The purpose of this paper is to show whether international policy coordination may be the best response to economic interdependence. We will study the short-run interactions taking place among interdependent economies, where monetary supply is the instrument used to maintain output and price targets. We develop a macroeconomic model in which countries show different preferences regarding objectives and face asymmetric disturbances, analyzing in strategic terms how monetary policy can deal with real, monetary, and supply shocks. We also show how the superiority of the cooperative solution depends on the sources of the disturbances, the underlying economic framework, and the asymmetry of the preferences.
(1999) Bajo Rubio, Óscar; Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
In this paper we offer a proposal of an automatic insurance mechanism designed to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. The mechanism would take as indicator the changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union, and would be financed through a fund built from contributions of those countries as a percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be later distributed among the countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which every one of them would have been affected by the shock. The mechanism proposed is illustrated by means of an empirical application to the case of the European monetary union.
