Incentives to give up resource extraction and avoid the tragedy of the commons

Benito Ostolaza, Juan MiguelOsés Eraso, Nuria2016-05-102016-05-102013https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20571This paper develops a general model of common resource extraction where we introduce payments for environmental services to encourage resource users to give up extraction. The goal is to reach a balance between resource use and conservation. As the essence of conservation is dynamic, we use a dynamic model to study the implementation of the compensation scheme. A stable heterogeneous equilibrium can be reached where both extractors and non-extractors live together. We analyze how the success of the compensation depends on factors such as the elasticity of demand and the biological characteristics of the resource.28 p.application/pdfengCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)Common resourceOvercapacityPayment for environmental servicesCompensationReplicator dynamicsIncentives to give up resource extraction and avoid the tragedy of the commonsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess