Apesteguía Garcés, JoséDufwenberg, MartinSelten, Reinhard2016-05-102016-05-102003https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/20672Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.33 p.application/pdfengCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)Anti trustLeniencyImmunityAmnestyBlow the whistleCartelsPrice competitionBertrand modelExperimentCommunicationinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess