Arlegi Pérez, RicardoDimitrov, Dinko2021-03-042022-09-0120200165-176510.1016/j.econlet.2020.109418https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/39334We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.10 p.application/pdfeng© 2020 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0AgendaBinary treeElectionsManipulationSequential votinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess