Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo

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Arlegi Pérez

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Ricardo

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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  • PublicationOpen Access
    Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
    (Elsevier, 2020) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Dimitrov, Dinko; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
    We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.