Alcalde Unzu, Jorge
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Alcalde Unzu
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Jorge
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Economía
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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics
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Publication Open Access Strategy-proof location of public facilities(2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaAgents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.Publication Open Access Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences(Elsevier, 2024-07-01) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEWe analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.Publication Open Access Strategy-proof location of public facilities(Elsevier, 2018) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaConsider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.