Open Access
On the insurance function of fiscal policy in a monetary union
(2000) Bajo Rubio, Óscar; Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
In this paper we first review the available literature on the degree of insurance against shocks, provided by the central budget in the federal systems already existing. Next, we discuss the main points raised on the debate about the implementation of an automatic mechanism designed to cope with country-specific shocks in a monetary union, and present a specific proposal of such a mechanism.
Open Access
Coordination of fiscal policies in a monetary union
(2000) Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper examines how the member countries of a monetary union react to country-specific shocks and to shocks from the rest of the world, when the budget deficit is the only policy instrument available. We develop a three-country model in which countries show different preferences regarding objectives, and face asymmetric disturbances. Two of the countries form a monetary union where an independent central bank controls monetary policy, and fiscal policy is determined by fiscal authorities at the national level. In this framework, we analyse in strategic terms how authorities can deal with monetary, real and supply shocks using fiscal policy with stabilizing purposes. Finally, we discuss the welfare aspects of the optimal solution and the extent to which a coordinated fiscal policy may influence the performance and evolution of the monetary union.
Open Access
La estabilización en una unión monetaria: implicaciones para las políticas de oferta
(1998) Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
En este trabajo se examina la manera en que los países miembros de una unión monetaria responden a las perturbaciones específicas y a las que proceden del resto del mundo, cuando aplican políticas de oferta. Desarrollamos un modelo de tres países que muestran preferencias distintas respecto a sus objetivos y sufren perturbaciones asimétricas. Dos de los países forman una unión monetaria, donde un banco central independiente controla la política monetaria y existe la posibilidad de desarrollar políticas por el lado de la oferta a nivel nacional. En este contexto, analizamos el modo en que las autoridades pueden hacer frente a perturbaciones reales, monetarias y de oferta agregada, y discutimos los aspectos de bienestar de la solución óptima y en qué medida una política de oferta coordinada puede ser beneficiosa para hacer frente a dichas perturbaciones
Open Access
Efectos de la coordinación de la política fiscal en una unión monetaria: implicaciones para la Unión Monetaria Europea
(1998) Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
En este trabajo se examina la manera en que los países miembros de una unión monetaria responden a las perturbaciones específicas y a las que proceden del resto del mundo, cuando el déficit público es el único instrumento de la política. Desarrollamos un modelo de tres países que muestran preferencias distintas respectos a sus objetivos y sufren perturbaciones asimétricas. Dos de los países forman una unión monetaria, donde un banco central independiente controla la política monetaria y la política fiscal es determinada por las autoridades fiscales a nivel nacional. En este contexto, analizamos el modo en que las autoridades pueden hacer frente a perturbaciones reales, monetarias y de oferta agregada. Finalmente, discutimos los aspectos de bienestar de la solución óptima y en qué medida una política fiscal común puede ejercer influencia sobre la estructura y evolución de la unión monetaria.
Open Access
Insurance mechanisms against asymmetric shocks in a monetary union: an application to the European Monetary Union
(1999) Bajo Rubio, Óscar; Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
In this paper we offer a proposal of an automatic insurance mechanism designed to cope with asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. The mechanism would take as indicator the changes in the unemployment rate of the countries belonging to the union, and would be financed through a fund built from contributions of those countries as a percentage of their tax receipts. The fund would be later distributed among the countries affected by a negative asymmetric shock according to the proportion in which every one of them would have been affected by the shock. The mechanism proposed is illustrated by means of an empirical application to the case of the European monetary union.
Open Access
Supply policies coordination in a monetary union
(2000) Díaz Roldán, Carmen; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper examines how the member countries of a monetary union react to country-specific shocks and to shocks from the rest of the world, using supply-side policies. We develop a three-country model in which countries show different preferences regarding objectives, and face asymmetric disturbances. Two of the countries form a monetary union where an independent central bank controls monetary policy, and supply policies are determined by the authorities at the national level. In this framework, we analyse in strategic terms how the authorities can deal with monetary, real and supply shocks, and discuss the welfare aspects of the optimal solution and the extent to which a coordinated supply-side policy may be useful to deal with those shocks.