Open Access
Ranking sets additively in decisional contexts: an axiomatic characterization
(2006) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Rodríguez Alcantud, José Carlos; Economía; Ekonomia
Ranking finite subsets of a given set X of elements is the formal object of analysis in this paper. This problem has found a wide range of economic interpretations in the literature. The focus of the paper is on the family of rankings that are additively representable. Existing characterizations are too complex and hard to grasp in decisional contexts. Furthermore, Fishburn [13] showed that the number of sufficient and necessary conditions that are needed to characterize such a family has no upper bound as the cardinality of X increases. In turn, this paper proposes a way to overcome these difficulties and allows for the characterization of a meaningful (sub)family of additively representable rankings of sets by means of a few simple axioms. Pattanaik and Xu’s [21] characterization of the cardinality based rule will be derived from our main result, and other new rules that stem from our general proposal are discussed and characterized in even simpler terms. In particular, we analyze restricted-cardinality based rules, where the set of “focal” elements is not given ex-ante; but brought out by the axioms.
Open Access
On freedom of choice, ambiguity, and the preference for easy choices
(2006) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Dimitrov, Dinko; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper is devoted to the study of opportunity set comparisons when the characteristics of the options within the sets in question may be ambiguous. We assume that agents display a preference for freedom of choice, but also aversion to the presence of ambiguous options. We propose a suitable environment for approaching this problem, and provide axiomatic characterizations of several rules for ranking sets in such a context.
Open Access
An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization
(Springer, 2012) Alcantud, José Carlos R.; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper contributes to the axiomatization of additive rules for ranking sets of objects under the psychological principle of categorization. Firstly we proceed with the case where the elements in the sets are categorized into at most three groups, namely good (with value 1), neutral (with value 0), and bad (with value−1). Secondly, we solve the case where there are only good and neutral elements. In both instances the evaluation of the sets is purely additive. Lastly, we show that dropping one of the axioms in our general characterization produces an axiomatization of the more general class of evaluations where good and bad elements are weighted differently. Areas of research in Economics such as committee selection problems, hedonic games and matching are among the ranking sets models where our results could potentially be applied.

Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo

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