The role of investor type in the fee structures of pension plans
Fecha
2016Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Artículo / Artikulua
Versión
Versión aceptada / Onetsi den bertsioa
Impacto
|
10.1007/s10693-015-0230-1
Resumen
We examine the role of the investor type in the fee structure of pension plans. Our examination uses a data set of employer-sponsored and individual private pension funds in Spain. We find different determinants of the fees between these two pension plans. We find evidence of market penetration strategies in individual plans but none in employer-sponsored plans. In these plans, the fees are negat ...
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We examine the role of the investor type in the fee structure of pension plans. Our examination uses a data set of employer-sponsored and individual private pension funds in Spain. We find different determinants of the fees between these two pension plans. We find evidence of market penetration strategies in individual plans but none in employer-sponsored plans. In these plans, the fees are negatively related to their financial groups’ market share, whereas in individual plans this relation is negative for management fees but positive for custodian fees. Further, except in the case of custodian fees in individual plans, we find that all fees diminish when the custodian and management firms belong to different financial groups. [--]
Materias
Pension plans,
Individual plans,
Employer plans,
Fee caps,
Censored data
Editor
Springer
Publicado en
Journal of Financial Services Research (2016) 50:387–417
Notas
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-015-0230-1
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Gestión de Empresas /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Enpresen Kudeaketa Saila
Versión del editor
Entidades Financiadoras
This paper has received financial support from the Spanish
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2012-35946-C02-01). Isabel Abinzano particularly acknowledges
the financial support of the Andalusian Regional Government (P12-SEJ-1733).