Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/49231

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Hernández Arenaz

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Íñigo

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Economía

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INARBE. Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics

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0000-0001-5157-2787

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750766

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9547

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2018 - 201922020 - 20231
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Author: Iriberri, Nagore × Has files: true ×

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Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
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    PublicationOpen Access
    A review of gender differences in negotiation
    (Oxford University Press, 2019) Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Iriberri, Nagore; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Women ask for less (only from men): evidence from bargaining in the field
    (Elsevier, 2018) Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Iriberri, Nagore; Economía; Ekonomia
    Data from a TV show provide the opportunity to study gender differences and gender interaction effects in bargaining with sizable stakes. A proposer and a responder, who is selected by the proposer, bargain over a fixed pie. Proposers are in a stronger bargaining position because they have a positive outside option and information on the size of the pie, while responders have neither. The matching between male proposers and female responders stands as the most favorable for proposers. Women as responders demand less only from male proposers, which explains the difference in earnings.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study
    (Sringer, 2023) Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Iriberri, Nagore; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-ofer bargaining and gender diferences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender diferences are absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men are less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they do, they obtain a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women show similar overall earnings but earnings are lower when bargaining with men. We fnd suggestive evidence that gender diferences diminish when we reduce ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.