Serrano Hernández, Adrián
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Serrano Hernández
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Adrián
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Estadística, Informática y Matemáticas
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ISC. Institute of Smart Cities
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Publication Open Access Valuations of transport nuisances and cognitive biases: a survey laboratory experiment in the Pyrenees region(Springer, 2021) Denant-Boemont, Laurent; Faulín Fajardo, Javier; Hammiche, Sabrina; Serrano Hernández, Adrián; Estatistika, Informatika eta Matematika; Institute of Smart Cities - ISC; Estadística, Informática y MatemáticasWe designed a survey that aims at estimating individual willingness-to-pay to reduce noise and air pollution arising from transportation activity near the Pyrenees in Navarre (Spain). Our participants cope with a series of contingent valuation questions and also with an economic experiment with real incentives about the same topic. Our goal is to identify several methodological problems in the valuation process coming from hypothetical bias, correlation effect and sequence effect when series of responses are requested. Our main results are that hypothetical bias is significant, because the willingness-to-pay is greater when the survey is hypothetical compared to when there is real monetary incentive. Likewise, the correlation effect also observes the same behavior since the willingness-to-pay for pollution mitigation is close to the one established for noise reduction. Finally, we have obtained mixed evidence for the sequence effect, being present only in the contingent valuation survey part.Publication Open Access Managing transportation externalities in the Pyrenees region: measuring the willingness-to-pay for road freight noise reduction using an experimental auction mechanism(Elsevier, 2018) Denant-Boemont, Laurent; Faulín Fajardo, Javier; Hammiche, Sabrina; Serrano Hernández, Adrián; Estatistika, Informatika eta Matematika; Institute of Smart Cities - ISC; Estadística, Informática y MatemáticasThe estimation of the noise impact caused by road freight transportation is critical to have acknowledgment of the ambiance pollution caused by road traffic crossing geographical areas containing important natural resources. Thus, our work proposes a within-subject survey where a Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is combined with a laboratory economic experimental auction. Our study objective is to measure the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for reducing traffic noise nuisances due to freight transportation in the region of Navarre, Spain. A special focus is made regarding the measurement of the hypothetical bias, when a comparison is done between hypothetical WTP, coming from the CVM study, with real-incentivized one, as the outcome of the economic experiment. Additionally, statistical analyses are conducted in order to find explanation factors for these outcomes. Results suggest a strong evidence for an upward hypothetical bias (from 50% to 160%) indicating the income, the educational level, the gender, and the age as the main factors which explain that bias.Publication Open Access Bargaining for the last mile cost and environmental preferences of stakeholders: an economic experiment(Elsevier, 2025-01-09) Denant-Boemont, Laurent; Faulín Fajardo, Javier; Hammiche, Sabrina; Serrano Hernández, Adrián; Estadística, Informática y Matemáticas; Estatistika, Informatika eta Matematika; Institute of Smart Cities - ISC; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate PublikoaWe aim at studying how environmental preferences matter when consumers negotiate with sellers in order to contract for delivery at home. To do that, we build an economic laboratory experiment where pairs of participants bargain for choosing either the click-and-collect option, which is free for consumer but implies for him private transportation costs, or the delivery-at-home option, which is pricey for him, but externalize transportation cost to the seller. In addition, in our game, transportation triggers environmental costs that are borne by both partners. We have 4 different treatments: The first one, as a benchmark, corresponds to an ultimatum bargaining game about the last mile cost with environmental costs. In the second one, we deliver a message about environmental impacts of transportation to the buyer, whereas, in the third one, the same message is delivered to the seller. The last one is a control where the message is delivered to both partners. The preliminary results (which included 178 participants) show that the average delivery price proposed by sellers is below Nash equilibrium price but above the "behavioral price" and that acceptance rates of seller's proposals by buyers are quite high.