Alcalde Unzu, JorgeVorsatz, Marc2019-06-252020-11-0120181090-247310.1016/j.geb.2018.06.010https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/33493Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.57 p.application/pdfeng© 2018 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licenseSocial choice ruleStrategy-proofnessPareto efficiencySingle-peaked preferencesSingle-dipped preferencesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess