Publication:
Do sustainability disclosure mechanisms reduce market myopia? Evidence from European sustainability companies

dc.contributor.authorRío Solano, María Cristina del
dc.contributor.authorLópez Arceiz, Francisco José
dc.contributor.authorMuga Caperos, Luis Fernando
dc.contributor.departmentInstitute for Advanced Research in Business and Economics - INARBEen
dc.contributor.funderUniversidad Pública de Navarra / Nafarroako Unibertsitate Publikoaes
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-16T08:25:53Z
dc.date.available2023-03-16T08:25:53Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.date.updated2023-03-15T10:31:45Z
dc.description.abstractMarket myopia is a behavioural bias that causes investors to overvalue short-term earnings and undervalue long-term profits. This anomaly should not be compatible with sustainability disclosure mechanisms, the set of tools which firms use for reporting on their sustainable practices, and which contribute towards long-term performance improvements. Our aim is to study whether market myopia, as a symptom of market inefficiency, decreases with the implementation of sustainability disclosure mechanisms. We test for the presence of market myopia in a sample of firms listed on the S&P Europe 350 Index. For this purpose, we propose to use an adaptation of the valuation model for residual income under linear information dynamics developed by Felthan and Ohlson. Using the rating provided by RobecoSAM Sustainability Yearbook, we find market myopia to be less prevalent in companies classified as high sustainability reporters. An association is also found between persistent enforcement of sustainability disclosure mechanisms and a reduction of the market myopia effect.en
dc.description.sponsorshipGrant PID2019- 104304GB-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/ 10.13039/501100011033 and grant TED2021-131216B-I00 funded by MCIN/AEI/10.130 39/501100011033 and European Union “NextGenerationEU”/PRTR. Open access funding provided by Universidad Pública de Navarra.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationDel-Río, C., López-Arceiz, F. J., Muga, L. (2023) Do sustainability disclosure mechanisms reduce market myopia? Evidence from European sustainability companies. International Review of Financial Analysis, 87, 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102600.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102600
dc.identifier.issn1057-5219
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/44919
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Review of Financial Analysis 87 (2023 ) 1-14en
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-104304GB-I00/ES/en
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2021-2023/TED2021-131216B-I00en
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102600
dc.rights© 2023 The Authors. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license.en
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectSustainability disclosureen
dc.subjectMarket myopiaen
dc.subjectCorporate sustainabilityen
dc.titleDo sustainability disclosure mechanisms reduce market myopia? Evidence from European sustainability companiesen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.versionVersión publicada / Argitaratu den bertsioaes
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionen
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication887be713-5d9d-4a01-8541-83181a6a58a6
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery53677d13-5a4f-477a-916d-d304440983f4

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