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Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael

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Santamaría Aquilué

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Rafael

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Gestión de Empresas

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0000-0001-7656-6412

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525

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Author: Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel × Subject: Bargaining power ×

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    PublicationOpen Access
    The effect of a switch of management company on pension plan fees
    (Routledge, 2021) Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel; Muga Caperos, Luis Fernando; Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael; Enpresen Kudeaketa; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Gestión de Empresas
    The impact of a switch of management company on pension plan fees is analysed by comparing the effects on employer-sponsored versus individual defined-contribution private pension plans in Spain. This framework is ideal because the two types differ significantly both in plan governance structure and consequently in the degree of bargaining power held by the decision-maker. In addition, intense bank restructuring, which has greatly modified the Spanish pension plan map, provides an interesting analytical context for the identification of causal links, because it is a scenario that features shocks exogenous to the relationship under analysis. The results show that a switch of management company significantly reduces management fees for employer-sponsored plans when the management change is not due to the bank restructuring process, on the contrary a switch of management company increases fees for individual pension plans.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Bad company. The indirect effect of differences in corporate governance in the pension plan industry
    (Elsevier, 2017) Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel; Muga Caperos, Luis Fernando; Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    This paper analyses the role played by pension plan governance structure and how it impacts on plan fees and plan performance. The results clearly show that fees decrease significantly and performance improves when pension plan governance structures permit full alignment of interests and allow greater capacity for the decision-makers to monitor and discipline the managers. It is also observed that companies managing both employee and individual funds, tend to exploit differences in the internal corporate governance mechanisms of each type of plan in order to nurture employer-sponsored plans at the expense of individual plans. These results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms allowing closer alignment with the interests of participants would be preferable to focusing exclusively on setting the minimum proportion of independent directors.