Blowing the whistle
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Date
2003
Version
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Type
Documento de trabajo / Lan gaiak
Impact
Abstract
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretic ...
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Subject
Anti trust,
Leniency,
Immunity,
Amnesty,
Blow the whistle,
Cartels,
Price competition,
Bertrand model,
Experiment,
Communication
Serie
Documentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak /
0303
Departament
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila
Sponsorship
The research has been sponsored by the European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR and through the Swedish Competition Authority.
Appears in Collections
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