Stuart Mill and the tree of life
    (Springer-Verlag, 2012) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
    This essay deals with the notion and content of freedom of choice proposing a new set up and a new family of measures for this concept which is, indeed, an ethical value of paramount importance in a well ordered and open society. Following some ideas of John StuartMill, we propose that freedom of choice has to be understood not in a single stage of choice, but in the ordered collection of choices that a person can make in her life.We then suggest to represent a life in a tree structure, where each node represents a state of life and the edges between nodes will represent possible decisions in life. In this new framework, we propose a set of axioms that imply the following family of measures of lifetime’s freedom of choice: the lifetime’s freedom of choice has to be evaluated by a weighted sum of all possible states of life an individual might visit, with weights representing the number of decisions the individual took to reach that state.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Strategy-proof location of public facilities
    (2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences: an axiomatic analysis
    (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    In this paper, we axiomatically study how to measure the similarity of preferences in a group of individuals. For simplicity, we refer to this as the cohesiveness. First, we provide axioms that characterize a family of linear and additive measures whose intersection is a partial ordinal criterion similar to first order stochastic dominance. The introduction of some additional properties isolates a one-parameter subfamily. This parameter evaluates the effect on the cohesiveness if one individual changes his ranking on a single pair of objects, as a function of how many of the remaining individuals in the group rank the first object over the second and vice versa. Finally, we characterize the focal measures of this subfamily separately showing that they coincide with measures constructed using two, at first sight, totally different approaches suggested in the literature.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Solidarity to achieve stability
    (Elsevier, 2024) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra, Elena; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, PJUPNA2023-11403
    Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Strategy-proof location of public facilities
    (Elsevier, 2018) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
    (Springer, 2023) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Klijn, Flip; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Size approval voting
    (2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility
    (Springer, 2020) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; Ekonomia
    We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al. in Games Econ Behav 90:134–150, 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    The measurement of the value of a language
    (Elsevier, 2022) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Weber, Shlomo; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
    We address the problem of assessing the value of a language. We consider a stylized model of multilingual societies in which we introduce axioms formalizing the principles of impartiality, monotonicity, invariance and consistency. We show that the combination of these axioms characterizes a family of communicative benefit functions which assign a value to each language in the society. The functions within the family involve a two-step procedure. First, they identify the groups of agents that can communicate in each language. Second, each group is assigned an aggregate (size-dependent) value, which is evenly divided among the languages in which the group can communicate. Our novel approach could be useful in a wide range of empirical applications and policy decisions.
  • PublicationOpen Access
    Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information
    (2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the different outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential outcomes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes, even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in different ranking rules.