Apesteguía Garcés, José

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https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/48549

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Apesteguía Garcés

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José

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Economía

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1172695

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2467

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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    PublicationOpen Access
    A theory of reference dependent behavior
    (2004) Apesteguía Garcés, José; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Economía; Ekonomia
    There is extensive field and experimental evidence in a wide variety of environments showing that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization for such behavior. Our approach is dual, we study choice behavior and preference relations. We proceed by gradually imposing more structure on behavior, requiring higher levels of rationality, that free the decision-maker from certain types of manipulations. Depending on the phenomena one wants to model, one degree of behavioral structure will be appropriate or another. We provide two applications of the theory: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Imitation theory and experimental evidence
    (2003) Apesteguía Garcés, José; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg; Economía; Ekonomia
    We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules. It is more important whom one imitates rather than how. In a laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences between treatments well. The data provide support for imitation on the individual level, both in terms of choice and in terms of perception. But imitation is not unconditional. Rather individuals’ propensity to imitate more successful actions is increasing in payoff differences.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Minimal bools of rationales
    (2005) Apesteguía Garcés, José; Ballester Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel; Economía; Ekonomia
    Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) propose the rationalization of choice functions that violate the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” axiom through a collection (book) of linear orders (rationales). In this paper we present an algorithm which, for any choice function, gives (i) the minimal number of rationales that rationalizes the choice function, (ii) the composition of such rationales, and (iii) information on how choice problems are related to rationales. As in the classical case, this renders the information given by a choice function completely equivalent to that given by a minimal book of rationales. We also study the structure of several choice procedures that are prominent in the literature.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Blowing the whistle
    (2003) Apesteguía Garcés, José; Dufwenberg, Martin; Selten, Reinhard; Economía; Ekonomia
    Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.