Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations
Ver/
Fecha
2014Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Documento de trabajo / Lan gaiak
Impacto
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nodoi-noplumx
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Resumen
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incen ...
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This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are riskaverse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital. [--]
Materias
Contracts,
Moral hazard,
Intrinsic motivation,
Crowding effects,
Motivational capital
Serie
Documentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak /
1402
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila
Entidades Financiadoras
The authors would like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation for financial support (Project ECO2009-12836).