Publication: Blowing the whistle
Consultable a partir de
Date
2003
Authors
Director
Publisher
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Documento de trabajo / Lan gaia
Project identifier
Abstract
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
Keywords
Anti trust, Leniency, Immunity, Amnesty, Blow the whistle, Cartels, Price competition, Bertrand model, Experiment, Communication
Department
Economía / Ekonomia
Faculty/School
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Doctorate program
Editor version
Funding entities
The research has been sponsored by the European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR and through the Swedish Competition Authority.
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