Stereotypes and tournament self-selection: a theoretical and experimental approach
Fecha
2020Autor
Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Artículo / Artikulua
Versión
Versión aceptada / Onetsi den bertsioa
Impacto
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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103448
Resumen
We present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and have to self-select into either a high-paying or a low-paying tournament. The model shows that negative (positive) stereotypes generate underrepresentation (overrepresentation) of stereotyped agents in the high-paying tournament even when the stereotype is false. This is because stereotypes affe ...
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We present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and have to self-select into either a high-paying or a low-paying tournament. The model shows that negative (positive) stereotypes generate underrepresentation (overrepresentation) of stereotyped agents in the high-paying tournament even when the stereotype is false. This is because stereotypes affect self-assessment and consequently subsequent behavior. We call this mechanism self-stereotyping. We run a lab experiment in which we use subjects’ beliefs about the gender bias of a real-effort task to test the predictions of the theoretical model. The results of the experiment are in line with the predictions of the model for men but not for women, which partially validates the model and the self-stereotyping mechanism. [--]
Materias
Competitive sorting,
Segregation,
Self-assessment,
Self-stereotyping,
Stereotypes
Editor
Elsevier
Publicado en
European Economic Review 126 (2020) 103448
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Economía /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Ekonomia Saila
Versión del editor
Entidades Financiadoras
Financial support from Vicerrectorado de Investigación de la UPV/EHU (PIF//13/015) and Departamento de Educación, Política Lingüística y Cultura del Gobierno Vasco (IT869-13) is gratefully acknowledged.