Motivational capital and incentives in health care organisations

dc.contributor.authorBerdud García-López, Mikel
dc.contributor.authorCabasés Hita, Juan Manuel
dc.contributor.authorNieto Vázquez, Jorge
dc.contributor.departmentEconomíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentEkonomiaeu
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-10T07:40:27Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T07:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards. Intrinsic motivation could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.en
dc.format.extent25 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20618
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiakes
dc.relation.ispartofseries1209en
dc.rightsCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)en
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectIntrinsic motivationen
dc.subjectCrowding effectsen
dc.subjectMotivational capitalen
dc.titleMotivational capital and incentives in health care organisationsen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6072ac37-8930-4914-b5a4-ce210d245831
relation.isAuthorOfPublication1a8dab3a-5e54-4aa0-bc0f-7d7fa49b3268
relation.isAuthorOfPublication77894d5e-4e5f-4020-aa8f-63cba38c3bf1
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6072ac37-8930-4914-b5a4-ce210d245831

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