Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/48591

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Arlegi Pérez

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Ricardo

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0002-7664-2742

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88397

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354

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2020 - 20233
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Author: Dimitrov, Dinko × Start date: 2020 ×

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    PublicationOpen Access
    League competitions and fairness
    (Springer, 2023) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Dimitrov, Dinko; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    We formulate two fairness principles and characterize the league competition systems that satisfy them. The first principle requires that all players should have the same chance of being the final winner if all players are equally strong, while the second states that the league competition should not favor weaker players. We apply these requirements to a class of systems which includes round-robin tournaments as a particular case.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Fair elimination-type competitions
    (Elsevier, 2020) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Dimitrov, Dinko; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
    We study the impact of two basic principles of fairness on the structure of elimination-type competitions and perform our analysis by focusing on sports competitions. The first principle states that stronger players should have a larger chance of winning than weaker players, while the second principle provides equally strong players the same chances of being the final winner. We apply these requirements to different kinds of knockout competitions, and characterise the structures satisfying them. In our results, a new competition structure that we call an antler is found to play a referential role.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
    (Elsevier, 2020) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Dimitrov, Dinko; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
    We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.