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dc.creatorBerdud, Mikeles_ES
dc.creatorCabasés Hita, Juan Manueles_ES
dc.creatorNieto Vázquez, Jorgees_ES
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-10T07:40:27Z
dc.date.available2016-05-10T07:40:27Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2454/20618
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards. Intrinsic motivation could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-averse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.en
dc.format.extent25 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiakes
dc.relation.ispartofseries1209en
dc.rightsCC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)en
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectMoral hazarden
dc.subjectIntrinsic motivationen
dc.subjectCrowding effectsen
dc.subjectMotivational capitalen
dc.titleMotivational capital and incentives in health care organisationsen
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo / Lan gaiakes
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentNafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Sailaeu
dc.rights.accessRightsAcceso abierto / Sarbide irekiaes
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen


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CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
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