Person:
Alcalde Unzu, Jorge

person.page.identifierURI

https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/48476

Last Name

Alcalde Unzu

First Name

Jorge

person.page.departamento

Economía

person.page.instituteName

INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

ORCID

0000-0003-1839-6245

person.page.upna

4338

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 19

Open Access
Freedom of choice: John Stuart Mill and the tree of life
(Springer-Verlag, 2012) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Nieto Vázquez, Jorge; Economía; Ekonomia
This essay deals with the notion and content of freedom of choice proposing a new set up and a new family of measures for this concept which is, indeed, an ethical value of paramount importance in a well ordered and open society. Following some ideas of John StuartMill, we propose that freedom of choice has to be understood not in a single stage of choice, but in the ordered collection of choices that a person can make in her life.We then suggest to represent a life in a tree structure, where each node represents a state of life and the edges between nodes will represent possible decisions in life. In this new framework, we propose a set of axioms that imply the following family of measures of lifetime’s freedom of choice: the lifetime’s freedom of choice has to be evaluated by a weighted sum of all possible states of life an individual might visit, with weights representing the number of decisions the individual took to reach that state.
Open Access
Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
(Elsevier, 2024-07-01) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.
Open Access
Ranking opportunity profiles through dependent evaluation of policies
(Springer US, 2012) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Economía; Ekonomia
Rankings to evaluate opportunity distributions present in most of the literature judge a policy (change from one distribution of opportunities to another) on the basis of the changes created and, thus, independently of the original situation. This paper proposes a group of axioms capturing the idea that rankings of equality of opportunities might consider not only the changes promoted, but also the initial situation in society. The combination of this group of axioms with other well-established properties enables us to characterize two families of new opportunity distribution rankings. The first family weighs each individual’s percentage share in the total number of opportunities, while the second weighs opportunities depending on how many agents have them available.
Open Access
Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the upstream responsibility rule
(2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; Ekonomia
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang [12] we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of ach region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs 'fairly' and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
Open Access
Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information
(Springer-Verlag, 2013) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Economía; Ekonomia
We present a model that is closely related to the so-called models of choice under complete uncertainty, in which the agent has no information about the probability of the outcomes. There are two approaches within the said models: the state space-based approach, which takes into account the possible states of nature and the correspondence between states and outcomes; and the set-based approach, which ignores such information, and solves certain difficulties arising from the state space-based approach. Kelsey (Int Econ Rev 34:297–308, 1993) incorporates into a state space-based framework the assumption that the agent has ordinal information about the likelihood of the states. This paper incorporates this same assumption into a set-based framework, thus filling a theoretical gap in the literature. Compared to the set-based models of choice under complete uncertainty we introduce the information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes while, compared to Kelsey’s approach, we incorporate the advantages of describing uncertainty environments from the set-based perspective. We present an axiomatic study that includes adaptations of some of the axioms found in the related literature and we characterize some rules featuring different combinations of information about the ordinal likelihood of the outcomes and information about their desirability.
Open Access
Solidarity to achieve stability
(Elsevier, 2024) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra, Elena; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, PJUPNA2023-11403
Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.
Open Access
Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule
(Elsevier, 2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gómez Rúa, María; Molis Bañales, Elena; Economía; Ekonomia
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.
Open Access
Strategy-proof location of public facilities
(Elsevier, 2018) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
Consider the problem of locating a public facility taking into account the agents' preferences. To construct strategy-proof social choice rules, we propose a new preference domain that allows agents to have any single-peaked or any single-dipped preference on the location of the facility such that the peak/dip of the preference is in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and study the conditions under which this family of strategy-proof rules includes non-dictatorial rules that have more than two alternatives in the range or that are Pareto efficient. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases all strategy-proof and Pareto efficient rules.
Open Access
Strategy-proof location of public facilities
(2015) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia
Agents frequently have different opinions on where to locate a public facility. While some agents consider the facility a good and prefer to have it nearby, others dislike it and would like to see it built far away from their own locations. To aggregate agents' preferences in these situations, we propose a new preference domain according to which each agent is allowed to have single-peaked or single-dipped preferences on the location of the facility, but in such a way that the peak or dip is situated in her own location. We characterize all strategy-proof rules in this general framework and show that they are also group strategy-proof. Finally, we characterize for some focal cases the rules that additionally satisfy Pareto efficiency.
Open Access
Uncertainty with ordinal likelihood information
(2007) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo; Economía; Ekonomia
This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the different outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential outcomes of each action have an associated probability distribution, and with the more recent complete uncertainty models, where the agent has no information whatever about the probability of the outcomes, even of an ordinal nature. We present an impossibility result in our framework, and some ways to circumvent it that result in different ranking rules.