Abinzano Guillén, María IsabelMuga Caperos, Luis FernandoSantamaría Aquilué, Rafael2022-01-182022-01-1820210210-241210.1080/02102412.2021.1896195https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/41832The impact of a switch of management company on pension plan fees is analysed by comparing the effects on employer-sponsored versus individual defined-contribution private pension plans in Spain. This framework is ideal because the two types differ significantly both in plan governance structure and consequently in the degree of bargaining power held by the decision-maker. In addition, intense bank restructuring, which has greatly modified the Spanish pension plan map, provides an interesting analytical context for the identification of causal links, because it is a scenario that features shocks exogenous to the relationship under analysis. The results show that a switch of management company significantly reduces management fees for employer-sponsored plans when the management change is not due to the bank restructuring process, on the contrary a switch of management company increases fees for individual pension plans.28 p.application/pdfeng© 2021 The Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License, which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.Bank restructuring processBargaining powerFee settingG23G30G34Pension plan industryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess