Documentos de trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak

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Browsing Documentos de trabajo DE - ES Lan Gaiak by Author "Alcalde Unzu, Jorge"

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    PublicationOpen Access
    Non anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting
    (2011) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of six intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Personalized Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. Hence, the implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
    (2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; Ekonomia
    The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang [12] we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of ach region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs 'fairly' and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Size approval voting
    (2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Strategy-proof location of public facilities
    (2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
    Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information
    (2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; Ekonomia
    This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the different outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential outcomes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes, even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in different ranking rules.