Leverage in family firms: the moderating role of female directors and board quality
Fecha
2020Versión
Acceso abierto / Sarbide irekia
Tipo
Artículo / Artikulua
Versión
Versión publicada / Argitaratu den bertsioa
Identificador del proyecto
ES/1PE/ECO2016-77631-R
Impacto
|
10.1002/ijfe.2147
Resumen
Grounded in the agency, socioemotional wealth and resource dependence theories, we study how debt decisions are influenced by family control and how such relationship is moderated by an internal corporate governance mechanism, the quality of the board of directors. Our results show that family-controlled firms use more leverage at lower levels of family ownership to retain family control over the ...
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Grounded in the agency, socioemotional wealth and resource dependence theories, we study how debt decisions are influenced by family control and how such relationship is moderated by an internal corporate governance mechanism, the quality of the board of directors. Our results show that family-controlled firms use more leverage at lower levels of family ownership to retain family control over the business, but once their socioemotional wealth is fulfilled at higher levels of ownership, they decrease leverage in pursuit of conservative financing policies. These actions are found to be moderated by board quality (i.e., experience and expertise) and female directors (predominantly independent). [--]
Materias
Board quality,
Family control,
Gender diversity,
Latin America,
Leverage
Editor
Wiley
Publicado en
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2020
Departamento
Universidad Pública de Navarra. Departamento de Gestión de Empresas /
Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa. Enpresen Kudeaketa Saila
Versión del editor
Entidades Financiadoras
This paper has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (ECO2016‐77631‐R [AEI/FEDER, UE]) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (PID2019‐104304GB‐I00).