On financial frictions and firm's market power

dc.contributor.authorCasares Polo, Miguel
dc.contributor.authorDeidda, Luca
dc.contributor.authorGaldón Sánchez, José Enrique
dc.contributor.departmentEconomíaes_ES
dc.contributor.departmentEkonomiaeu
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-04T09:56:47Z
dc.date.available2024-03-12T00:00:08Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.date.updated2023-07-04T09:42:38Z
dc.description.abstractThere are two opposing welfare effects of market power in a model with monopolistic competition, loan defaults and moral hazard. The loss of output produced if firms set a higher mark-up over marginal costs confronts with some gain due to higher expected profits and the reduction of defaults. Such tradeoff results in an optimal level of market power that decreases with the efficiency of liquidation following default on a loan. If moral hazard is pervasive, credit rationing cuts down the default rates and mitigates the welfare cost of financial frictions.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors thank Banco de España for financial support through the project. Política monetaria en economías con fricciones financieras y bancarias. Miguel Casares and Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez also acknowledge financial support from Spanish State Research Agency through project PID2021-127119NB-I00 and by “ERDF A way of making Europe”. Luca G. Deidda also acknowledges the financial support by the Italian Ministero dell’Università (Grant No. 20157NH5TP), Fondazione di Sardegna, Università di Sassari (Una tantum 2019), and RAS (Grant No. RASSR89213).en
dc.embargo.lift2024-03-12
dc.embargo.terms2024-03-12
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationCasares, M., Deidda, L. G., & Galdon‐Sanchez, J. E. (2023). On financial frictions and firm’s market power. Economic Inquiry, ecin.13146. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13146en
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/ecin.13146
dc.identifier.issn0095-2583
dc.identifier.urihttps://academica-e.unavarra.es/handle/2454/45730
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.ispartofEconomic Inquiry 2023;1–24en
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2021-2023/PID2021-127119NB-I00/
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13146
dc.rights© 2023 Western Economic Association International.en
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectCredit rationingen
dc.subjectLoan defaultsen
dc.subjectMarket poweren
dc.titleOn financial frictions and firm's market poweren
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication308e2f24-fee5-4ddb-be38-6e7a11cabf44
relation.isAuthorOfPublication3f7a9508-2d51-4cee-bf85-05eb852beb4f
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery308e2f24-fee5-4ddb-be38-6e7a11cabf44

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