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Identity, incentives and motivational capital in public organizations

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dc.contributor.authorBerdud García-López, Mikel
dc.contributor.authorCabasés Hita, Juan Manuel
dc.contributor.authorNieto Vázquez, Jorge
dc.contributor.departmentEconomíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentEkonomiaeu
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-10T07:40:47Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T07:40:47Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organization) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organization can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organizational objectives and views herself as a part of the organization. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that the principal can include investments to foster identity in contracts. Think for instance in developing a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organizations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors would like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support of these projects (ECO2009-12836, ECO2012-34202).en
dc.format.extent51 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20666
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiakes
dc.relation.ispartofseries1403en
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//ECO2009-12836/ES/en
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO//ECO2012-34202/ES/en
dc.rightsCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)en
dc.rights.accessRightsAcceso abierto / Sarbide irekiaes
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectIdentityen
dc.subjectSocializationen
dc.subjectMissionen
dc.subjectMotivational capitalen
dc.titleIdentity, incentives and motivational capital in public organizationsen
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo / Lan gaiakes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperen
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6072ac37-8930-4914-b5a4-ce210d245831
relation.isAuthorOfPublication1a8dab3a-5e54-4aa0-bc0f-7d7fa49b3268
relation.isAuthorOfPublication77894d5e-4e5f-4020-aa8f-63cba38c3bf1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6072ac37-8930-4914-b5a4-ce210d245831

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