Open Access
Stereotypes and tournament self-selection: a theoretical and experimental approach
(Elsevier, 2020) Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Economía; Ekonomia
We present a theoretical model in which agents have imperfect self-knowledge about their abilities and have to self-select into either a high-paying or a low-paying tournament. The model shows that negative (positive) stereotypes generate underrepresentation (overrepresentation) of stereotyped agents in the high-paying tournament even when the stereotype is false. This is because stereotypes affect self-assessment and consequently subsequent behavior. We call this mechanism self-stereotyping. We run a lab experiment in which we use subjects’ beliefs about the gender bias of a real-effort task to test the predictions of the theoretical model. The results of the experiment are in line with the predictions of the model for men but not for women, which partially validates the model and the self-stereotyping mechanism.
Open Access
Understanding soft commitment: evidence from a field experiment on recycling
(2022) Alonso-Paulí, Eduard; Balart, Pau; Ezquerra, Lara; Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Economía; Ekonomia
Taking advantage of a card-scanning system that records individual, real-time data on the use of bio-waste sorting bins, we run a randomized field experiment to analyze the effectiveness of soft commitments in promoting participation in waste sorting. Being given the offer to sign a soft commitment increased participation in waste sorting by 7-8 percentage points (0.22 s.d.). This represents a 23-28% increase relative to the control group of households that participated in the study but were not given the opportunity to sign a soft commitment. This positive effect of the soft commitment operates exclusively through the extensive margin (households start to sort their waste); it does not affect the intensive margin (household adherence to waste sorting). This implies that soft commitments can improve the effectiveness of environmental campaigns in cities or areas where a large part of the population has never participated in waste sorting, while they would have little impact in places where a majority of households have already participated in recycling. We also show that the positive effect of the soft commitment remains constant 35 weeks after being offered. The effect also persists after 36-47 weeks, although its size is reduced by one half.
Open Access
Using pledges to improve the effectiveness of environmental information campaigns: the case of biowaste recycling
(National Academy of Sciences, 2025-05-02) Alonso-Paulí, Eduard; Balart, Pau; Ezquerra, Lara; Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
Through a field study (N = 1,519) that uses a technology to record real-time data on waste sorting, we find that offering the opportunity to sign a pledge increases the effectiveness of an environmental campaign. With a timespan of over four years, the pledge increased waste sorting participation by 4.55 to 5.10 percentage points (SD = 0.1997). The effect is greater immediately after the campaign (around 9 to 10 pp during the first 15 wk), but it remains sizable and statistically significant 150 to 210 wk after signing (3.11 to 4.45 pp). Continue Reading
Open Access
Framing effects on risk-taking behavior: evidence from a field experiment in multiple choice tests
(Sringer, 2022) Balart, Pau; Ezquerra, Lara; Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Economía; Ekonomia
We exploit testing data to gain better understanding on framing effects on decision-making and performance under risk. In a randomized field experiment, we modified the framing of scoring rules for penalized multiple-choice tests. In penalized multiple-choice tests, right answers are typically framed as gains while wrong answers are framed as losses (Mixed-framing). In the Loss-framing proposed, both non-responses and wrong answers are presented in a loss domain. According to our theoretical model, we expect the change in the framing to decrease students' non-response and to increase students' performance. Under the Loss-framing, students' non-response reduces by a 18%-20%. However, it fails to increase students¿ scores. Indeed, our results support the possibility of impaired performance in the Loss-framing.
Open Access
Economic consequences of gender differences in behavior
(Elsevier, 2025-05-16) García-Segarra, Jaume; Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Rey-Biel, Pedro; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
This paper serves as the opening for the Virtual Special Issue on the economic consequences of gender differences in behavior, published in the Journal of Economic Psychology. The issue aims to consolidate recent research exploring how gender differences in behavior, reflected in risk attitudes, competitiveness, and negotiation tendencies, impact economic outcomes and, in particular, may partially explain labor market differences across genders regarding occupational segregation, wage gaps, and disparities in career advancement. We provide an overview of the topic, highlighting the importance of understanding gender-specific economic behaviors and setting the stage for the detailed studies, and follow by introducing the articles included in the special issue, which use mainly experimental and empirical insights.
Open Access
Gender differences in alternating-offer bargaining: an experimental study
(Sringer, 2023) Hernández Arenaz, Íñigo; Iriberri, Nagore; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
A laboratory study was carried out to analyze the relationship between ambiguity regarding the sharing norms in structured alternating-ofer bargaining and gender diferences in bargaining. Symmetric environments, where a 50:50 split emerges as the unique sensible norm, showed the lowest ambiguity and gender diferences are absent. We increased ambiguity by introducing asymmetries into the bargaining environment by making one bargaining party get a higher share than the other (due to empowerment, entitlement or informational asymmetries), but without imposing new sharing norms. In these situations, men are less likely to reach an agreement, but, when they do, they obtain a larger share of the pie. As a result, men and women show similar overall earnings but earnings are lower when bargaining with men. We fnd suggestive evidence that gender diferences diminish when we reduce ambiguity regarding the sharing norms by providing information about other participants’ agreements in asymmetric environments.