Publication: Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations
dc.contributor.author | Berdud García-López, Mikel | |
dc.contributor.author | Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel | |
dc.contributor.author | Nieto Vázquez, Jorge | |
dc.contributor.department | Economía | es_ES |
dc.contributor.department | Ekonomia | eu |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-05-10T07:40:43Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-05-10T07:40:43Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are riskaverse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | The authors would like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support (Project ECO2009-12836). | en |
dc.format.extent | 34 p. | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
dc.identifier.uri | https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20655 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Documentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak | es |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 1402 | en |
dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//ECO2009-12836/ES/ | en |
dc.rights | CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia | es |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | Contracts | en |
dc.subject | Moral hazard | en |
dc.subject | Intrinsic motivation | en |
dc.subject | Crowding effects | en |
dc.subject | Motivational capital | en |
dc.title | Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations | en |
dc.type | Documento de trabajo / Lan gaiak | es |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | en |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
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