Bargaining for the last mile cost and environmental preferences of stakeholders: an economic experiment

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dc.contributor.authorDenant-Boemont, Laurent
dc.contributor.authorFaulín Fajardo, Javier
dc.contributor.authorHammiche, Sabrina
dc.contributor.authorSerrano Hernández, Adrián
dc.contributor.departmentEstadística, Informática y Matemáticases_ES
dc.contributor.departmentEstatistika, Informatika eta Matematikaeu
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute of Smart Cities - ISCen
dc.contributor.funderUniversidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoa
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-05T11:30:19Z
dc.date.available2025-02-05T11:30:19Z
dc.date.issued2025-01-09
dc.date.updated2025-02-05T11:22:18Z
dc.description.abstractWe aim at studying how environmental preferences matter when consumers negotiate with sellers in order to contract for delivery at home. To do that, we build an economic laboratory experiment where pairs of participants bargain for choosing either the click-and-collect option, which is free for consumer but implies for him private transportation costs, or the delivery-at-home option, which is pricey for him, but externalize transportation cost to the seller. In addition, in our game, transportation triggers environmental costs that are borne by both partners. We have 4 different treatments: The first one, as a benchmark, corresponds to an ultimatum bargaining game about the last mile cost with environmental costs. In the second one, we deliver a message about environmental impacts of transportation to the buyer, whereas, in the third one, the same message is delivered to the seller. The last one is a control where the message is delivered to both partners. The preliminary results (which included 178 participants) show that the average delivery price proposed by sellers is below Nash equilibrium price but above the "behavioral price" and that acceptance rates of seller's proposals by buyers are quite high.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work has been partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities (RED2018-102642-T; PID2019-111100RB-C22 AEI/10.13039/501100011033) and the SEPIE Erasmus+ Program (2019-I-ES01-KA103-062602). Additionally, we acknowledge the support from the Public University of Navarra for Young Researchers Projects Program (PJUPNA26-2022) and of University of Rennes. Thanks to Elven Priour (CREM CNRS, France) for programming the computer scripts for the experiment and organizing the experimental sessions at LABEX-EM, Rennes, France.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationDenant-Boemont, L., Faulin, J., Hammiche, S., Serrano-Hernandez, A. (2025). Bargaining for the last mile cost and environmental preferences of stakeholders: an economic experiment. Transportation Research Procedia, 82, 251-270. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2024.12.041.
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.trpro.2024.12.041
dc.identifier.issn2352-1465
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/53284
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.ispartofTransportation Research Procedia (2025), vol. 82
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/RED2018-102642-T/
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-111100RB-C22/ES/
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2024.12.041
dc.rights© 2024 The Authors. Published by ELSEVIER B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license.
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectLast mile problemen
dc.subjectEnvironmental preferencesen
dc.subjectBargainingen
dc.subjectTransportation costsen
dc.titleBargaining for the last mile cost and environmental preferences of stakeholders: an economic experimenten
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication2f9b6dfd-9ac6-42b0-bff1-82079b8a03b8
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationa5bd4bdf-1145-4413-84b6-682cbe997245
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery2f9b6dfd-9ac6-42b0-bff1-82079b8a03b8

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