# Person: Alcalde Unzu, Jorge

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Alcalde Unzu

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Jorge

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0003-1839-6245

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4338

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Publication Open Access Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information(2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; EkonomiaShow more This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the different outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential outcomes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes, even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in different ranking rules.Show more Publication Open Access Solidarity to achieve stability(Elsevier, 2024) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra, Elena; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, PJUPNA2023-11403Show more Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.Show more Publication Open Access Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences: an axiomatic analysis(Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more In this paper, we axiomatically study how to measure the similarity of preferences in a group of individuals. For simplicity, we refer to this as the cohesiveness. First, we provide axioms that characterize a family of linear and additive measures whose intersection is a partial ordinal criterion similar to first order stochastic dominance. The introduction of some additional properties isolates a one-parameter subfamily. This parameter evaluates the effect on the cohesiveness if one individual changes his ranking on a single pair of objects, as a function of how many of the remaining individuals in the group rank the first object over the second and vice versa. Finally, we characterize the focal measures of this subfamily separately showing that they coincide with measures constructed using two, at first sight, totally different approaches suggested in the literature.Show more Publication Open Access Strategy-proof location of public facilities(Elsevier, 2018) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.Show more Publication Open Access Non anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting(2011) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we propose a set of six intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize a new class of voting procedures, called Personalized Approval Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of weighted votes is elected. Hence, the implemented voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types.Show more Publication Open Access Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule(Elsevier, 2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; EkonomiaShow more The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.Show more Publication Open Access Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information(Springer-Verlag, 2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Economía; EkonomiaShow more We present a model that is closely related to the so-called models of choice under complete uncertainty, in which the agent has no information about the probability of the outcomes. There are two approaches within the said models: the state space-based approach, which takes into account the possible states of nature and the correspondence between states and outcomes; and the set-based approach, which ignores such information, and solves certain difficulties arising from the state space-based approach. Kelsey (Int Econ Rev 34:297–308, 1993) incorporates into a state space-based framework the assumption that the agent has ordinal information about the likelihood of the states. This paper incorporates this same assumption into a set-based framework, thus filling a theoretical gap in the literature. Compared to the set-based models of choice under complete uncertainty we introduce the information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes while, compared to Kelsey’s approach, we incorporate the advantages of describing uncertainty environments from the set-based perspective. We present an axiomatic study that includes adaptations of some of the axioms found in the related literature and we characterize some rules featuring different combinations of information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes and information about their desirability.Show more Publication Open Access Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule(2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; EkonomiaShow more The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang [12] we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of ach region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs 'fairly' and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.Show more Publication Open Access Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis(Springer, 2023) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Klijn, Flip; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEShow more The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment.Show more Publication Open Access Size approval voting(2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; EkonomiaShow more We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting. According to this rule, the effective weight of a vote from a given individual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for a given profile of individual votes, all those alternatives with the maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized by a set of natural properties.Show more