# Person: Alcalde Unzu, Jorge

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Alcalde Unzu

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Jorge

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0003-1839-6245

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4338

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Publication Open Access Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule(Elsevier, 2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; EkonomiaShow more The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.Show more Publication Open Access Strategy-proof location of public facilities(Elsevier, 2018) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.Show more Publication Open Access Solidarity to achieve stability(Elsevier, 2024) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra, Elena; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, PJUPNA2023-11403Show more Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.Show more Publication Open Access Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences: an axiomatic analysis(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more In this paper, we axiomatically study how to measure the similarity of preferences in a group of individuals. For simplicity, we refer to this as the cohesiveness. First, we provide axioms that characterize a family of linear and additive measures whose intersection is a partial ordinal criterion similar to first order stochastic dominance. The introduction of some additional properties isolates a one-parameter subfamily. This parameter evaluates the effect on the cohesiveness if one individual changes his ranking on a single pair of objects, as a function of how many of the remaining individuals in the group rank the first object over the second and vice versa. Finally, we characterize the focal measures of this subfamily separately showing that they coincide with measures constructed using two, at first sight, totally different approaches suggested in the literature.Show more Publication Open Access Freedom of choice: John Stuart Mill and the tree of life(Springer-Verlag, 2012) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; EkonomiaShow more This essay deals with the notion and content of freedom of choice proposing a new set up and a new family of measures for this concept which is, indeed, an ethical value of paramount importance in a well ordered and open society. Following some ideas of John StuartMill, we propose that freedom of choice has to be understood not in a single stage of choice, but in the ordered collection of choices that a person can make in her life.We then suggest to represent a life in a tree structure, where each node represents a state of life and the edges between nodes will represent possible decisions in life. In this new framework, we propose a set of axioms that imply the following family of measures of lifetime’s freedom of choice: the lifetime’s freedom of choice has to be evaluated by a weighted sum of all possible states of life an individual might visit, with weights representing the number of decisions the individual took to reach that state.Show more Publication Open Access Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information(2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; EkonomiaShow more This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the different outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential outcomes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes, even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in different ranking rules.Show more Publication Open Access Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis(Springer, 2023) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Klijn, Flip; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEShow more The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment.Show more Publication Open Access Strategy-proof location of public facilities(2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.Show more Publication Open Access Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule(2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; EkonomiaShow more The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang [12] we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of ach region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs 'fairly' and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.Show more Publication Open Access Non anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting(2011) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of six intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Personalized Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. Hence, the implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types.Show more