Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
Date
2020
Version
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Type
Artículo / Artikulua
Version
Versión aceptada / Onetsi den bertsioa
Impact
Abstract
We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments ...
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Subject
Agenda,
Binary tree,
Elections,
Manipulation,
Sequential voting
Publisher
Elsevier
Published in
Economics Letters, 2020, 194, 109418
Departament
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila /
Universidad Pública de Navarra/Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
Publisher version
Appears in Collections
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as © 2020 Elsevier B.V. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0
