Bad company. The indirect effect of differences in corporate governance in the pension plan industry
| dc.contributor.author | Abinzano Guillén, María Isabel | |
| dc.contributor.author | Muga Caperos, Luis Fernando | |
| dc.contributor.author | Santamaría Aquilué, Rafael | |
| dc.contributor.department | Institute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBE | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-04T09:30:51Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-11-01T00:00:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper analyses the role played by pension plan governance structure and how it impacts on plan fees and plan performance. The results clearly show that fees decrease significantly and performance improves when pension plan governance structures permit full alignment of interests and allow greater capacity for the decision-makers to monitor and discipline the managers. It is also observed that companies managing both employee and individual funds, tend to exploit differences in the internal corporate governance mechanisms of each type of plan in order to nurture employer-sponsored plans at the expense of individual plans. These results suggest that internal corporate governance mechanisms allowing closer alignment with the interests of participants would be preferable to focusing exclusively on setting the minimum proportion of independent directors. | en |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Econ omy and Competitiveness, Project ECO2016-77631-R and Fundación Caja Navarra FUNCAN-07445 are gratefully acknowledged.. | en |
| dc.embargo.lift | 2019-11-01 | |
| dc.embargo.terms | 2019-11-01 | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.irfa.2017.09.008 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1057-5219 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/25856 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
| dc.relation.ispartof | International Review of Financial Analysis, 54 (2017) 63-75 | en |
| dc.relation.projectID | info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/ECO2016-77631/ | |
| dc.relation.publisherversion | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2017.09.008 | |
| dc.rights | © 2017 Elsevier Inc. The manuscript version is made available under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. | en |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Pension plan governance | en |
| dc.subject | Bargaining power | en |
| dc.subject | Fees | en |
| dc.subject | Performance | en |
| dc.title | Bad company. The indirect effect of differences in corporate governance in the pension plan industry | en |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | |
| dc.type.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
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