Rank dependent expected utility in the pelota betting system: an experiment

dc.contributor.authorLlorente Erviti, Loreto
dc.contributor.departmentEconomíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentEkonomiaeu
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-10T07:40:41Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T07:40:41Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.description.abstractWe theoretically and experimentally study a zero sum betting market: the pelota betting system, but with commonly known objective probabilities and without commissions. We know that risk-averse expected utility maximizers with identical objective probabilities cannot agree on a bet. Nevertheless, the rank dependent expected utility model allows us to explain the existence of such betting markets even assuming individuals are all identical even in utilities. We focus on behaviour in a given period in a pelota betting market and we aim to explain the volume of bets assuming that all individuals are equal and their marginal utility on wealth is decreasing. We do this in two stages. First, subjects are asked to take betting decisions and the power utility function and probability weighting function are estimated. Once the underlying utility and probability weighting function are known, in a second stage subjects interact in a betting market and we test whether the volume of bets differs from proposed theoretical predictions.en
dc.format.extent40 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20650
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiakes
dc.relation.ispartofseries0604en
dc.rightsCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)en
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectPelota betting marketen
dc.subjectExperimenten
dc.subjectRank dependent expected utilityen
dc.subjectSport betting marketen
dc.titleRank dependent expected utility in the pelota betting system: an experimenten
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication7972c2b8-8f18-41e1-8ff5-210a2ebe0ac0
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7972c2b8-8f18-41e1-8ff5-210a2ebe0ac0

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