Berdud, MikelCabasés Hita, Juan ManuelNieto Vázquez, Jorge2016-05-102016-05-102014https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20655This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are riskaverse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.34 p.application/pdfengCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)ContractsMoral hazardIntrinsic motivationCrowding effectsMotivational capitalDocumento de trabajo / Lan gaiakAcceso abierto / Sarbide irekiainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess