Artículos de revista INARBE - INARBE aldizkari artikuluak

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Browsing Artículos de revista INARBE - INARBE aldizkari artikuluak by Author "Alcalde Unzu, Jorge"

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    Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
    (Springer, 2023) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Klijn, Flip; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    The theoretical literature on public school choice proposes centralized mechanisms that assign children to schools on the basis of parents’ preferences and the priorities children have for different schools. The related experimental literature analyzes in detail how various mechanisms fare in terms of welfare and stability of the resulting matchings, yet often provides only aggregate statistics of the individual behavior that leads to these outcomes (i.e., the degree to which subjects tell the truth in the induced simultaneous move game). In this paper, we show that the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) adequately describes individual behavior and the resulting matching in three constrained problems for which the immediate acceptance mechanism and the student-optimal stable mechanism coincide. Specifically, the comparative statics of the logit-QRE with risk-neutral and expected-payoff-maximizing agents capture the directional changes of subject behavior and the prevalence of the different stable matchings when cardinal payoffs (i.e., relative preference intensities) are modified in the experiment.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    An evolutionary model of prenatal and postnatal discrimination against females
    (Elsevier, 2020) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Echavarri, Rebeca; Husillos Carques, Francisco Javier; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    Discrimination against born and unborn females is a well-documented phenomenon in countries such as India, China, Taiwan or Korea. Empirical studies support both additive and substitutive relationships between prenatal and postnatal discriminatory practices against females. We introduce a theoretical evolutionary model that endogenizes the preference for sons in a society, and consequently, can explain why one type of relationship or the other emerges in a society.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    The measurement of the value of a language
    (Elsevier, 2022) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Weber, Shlomo; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Economía
    We address the problem of assessing the value of a language. We consider a stylized model of multilingual societies in which we introduce axioms formalizing the principles of impartiality, monotonicity, invariance and consistency. We show that the combination of these axioms characterizes a family of communicative benefit functions which assign a value to each language in the society. The functions within the family involve a two-step procedure. First, they identify the groups of agents that can communicate in each language. Second, each group is assigned an aggregate (size-dependent) value, which is evenly divided among the languages in which the group can communicate. Our novel approach could be useful in a wide range of empirical applications and policy decisions.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Solidarity to achieve stability
    (Elsevier, 2024) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Iñarra, Elena; Moreno Ternero, Juan D.; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE; Universidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa, PJUPNA2023-11403
    Agents may form coalitions. Each coalition shares its endowment among its agents by applying a sharing rule. The sharing rule induces a coalition formation problem by assuming that agents rank coalitions according to the allocation they obtain in the corresponding sharing problem. We characterize the sharing rules that induce a class of stable coalition formation problems as those that satisfy a natural axiom that formalizes the principle of solidarity. Thus, solidarity becomes a sufficient condition to achieve stability.
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    PublicationOpen Access
    Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences
    (Elsevier, 2024-07-01) Alcalde Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Vorsatz, Marc; Economía; Ekonomia; Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE
    We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barberà and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy-proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.