Nieto Vázquez, Jorge

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/49658

Last Name

Nieto Vázquez

First Name

Jorge

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Economía

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751111

person.page.upna

258

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Open Access
On the equivalence of the two existing extensions of the leximax criterion to the infinite case
(2006) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Besada, M.; Miguel Velasco, Juan Ramón de; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Vázquez, C.; Economía; Ekonomia
Using a common framework, we consider the two existing extensions of the leximax criterion to infinite environments (Arlegi et al. (2005) and Ballester and De Miguel (2003), and show that, though the respective definitions of the rules and their axiomatic characterizations appear to differ considerably, they actually propose the same extension of the leximax criterion to the infinite case.
Open Access
Freedom of choice: the leximax criterion in economic environments
(2000) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Besada, M.; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Vázquez, C.; Economía; Ekonomia
Many recent works have investigated the question of extending a preference over a set of alternatives to its power set, as a way to provide a formal representation of the notion of freedom of choice. In general, the results are limited to the finite case, which excludes the case of economic environments. This paper deals with the possibility of extending those results to the context where the basic set of alternatives is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. We present an extension of the leximax criterion of Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) on this more general framework. This characterization result opens the possibility of application of the literature on freedom of choice to standard economic environments.
Open Access
Incentives beyond the money: identity and motivational capital in public organizations
(2012) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper explores optimality of contracts and incentives when the principal (public organisation) can undertake investments to change agents’ (public workers) identity. In the model, workers within the organisation can have different identities. We develop a principal-agent dynamical model with moral hazard, which captures the possibility of affecting this workers’ identity through contracts offered by the firm. In the model, identity is a motivation source which reduces agents’ disutility from effort. We use the term identity to refer to a situation in which the worker shares the organisational objectives and views herself as a part of the organisation. Contrary, we use the term conflict to refer to a situation in which workers behave self-interested and frequently in the opposite way of the organisation. We assume that identity can be achieved when principal include mission-sense developing investments in contracts. By mission we mean a single culture that is shared by all the members of an organization. We discuss the conditions under which spending resources in changing workers’ identity and invest in this kind of motivational capital is optimal for organisations. Our results may help to inform public firms’ managers about the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies. For instance, we conclude that investing in motivational capital is the best option in the long run whereas pure monetary incentives works better in the short run.
Open Access
Motivational capital and incentives in health care organizations
(2014) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted (crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives. We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are riskaverse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.
Open Access
A pilot inquiry on incentives and intrinsic motivation in health care: the motivational capital explained by doctors
(2014) Berdud García-López, Mikel; Cabasés Hita, Juan Manuel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
Where the contracts are incomplete, the resulting co-ordination problems may be attenuated if workers are intrinsically motivated to do the work. It is established by theoretical and empirical literature that workers within public organizations are intrinsically motivated to exert effort doing the job and have a strong sense of social agents with the mission of providing collective goods to citizens and tax payers. This paper is an empirical pilot study in the health care sector using methods of Qualitative Analysis research. We run semistructured interviews á-la-Bewley to sixteen physicians of Navarre’s health Care Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea (SNS-O). The objective of the work is twofold: first, to find empirical evidence about doctors’ non-monetary motives and second, to find evidence about how these non-monetary motives shape doctors’ behavior. We formulate several testable hypotheses: (1) Doctors are intrinsically motivated agents, (2) Economic incentives and control policies may crowd-out intrinsic motivation and (3) Well designed incentives may crowd-in agents intrinsic motivation. Results confirm the hypotheses formulated above and coming from our theoretical findings [11], [12]. Finally, we also found empirical evidence of conflict between political advisors or health managers (principals) and physicians (agents). Results are a step forward in the optimal design of incentive schemes and policies which crowd in doctors’ intrinsic motivation.
Open Access
Freedom of choice: the leximax criterion in the infinite case
(2006) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Besada, M.; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Vázquez, C.; Economía; Ekonomia
Many recent works have investigated the problem of extending a preference over a set of alternatives to its power set, in an attempt to provide a formal representation of the notion of freedom of choice. In general, results are limited to the finite case, which excludes, for instance, the case of economic environments. This paper deals with the possibility of extending those results to the context where the basic set of alternatives is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. We present an extension of the leximax criterion described by Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994) to this more general framework.
Open Access
Distribución, compensación y fondos estructurales: una propuesta metodológica
(1998) Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Pascual Arzoz, Pedro; Rapún Gárate, Manuel; Economía; Ekonomia
Este trabajo tiene por objeto analizar el problema de la distribución interregional de dos fondos de desarrollo: El FCI y el FEDER. Ambos instrumentos, además de satisfacer la vocación compensadora de la política regional, han de ser repartidos de modo que se tiendan a igualar las oportunidades de desarrollo de las distintas regiones. Se identifica el problema distributivo planteado y se enmarca en un modelo teórico denominado “Igualdad de Oportunidades para el Desarrollo”. A continuación, se describen sintéticamente los modos de reparto reales de dichos fondos. Finalmente, se lleva cabo un ejercicio ilustrativo de simulación del método de reparto propuesto.
Open Access
Equality of opportunities: cardinality-based criteria
(1998) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
In this paper we study possible rankings of opportunity profiles. An opportunity profile is a list of sets of alternative opportunities, one set for each agent in the society. We compare such opportunity profiles on the basis of the notion of “equality of opportunities”. Our main results show the necessary and sufficient conditions for this comparison to be made using exclusively the information provided by two cardinal measures: the number of common alternatives for all sets in a given profile and/or the difference between the number of alternatives of individual sets. We also show that, under given circumstances, the only way to solve conflicts between these two numbers is to combine them in a lexicographic procedure.
Open Access
Freedom of choice: John Stuart Mill and the tree of life
(Springer-Verlag, 2012) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
This essay deals with the notion and content of freedom of choice proposing a new set up and a new family of measures for this concept which is, indeed, an ethical value of paramount importance in a well ordered and open society. Following some ideas of John StuartMill, we propose that freedom of choice has to be understood not in a single stage of choice, but in the ordered collection of choices that a person can make in her life.We then suggest to represent a life in a tree structure, where each node represents a state of life and the edges between nodes will represent possible decisions in life. In this new framework, we propose a set of axioms that imply the following family of measures of lifetime’s freedom of choice: the lifetime’s freedom of choice has to be evaluated by a weighted sum of all possible states of life an individual might visit, with weights representing the number of decisions the individual took to reach that state.
Open Access
Variable population egalitarian ethics and the critical-level: a note
(2000) Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in a variable population context. We focus the attention on the “Critical-Level Egalitarian Rule”, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social states as follows: (i) It reproduces the leximin criterion when applied to vectors of identical dimension and (ii) otherwise, it completes the small one with so many times a variable critical-level as to make the two vectors equal in size and applies the leximin criterion again. We prove that the use of a strict monotonic critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule. This problem disappears when a weak monotonicity condition is required.